[423]. Phillips v. Bradshaw, 167 Ala. 199; Allen v. Fincher, 187 Ala. 599; Pouchan v. Godeau, 167 Cal. 692; United Mine Workers v. Cromer, 159 Ky. 605; Tawney v. Simonson, 109 Minn. 341; Sweaas v. Evenson, 110 Minn. 304; Vanloon v. Vanloon, 159 Mo. App. 255; Jones v. Banner, 172 Mo. App. 132; Bigley v. National Fidelity Co., 94 Neb. 813; Phillips v. Barber, 7 Wend. 439; Church v. New York Tribune Ass’n, 135 App. Div. 30; Rossiter v. New York Press Co., 141 App. Div. 339; Spencer v. Minnick, 41 Okl. 613; McGeary v. Leader Pub. Co., 52 Pa. Super. Ct. 35; Lehmann v. Medack, (Tex. Civ. App.) 152 S. W. 438 Accord. Compare Marshall v. Chicago Herald Co., 185 Ill. App. 224; Willfred Coal Co. v. Sapp, 193 Ill. App. 400; Sweet v. Post Pub. Co., 215 Mass. 450; Corr v. Sun Printing & Pub. Ass’n, 177 N. Y. 131. But see M. v. J., 164 Wis. 39.
A lunatic is liable for torts generally and also for a libel. Mordaunt v. Mordaunt, 39 L. J. Pr. & M. 57, 59. But it is another illustration of the rule of the principal case that defamatory words spoken by a lunatic whose insanity was obvious or known to all the hearers, are not actionable. Yeates v. Reed, 4 Blackf. 463; Irvine v. Gibson, 117 Ky. 306; Dickinson v. Barber, 9 Mass. 225, 227; Bryant v. Jackson, 6 Humph. 199. So also of words spoken and understood as a jest. Donoghue v. Hayes, Hayes, 265. Drunkenness is no defence. Kendrick v. Hopkins, Cary, 133; Gates v. Meredith, 7 Ind. 440.
The old rule of construing defamatory statements in mitiori sensu was long ago exploded. See Odgers, Libel & Slander (5 ed.), 111–113.
Explanation of words by context, see Deitchman v. Bowles, 166 Ky. 285; McCurda v. Lewiston Journal Co., 109 Me. 53; Wing v. Wing, 66 Me. 62; Larsen v. Brooklyn Eagle, 165 App. Div. 4; Guenther v. Ridgway Co., 170 App. Div. 725; Eddy v. Cunningham, 69 Wash. 544; Leuch v. Berger, 161 Wis. 564.
[424]. Only the opinion of the court is given.
[425]. Massee v. Williams, (C. C. A.) 207 Fed. 222; Ivie v. King, 167 N. C. 174; Olympia Waterworks v. Mottman, 88 Wash. 694 Accord. See Ex parte Nelson, 251 Mo. 63.
[426]. A portion of the opinion is omitted.
[427]. The article was as follows: “He Waxed Eloquent. H. P. Hanson fined ten dollars for refusing payment of car fare.... H. P. Hanson, a real estate and insurance broker of South Boston, emerged from the seething mass of humanity that filled the dock and indulged in a wordy bout with policeman Hogan, who claimed to have arrested Hanson on the charge of evading car fare and being drunk at the same time. The judge agreed that the prisoner was sober, but on the charge of evasion of car fare the evidence warranted the fining of the eloquent occupant of the dock ten dollars without costs, which he paid.”
[428]. The opinion of the dissenting judges is supported by the decisions and dicta in other jurisdictions. Butler v. Barret, 130 Fed. 944 (semble); Every Evening Co. v. Butler, 144 Fed. 916; Taylor v. Hearst, 107 Cal. 262; Hulbert v. New Co., 111 Ia. 490; Davis v. Marxhausen, 86 Mich. 281, 103 Mich. 315 (semble); Clark v. North American Co., 203 Pa. St. 346 (semble); Hutchinson v. Robinson, 21 N. S. W. L. R. (Law) 130 (semble). Compare Newton v. Grubbs, 155 Ky. 479; Ellis v. Brockton Pub. Co., 198 Mass. 538; Dunlop v. Sundberg, 55 Wash. 609.
[429]. Compare Gandia v. Pettingill, 222 U. S. 452; Van Wiginton v. Pulitzer Pub. Co., (C. C. A.) 218 Fed. 795; Jones v. R. L. Polk & Co., 190 Ala. 243 (publishing of white woman that she is colored); Ball v. Evening American Co., 237 Ill. 592; MacIntyre v. Fruchter, 148 N. Y. Suppl. 786 (“fit only for negroes to associate with”); Spencer v. Looney, 116 Va. 767 (assertion of white person that he was colored); Galveston Tribune v. Guisti, (Tex. Civ. App.) 134 S. W. 239.