MENTAL DISEASES.
BY CHARLES F. FOLSOM, M.D.
DEFINITIONS OF INSANITY.—The term insanity conveys quite different meanings to the community, to lawyers, and to physicians. From the three points of view its definition has been constantly widening for the past century. A great part of the alleged recent increase in insanity is due to the fact that its definition is applied to more people. Our insane asylums are more quiet and orderly, not only because of the more humane treatment of the inmates, but largely also because quieter and less insane people are now sent there than formerly. Doubtless the mistake is sometimes made of going so far, in zeal for science and philanthropy, as to make the definition of insanity too broad; and in a refined civilization the nice adjustment of complicated social relations, or even a fastidious taste, requires people to be sent to insane asylums who in simpler states of society would be cared for at home.1
1 The physician in general practice is referred to Clouston's Clinical Lectures on Mental Diseases, and to Part 1 of Spitzka's Manual of Insanity. For those who wish to study insanity thoroughly the literature is rich and its bibliography is readily available. Of many parts of the subject only an outline, of course, can be given within the limits of the present paper.
The popular idea of insanity is of wild, incoherent, or crazy conduct. If maniacal, the timid or frightened young girl who would not hurt a fly, and the tottering, harmless old man if confused and partly demented, are hurried off to the asylum with the use and show of force suitable for a desperate criminal, while the victim of overwhelming delusions, because he seems clear, logical, and collected, is vigorously defended against the physician's imputation of insanity until he commits an offence against the laws, when he is fortunate if he is not treated as a criminal. It is often impossible for judges, juries, counsel, and even medical experts, to wholly divest themselves of the popular notions of insanity in cases appealing strongly to the passion or prejudice of the day. Cases involving the question of responsibility for crime are decided against science and the evidence because of certain preconceived notions upon insanity which no amount of skilled opinion can controvert. Jurors, and less often judges, make up their minds what a sane man would do under given conditions, and of what an insane man is capable, judging from the facts within their own experience; and in forming their decisions it is the act itself, and not the man, diseased or otherwise, in connection with the act, that chiefly governs them. Often they are right, not seldom wrong. Strange, apparently purposeless, illogical, inconsistent action is frequently attributed to the author of it being insane on that subject, whereas he may be simply acting from strong impulse or emotion, and may be by no means insane. On the other hand, because a man knows right from wrong in the abstract, and can ordinarily behave well, the very characteristic workings of his insane mind are often seized upon as unquestionable proof of sanity, even when they admit of no other explanation to the skilled physician than that of insanity. There is no doubt of the fact that the whipping commonly used in the treatment of the insane by the monks several centuries ago put an end to much insane conduct; and in insane asylums now, in spite of the best efforts of the medical staff to the contrary, a brutal, bullying patient is sometimes struck by another patient or an attendant in return for some unusually exasperating and cruel conduct, with the result of making him behave well in the future. It is with reference to this class of cases that the crowd oftenest errs in its definition of insanity. Society claims a voice in the enforcement of the laws for its own protection, assuming to know who could control themselves from crime and who not, and naturally wishes the standard of responsibility to be kept high. Of course its sympathies and prejudices largely govern its voice in the matter.
With precisely the same degree of insanity and the same power to control their actions two murderers may be sentenced, one to death for an act where the motive and method were those of the criminal, and the other to an insane asylum for killing a person under circumstances which are not explainable by sane reasons. The Pocasset Adventist who sacrificed his loved child, as he thought, by the Lord's command, would probably have been hanged if he had committed a crime similar to John Brown's, Wilkes Booth's, Orsini's, or Guiteau's. Sometimes the accused gets the benefit of the doubt, and sometimes society, according to the view of the merits of the case taken by the judge in his charge or by the jury in their verdict.
To the lawyer insanity means only a condition of mind with reference to certain conduct. An insane man is simply non compos mentis. Insanity is irresponsibility. The whole question to the lawyer is with regard to a certain act or series of acts. The lawyer's definition is narrower than that of the physician. In wills and contracts the course is usually clearer than when there is a question of serious crime, and even an insane person in an asylum may be a party to a valid contract or make a will that will hold in law. It is not necessary that a will or contract be such as would be made by a just man or a reasonable man, but simply that it fairly represent the wishes and character of the man making it, uninfluenced by any insane delusion or prejudice caused by mental impairment; that the will or contract in itself bear evidence of a correct appreciation of the circumstances and conditions of the case; and that the mind be able to act independently enough, with a reasonable knowledge of the duties of the individual and the just rights of others. An unsound mind, as defined by the physician, would cover a large portion of the convicts in our workhouses and prisons to-day if they could be critically examined, but the lawyers and courts would not find many of them insane. A man is not insane in law unless his act is traceable to, or its nature has been determined by, mental disease affecting his free agency; in other words, unless insanity caused his act either wholly or in great part.