[198]. Printed papers in the case.
[199]. L. R. 9 Ex. 71.
[200]. L. R. 10 Ex. 700.
[201]. Arguments of counsel are omitted.
[202]. L. R. 9 Ex. at 72.
[203]. See also Cayzer v. Carron, 9 App. Cas. 873; McDermaid v. Edinburgh Tramways Co., 22 Sc. L. R. 13.
[204]. Only a portion of the opinion is printed.
[205]. This opinion of Carpenter, J., was given in the Circuit Court; and was quoted by Moore, J., in his dissenting opinion in the Supreme Court.
[206]. “We shall immediately see, moreover, that independent negligent acts of A and B may both be proximate in respect of harm suffered by Z, though either of them, if committed by Z himself, would have prevented him from having any remedy for the other. Thus it appears that the term ‘proximate’ is not used in precisely the same sense in fixing a negligent defendant’s liability and a negligent plaintiff’s disability.” Pollock, Torts, 6th ed. 447.
“... In determining whether the cause of the accident is proximate or remote, the same test must be applied to the conduct of the injured party as is to be applied to the defendant. The conduct of the latter cannot be judged by one rule and that of the former by some other rule.”—O’Brien, J., in Rider v. Syracuse R. Co., 171 N. Y. 139, 154.