The necessity that the plaintiffs should join this association is not so great, nor is its relation to the rights of the defendants, as compared with the right of the plaintiffs to be free from molestation, such as to bring the acts of the defendants under the shelter of the principles of trade competition. Such acts are without justification, and therefore are malicious and unlawful, and the conspiracy thus to force the plaintiffs was unlawful. Such conduct is intolerable, and inconsistent with the spirit of our laws.
The language used by this court in Carew v. Rutherford, 106 Mass. 1, 15, may be repeated here with emphasis, as applicable to this case: “The acts alleged and proved in this case are peculiarly offensive to the free principles which prevail in this country; and if such practices could enjoy impunity, they would tend to establish a tyranny of irresponsible persons over labor and mechanical business which would be extremely injurious to both.” See, in addition to the authorities above cited, Commonwealth v. Hunt, 4 Met. 111; Sherry v. Perkins, 147 Mass. 212, 214; Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 97; St. 1894, c. 508, § 2;[[612]] State v. Donaldson, 3 Vroom, 151; State v. Stewart, 59 Vt. 273; State v. Glidden, 55 Conn. 46; State v. Dyer, 67 Vt. 690; Lucke v. Clothing Cutters & Trimmers’ Assembly, 77 Md. 396.
As the plaintiffs have been injured by these acts, and there is reason to believe that the defendants contemplate further proceedings of the same kind which will be likely still more to injure the plaintiffs, a bill in equity lies to enjoin the defendants. Vegelahn v. Guntner, ubi supra.
Some phases of the labor question have recently been discussed in the very elaborately considered case of Allen v. Flood, ubi supra. Whether or not the decision made therein is inconsistent with the propositions upon which we base our decision in this case, we are not disposed, in view of the circumstances under which that decision was made, to follow it. We prefer the view expressed by the dissenting judges, which view, it may be remarked, was entertained not only by three of the nine lords who sat in the case, but also by the great majority of the common law judges who had occasion officially to express an opinion.
There must be, therefore, a decree for the plaintiffs. We think, however, that the clause, “or by causing or attempting to cause, any person to discriminate against any employer of members of plaintiffs’ said association (because he is such employer) in giving or allowing the performance of contracts to or by such employer,” is too broad and indefinite, inasmuch as it might seem to include mere lawful persuasion and other similar and peaceful acts; and for that reason, and also because so far as respects unlawful acts it seems to cover only such acts as are prohibited by other parts of the decree, we think it should be omitted.
Inasmuch as the association of the defendants is not a corporation, an injunction cannot be issued against it as such, but only against its members, their agents and servants.
As thus modified, in the opinion of the majority of the court, the decree should stand.
Decree accordingly.
Holmes, C. J. When a question has been decided by the court, I think it proper, as a general rule, that a dissenting judge, however strong his convictions may be, should thereafter accept the law from the majority and leave the remedy to the Legislature, if that body sees fit to interfere. If the decision in the present case simply had relied upon Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, I should have hesitated to say anything, although I might have stated that my personal opinion had not been weakened by the substantial agreement with my views to be found in the judgments of the majority of the House of Lords in Allen v. Flood, [1898] A. C. 1. But much to my satisfaction, if I may say so, the court has seen fit to adopt the mode of approaching the question which I believe to be the correct one, and to open an issue which otherwise I might have thought closed. The difference between my brethren and me now seems to be a difference of degree, and the line of reasoning followed makes it proper for me to explain where the difference lies.