THE BOER WAR
Source.—The Times History of the War in South Africa, 1899-1902, Vol. III, pp. 30-31, 34-35; Vol. IV, p. 428
The clash of interests in South Africa between settlers of Dutch and of British origin gave rise to much ill-feeling, and in 1899 Great Britain decided to annex the South African Colonies in order to protect the interests of her subjects. In the ensuing struggle the Colonies freely offered support, both moral and physical.
Of all the colonies the Australian ones were the most directly interested in the South African controversy. In view of the vast and increasing trade between Australia and the mother-country, the safety of the Cape route must always be a question of the very highest importance in the eyes of Australian statesmen. And apart from such considerations of contingent self-interest, Australians had strong personal feelings over the issue between Kruger and the Uitlanders. Australian miners formed no small section of the population of the Rand. Australians were under no illusions as to the idyllic character of the peasant-owners of the Transvaal. As soon as the crisis became acute, public meetings were held all over the Australian colonies to express sympathy with the Uitlanders and to support the attitude of the Imperial Government. The question of sending Australian contingents to join the Imperial forces in the event of a war was discussed at an early stage. The idea of active participation in the wars of the Empire was not altogether a new one. As far back as 1867 Tasmania had sent a contingent to assist the Imperial forces in the Maori war. More recently a body of New South Wales troops took part in the Sudan campaign of 1885. A little active service and much tedious waiting at Suakim was all they saw, and one might have imagined that in Australia the result had been to damp any inclination to repeat the performance. But the partial disappointment of 1885 made the Australians all the more eager to try again.
Between October 28 and November 5 the first Australian contingents sailed amidst the most enthusiastic popular demonstrations. They were officered and manned almost entirely by members of the various colonial volunteer forces, and thus possessed the advantage of a certain amount of initial training which was destined to stand them in good stead in the field. It should never be forgotten that their success was mainly due to the persistent effort of those officers, whether Imperial or colonial, who during the past twenty years had given their services to the development and organization of the colonial forces. It was the existence of these forces that kept up the military spirit in the colonies.
Small as was the force contributed by the Empire (nearly 80,000 men) it was none the less a material assistance, whose value can hardly be overrated. It practically doubled the mounted force, and thus made possible those sweeping movements by which Lord Roberts reached Pretoria. Above all, it gave the Imperial Government a moral support which enabled it to face with equanimity the almost universal hostility of the European powers or the fanatical outcries of a few anti-Imperialist partisans at home. Never, probably, in modern times has there been a greater consensus of honest opinion in support of a great national movement than that which backed up Britain's effort to maintain her position in South Africa. It was simply that the free citizens of free countries asked to be allowed to venture their lives for the sake of a political ideal which was personally and intimately dear to each one of them, and that, in spite of the paralysing absence of either precedent or preparation, many thousands actually achieved their desire. The war has not shown what the Empire can do, but it has revealed to those who perhaps doubted before, what an Empire we can make if we but choose.
ELANDS RIVER
Amongst varying fortunes and many indecisive actions, the defence of the position at Elands River stands out as an achievement only made possible by courage and grim determination.
For several weeks Colonel Hore, with a small garrison at Brakfontein on the Elands River, had been keeping up the connection between Mafeking and Zeerust, policing the district and forwarding on convoys to Rustenburg. At the beginning of August the force which he had for this purpose, as well as to guard a large store of supplies, consisted of 500 men, nearly all Imperial bushmen or Rhodesians, an old muzzle-loading seven-pounder, and two maxims. By this time Lord Roberts had determined that several isolated posts in the Western Transvaal, such as this one, which were in constant danger of attack, must be evacuated, and on August 1 ordered General Carrington to march to Elands River to cover Hore's retirement. But De la Rey, with three detachments of his troops under himself, Lemmer, and Steenekemp, each numbering about 300 men, and each with a gun and a pom-pom, and a maxim, had arrived there before him, and on the morning of August 4 had aroused Hore's camp by shell and rifle fire from the north-west, east, and south-east. The camp was on a small boulder-strewn kopje, in the centre of an amphitheatre about five acres in extent, and half a mile east of the river. Most of the men were on this central kopje, but two small hills on the bank of the river were held by detachments under Captain Butters and Lieutenant Zouch. Luckily, an attack had been expected, and stone sangars and shelters of ox-wagons had been made and further protected by biscuit boxes and bags of flour and sugar from the stores the men were guarding. Nevertheless the Boer attack seemed to have every chance in its favour; their guns were in safe positions 2,400 yards from the camp, and along the river banks they could creep close up to the defenders. Hore's old seven-pounder, though it succeeded in silencing a Boer gun, and killed a German gunner, was very capricious in its working, and was obviously no match for the Boer guns. The thousands of horses and oxen which were in the camp under no sort of cover were nearly all killed on the first day by the Boer shells; and the stench arising from these dead animals in the narrow camp makes it almost marvellous that the men who escaped the Boer shells were not killed by pestilence. Moreover, the only chance of getting water was to take the water carts down to the river at night, and then the drivers and escort were not always safe. To make matters worse, on the second day of the siege Carrington's advance scouts, after appearing on the rise to the west, were soon seen retiring again, so that rescue from this side seemed now out of the question. When starting, Carrington did not know that Hore was invested, so he carried very few rations. He no doubt had a small force with him and was badly off for supplies; but he had gained a ridge from which he commanded the way to Elands River, and under the circumstances of Hore's pressing danger he was too quickly discouraged from a more determined effort to bring out the garrison. From the east another attempt was made to relieve Hore which proved equally abortive.