The III Corps (Lt.-Gen. Sir W. Pulteney) was on the right, and consisted of the 12th, 20th, and 6th Divisions, which attacked in the order named. The left corps (IV) consisted of the 51st and 62nd Divisions. These covered the six miles with an average frontage of one and a half miles. The 6th Division attacked on the front Villers Plouich-Beaucamps, with the 71st Infantry Brigade (Brig.-Gen. P. W. Brown) on the left next to the 51st Division, the 16th Infantry Brigade (Brig.-Gen. H. A. Walker) on the right next to the 20th Division. These two brigades were to advance about 3,000 yards to the first objective (Ribécourt and spur to south-east of it), and another 1,000 yards to the second objective (support system). The 18th Infantry Brigade (Brig.-Gen. G. S. G. Craufurd) was ordered to advance through the 71st Infantry Brigade and secure the third objective about a mile farther on (Premy Chapel Ridge), throwing back a defensive flank towards Flesquières for the further operations of the 51st Division on its left and securing the flank of the 29th Division on its right. The latter division passing through the right of the 6th Division and the left of the 20th Division, was charged with securing the crossings of the St. Quentin Canal at Marcoing and Masnières and seizing the high ground at Rumilly, thus facilitating exploitation to the south-east, preventing a concentration against the widely stretched defensive flanks of the III Corps and threatening Cambrai.
The Divisional Artillery was reinforced during the first part of the operations by the 17th Brigade of the 29th Division and the 181st Brigade of the 40th Division, as well as by two R.H.A. Brigades. Batteries moved into position and camouflaged their guns. No registration could, of course, take place, but long practice enabled the gunners to put down a very accurate barrage without this desideratum.
Opposite the Division the Hindenburg Line commenced with an outpost line 750 yards distant on the left and 250 yards on the right. This was out of sight of our front trenches by reason of the curve of the ground. Half a mile behind this came the main system, consisting of two trenches 200 yards apart, the whole guarded by most formidable belts of wire about 150 yards in depth. The interval between outpost and main systems was sown with well-sighted and concealed machine gun positions. A mile farther on, and on the opposite side of the valley for the most part, ran the support system, similar to the main system. One and a half miles farther back again was the reserve system, of which only machine-gun dug-outs were completed, and a small amount of wire had been erected.
Two battalions of tanks, each of thirty-six tanks, were allotted to the Division. "B" Battalion (Lt.-Col. E. D. Bryce, D.S.O.) operated with the 16th Infantry Brigade, and "H" Battalion (Lt.-Col. Hon. C. Willoughby) with the 71st Infantry Brigade. The 18th Infantry Brigade advanced without tanks. The only points which caused anxiety, provided that the tanks functioned satisfactorily, were Couillet Wood on the right of the 16th Infantry Brigade front, in which tanks could not operate, and Ribécourt Village on the left of the 71st Infantry Brigade front.
The former was successfully cleared by the Buffs, and the latter gallantly captured by the 9th Norfolk Regiment; the 11th Essex clearing and securing it for the advance of the 18th Infantry Brigade, while the 71st Infantry Brigade attacked the second objective.
The 18th Infantry Brigade pushed through the 71st Infantry Brigade and secured Premy Chapel Ridge in good time, and rendered great assistance to the 51st Division on our left, who were held up at Flesquières by guns in the valley picking off the tanks one by one as they breasted the ridge. The West Yorks and the 2nd D.L.I. each charged over the Premy Ridge spur and captured a battery at the point of the bayonet.
At 3.15 p.m. the cavalry, who would have been of the greatest assistance in capturing the enemy guns holding up the 51st Division, reported that they could not advance owing to snipers in Ribécourt. The village had been in our possession since 10 a.m., and the 18th Infantry Brigade had passed through it at 11.30, and were now two miles beyond it. However, the cavalry pushed through patrols before nightfall to Nine Wood.
A company of the 9th Suffolk Regiment successfully carried out its mission of advancing without artillery or tank support, and capturing the bridge at Marcoing. The Division had a most successful day, with very light casualties (about 650), capturing 28 officers and 1,227 other ranks prisoners, 23 guns, and between 40 and 50 machine-guns and many trench-mortars, and receiving the congratulations of the Corps Commander. Everything had gone like clockwork: the artillery had pushed forward to advanced positions to cover the new front before darkness came on; the machine-guns, under Major Muller, D.M.G.O., were likewise established in their new forward positions, thanks to careful arrangements and the use of pack animals; and the 11th Leicesters, under Major Radford, were repairing and clearing the roads before the third objective had been secured. The tanks, which had made surprise possible, were most gallantly handled, and all arrangements most carefully thought out by Col. A. Courage, D.S.O.
The next morning the 51st Division captured Flesquières from the north, and three companies of the 14th D.L.I., moving forward slightly in advance of them and operating with a squadron of the Queen's Bays, entered Cantaing ahead of the 51st Division, handing over subsequently to the 4th Gordons.
The Buffs, with the assistance of the tanks, completed the clearing of Noyelles (a village some 2,500 yards north-east of Premy Chapel), which had been entered the previous day by the 29th Division, and relieved the latter there. On the night of the 26/27th November the 18th Infantry Brigade extended its left up to the south-east edge of Cantaing.