5. Resd. that a federal judiciary be established to consist of a supreme Tribunal the Judges of which to be appointed by the Executive, and to hold their offices during good behaviour, to receive punctually at stated times a fixed compensation for their services in which no increase or diminution shall be made, so as to affect the persons actually in office at the time of such increase or diminution; that the Judiciary so established shall have authority to hear and determine in the first instance on all impeachments of federal officers, and by way of appeal, in the dernier resort, in all cases touching the rights of Ambassadors, in all cases of captures from an enemy, in all cases of piracies and felonies on the high seas, in all cases in which foreigners may be interested, in the construction of any treaty or treaties, or which may arise on any of the Acts for regulation of trade, or the collection of the federal Revenue: that none of the Judiciary shall during the time they remain in Office be capable of receiving or holding any other office or appointment during their time of service, or for —— thereafter.
6. Resd. that all Acts of the U. States in Congs. made by virtue and in pursuance of the powers hereby and by the articles of confederation vested in them, and all Treaties made and ratified under the authority of the U. States shall be the supreme law of the respective States so far forth as those Acts or Treaties shall relate to the said States or their Citizens, and that the Judiciary of the several States shall be bound thereby in their decisions, any thing in the respective laws of the individual States to the contrary notwithstanding; and that if any State or any body of men in any State shall oppose or prevent the carrying into execution such acts or treaties, the federal Executive shall be authorized to call forth the power of the Confederated States, or so much thereof as may be necessary to enforce and compel an obedience to such Acts or an Observance of such Treaties.
7. Resd. that provision be made for the admission of new States into the Union.
8. Resd. the rule for naturalization ought to be the same in every State.
9. Resd. that a Citizen of one State committing an offence in another State of the Union, shall be deemed guilty of the sane offence as if it had been committed by a Citizen of the State in which the Offence was committed.
Adjourned
159. Hamilton's Plan
On June 18, Hamilton occupied nearly the whole session with an argument for a government stronger and more centralized even than the Virginia Plan—to meet the advocates of the New Jersey Plan by taking high ground. During this address he presented his own Plan (not what he thought attainable, but desirable). The paper given below (from Hamilton's Works, Federalist edition, I, 401 ff.) seems to have been prepared to assist the delivery of this address, as a sort of brief. The address itself is reported by Madison (Journal, for June 18) much more at length, but with many of the same phrases. The student would do well to compare the two. Copious extracts from that speech, and from other words of Hamilton in the Convention, are quoted in American History and Government, § 200.
All communities divide themselves into the few and the many. The first are the rich and well-born; the other, the mass of the people. ... The people are turbulent and changing; they seldom judge or determine right. Give therefore to the first class [the few] a distinct permanent share in the government. They will check the unsteadiness of the second; and, as they cannot receive any advantage by a change, they therefore will ever maintain good government. ... Nothing but a permanent body can check the imprudence of democracy. Their turbulent and uncontrollable disposition requires checks....
It is admitted that you cannot have a good Executive upon a democratic plan. See the excellency of the British Executive. He is placed above temptation. He can have no distinct interests from the public welfare. Nothing short of such an executive can be efficient. ... Let one body of the Legislature be constituted during good behavior or life. Let one Executive be appointed who dares execute his powers. It may be asked: Is this a republican system? It is strictly so, as long as they remain elective. And let me observe that an Executive is less dangerous to the liberties of the people when in office during life, than for seven years. ... Let electors be appointed in each of the States to elect the Legislature, to consist of two branches; and I would give them [the national legislature] the unlimited power of passing all laws, without exception. The Assembly to be elected for three years by the people in districts. The Senate to be elected by electors to be chosen for that purpose by the people, and to remain in office during life. The Executive to have the power of negativing all laws; to make war and peace, with their [Senate's] advice, but to have sole direction of all military operations, and to send ambassadors, and appoint all military officers; and to pardon all offenders, treason excepted, unless by advice of the Senate ... Supreme judicial officers to be appointed by the Executive and the Senate.