“We cannot accept the absolute and unqualified privilege laid down in Munster v. Lamb.... We cannot agree with Brett, M. R., that in a suit against counsel for slander the only inquiry is whether the words were spoken in a judicial proceeding, and if so, the case must be stopped. We quite agree however, with Bramwell, J. A., in Seaman v. Netherclift, that ‘relevant’ and ‘pertinent’ are not the best words that could be used. These words have in a measure a technical meaning, and we all know the difficulty in determining in some cases what is relevant or pertinent. With Lord Chancellor Cairns we prefer the words ‘having reference’ or ‘made with reference,’ or in the language of Shaw, C. J., ‘having relation to the cause or subject-matter.’ And if counsel in the trial of a cause maliciously slanders a party, or witness or any other person in regard to a matter that has no reference or relation to, or connection with, the case before the Court, he is and ought to be answerable in an action by the party injured. This qualification of his privilege in no manner impairs the freedom of discussion so necessary to the proper administration of the law, nor does it subject counsel to actions for slander except in cases in which upon reason and sound public policy he ought to be held answerable. We cannot agree that for the abuse of his privilege he is amenable only to the authority of the Court. Mere punishment by the Court is no recompense to one who has thus been maliciously and wantonly slandered.” Robinson, J., in Maulsby v. Reifsnider, 69 Md. 143, 162. La Porta v. Leonard, 88 N. J. Law, 663; Andrews v. Gardiner, 165 App. Div. 595 Accord.
Defamatory statements in brief of counsel. Brooks v. Bank of Acadia, 138 La. 657.
Pleadings. Nalle v. Oyster, 230 U. S. 165; Carpenter v. Grimes Min. Co., 19 Idaho, 384; Hess v. McKee, 150 Ia. 409; Lebovitch v. Levy, 128 La. 518; Flynn v. Boglarsky, 164 Mich. 513; Rosenberg v. Dworetsky, 139 App. Div. 517; Harris v. Santa Fé Townsite Co., (Tex. Civ. App.) 125 S. W. 77.
In England, statements in a pleading are absolutely privileged, though not relevant. Hodson v. Pare, [1899] 1 Q. B. 455.
In the United States, statements in a pleading not pertinent to the action are not privileged. Union Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 83 Fed. 803; King v. McKissick, 126 Fed. 215; Potter v. Troy, 175 Fed. 128; Myers v. Hodges, 53 Fla. 197; Gaines v. Aetna Ins. Co., 104 Ky. 695; Jones v. Brownlee, 161 Mo. 258; Gilbert v. People, 1 Denio, 41; Kemper v. Fort, 219 Pa. St. 85; Crockett v. McLanahan, 109 Tenn. 517; Miller v. Gust, 71 Wash. 139.
Charges in disbarment proceedings, see Preusser v. Faulhaber, 33 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 312.
Statements in a petition for pardon. Connollee v. Blanton, (Tex. Ci v. App.) 163 S. W. 404 (held absolutely privileged).
Statement by defendant on trial for crime. Nelson v. Davis, 9 Ga. App. 131.
In Louisiana the statements of parties in judicial proceedings are not absolutely privileged. Lescale v. Joseph Schwartz Co., 116 La. 293, 118 La. 718; Dunn v. Southern Co., 116 La. 431.
[458]. The arguments and the opinion of Amphlett, J. A., are omitted.