Boarding moving car: Central R. Co. v. Hingson, 186 Ala. 40; South Chicago R. Co. v. Dufresne, 200 Ill. 456; Chicago Traction Co. v. Lundahl, 215 Ill. 289; Pence v. Wabash R. Co., 116 Ia. 279; Jonas v. South Covington R. Co., 162 Ky. 171; Mabry v. Boston R. Co., 214 Mass. 463; Foley v. Detroit R. Co., 179 Mich. 586; Hull v. Minneapolis R. Co., 116 Minn. 349; Nolan v. Metropolitan R. Co., 250 Mo. 602.
Standing on platform or running board: Texas R. Co. v. Lacey, 185 Fed. 225; Central R. Co. v. Brown, 165 Ala. 493; Holloway v. Pasadena R. Co., 130 Cal. 177; Augusta R. Co. v. Snider, 118 Ga. 146; Chicago R. Co. v. Newell, 212 Ill. 332; Math v. Chicago R. Co., 243 Ill. 114; Louisville R. Co. v. Stillwell, 142 Ky. 330; Blair v. Lewiston R. Co., 110 Me. 235; Olund v. Worcester R. Co., 206 Mass. 544; Heshion v. Boston R. Co., 208 Mass. 117; Wheeler v. Boston R. Co., 220 Mass. 298; Lacey v. Minneapolis R. Co., 118 Minn. 301; Setzler v. Metropolitan R. Co., 227 Mo. 454; Trussell v. Traction Co., 79 N. J. Law, 533; Ward v. International R. Co., 206 N. Y. 83; Edwards v. New Jersey R. Co., 144 App. Div. 554; Germantown R. Co. v. Walling, 97 Pa. St. 55; Brice v. Southern R. Co., 85 S. C. 216.
Part of body protruding from car: Georgetown R. Co. v. Smith, 25 App. D. C. 259; Clerc v. Morgan’s R. Co., 107 La. 370; Lange v. Metropolitan R. Co., 151 Mo. App. 500; Kuttner v. Central R. Co., 80 N. J. Law, 11; Goller v. Fonda R. Co., 110 App. Div. 620.
[94]. But see L. R. 6 Q. B. 760–761.
[95]. Arguments omitted; also the concurring opinion of Lush, J., and the dissenting opinion of Hannen, J.
[96]. Affirmed in the Exchequer Chamber, L. R. 6 Q. B. 759.
Byrne v. Boadle, 2 H. & C. 722; Scott v. London Docks Co., 3 H. & C. 596; Skinner v. London R. Co., 5 Ex. 787; The Joseph D. Thomas, 81 Fed. 578; Hastorf v. Hudson River Co., 110 Fed. 669; Cincinnati R. Co. v. South Fork Coal Co., 139 Fed. 528; Kahn v. Cap Co., 139 Cal. 340; Armour v. Golkowska, 202 Ill. 144; Talge v. Hockett, 55 Ind. App. 303; Nicoll v. Sweet, 163 Ia. 683; Melvin v. Pennsylvania Steel Co., 180 Mass. 196; Hull v. Berkshire R. Co., 217 Mass. 361; Cleary v. Cavanaugh, 219 Mass. 281; Scharff v. Southern Construction Co., 115 Mo. App. 157; Pratt v. Missouri R. Co., 139 Mo. App. 502; Mullen v. St. John, 57 N. Y. 567; Wolf v. American Society, 164 N. Y. 30; Griffen v. Manice, 166 N. Y. 188; Kennedy v. McAllaster, 31 App. Div. 453; Scheider v. American Bridge Co., 78 App. Div. 163; Travers v. Murray, 87 App. Div. 552; Connor v. Koch, 89 App. Div. 33; Larkin v. Reid Co., 161 App. Div. 77; Papazian v. Baumgartner, 49 Misc. 244; Barnes v. Automobile Co., 32 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 233; Muskogee Traction Co. v. McIntire, 37 Okl. 684; Edwards v. Manufacturers’ Co., 27 R. I. 248; Patterson v. Brewing Co., 16 S. D. 33; Richmond R. Co. v. Hudgins, 100 Va. 409; Gibson v. Chicago R. Co., 61 Wash. 639; Carroll v. Chicago R. Co., 99 Wis. 399; Klitzke v. Webb, 120 Wis. 254; Schmidt v. Johnson Co., 145 Wis. 49; Snyder v. Wheeling Electrical Co., 43 W. Va. 661 Accord.
Where the declaration alleges negligence and sets forth the nature and particulars of the accident but not the particulars of the alleged negligence, plaintiff may rely upon this doctrine, if the accident is of such a kind as to indicate that it would not have happened without negligence on the part of the defendant. James v. Boston R. Co., 204 Mass. 158.
The doctrine applies only in the absence of explanation. Cook v. Newhall, 213 Mass. 392. The inference may be met by defendant’s showing the real cause of the accident. Nawrocki v. Chicago R. Co., 156 Ill. App. 563; Parsons v. Hecla Iron Works, 186 Mass. 221; Cohen v. Farmers’ Co., 70 Misc. 548; Stearns v. Spinning Co., 184 Pa. St. 519; Scarpelli v. Washington Power Co., 63 Wash. 18. By plaintiff showing by his own witnesses just how the accident happened. Buckland v. New York R. Co., 181 Mass. 3. Or by defendant’s showing that reasonable care was employed to prevent all probable sources of accident. Thompson v. St. Louis R. Co., 243 Mo. 336, 355; Sweeney v. Edison Co., 158 App. Div. 449.
“There are many cases that hold that an unexplained accident with a machine, not liable to occur if such machine was properly constructed and in a proper state of repair, is evidence of negligence; as in Spaulding v. C. & N. W. R. Co., 30 Wis. 110, where it was held that the escape of fire from a passing locomotive engine, sufficient to cause damage, raised a presumption of improper construction or insufficient repair or negligent handling of such engine. To the same effect are Cummings v. Nat. Furnace Co., 60 Wis. 603; Kurz & Huttenlocher Ice Co. v. M. & N. R. Co., 84 Wis. 171; Stacy v. M., L. S. & W. R. Co., 85 Wis. 225; Mullen v. St. John, 57 N. Y. 567; Volkmar v. Manhattan R. Co., 134 N. Y. 418; McCarragher v. Rogers, 120 N. Y. 526, and many others that might be cited. Such cases lay down a very well-recognized principle in the law of negligence, but do not ... conflict in the slightest degree with numerous authorities that go on another principle, just as well-recognized and firmly established, to the effect that undisputed proof of freedom of the machine from all discoverable defects, either in construction or repair, effectually overcomes any mere inference or presumption arising from the happening of the accident, so as to leave no question in that regard for the jury; as in Spaulding v. C. & N. W. R. Co., 33 Wis. 582, where this court held the inference that a locomotive engine was defective, arising merely from the escape of fire therefrom sufficient to cause damage, rebutted by conclusive proof that the engine was free from discoverable defects, so as to leave nothing on that point for the consideration of a jury.” Marshall, J., Vorbrich v. Geuder Co., 96 Wis. 277, 284. See Green v. Urban Constructing Co., 106 App. Div. 460 Accord.