If the date of the place from whence this letter is written surprises you, let me refer you to my public despatch for all the wholesale reasons, and desire you to wait for the more detailed one till to-morrow evening, or probably Wednesday morning, when I hope we shall meet. Your private letter to me by Herslet, although on an uncomfortable subject, afforded me very great consolation; since I not only perceive you are prepared for my return, but prepared for it in a way which totally disperses the few apprehensions I had, lest my conduct, under the present circumstances, might not in every respect have met every approbation.

From what you say, I am now certain it will; and it gives me the more pleasure, from a consciousness that I never in my life acted more rightly.

I am too fatigued to go on to-night with the messengers, but we sail to-morrow at nine a.m.; and on the whole, I had rather you should read my story than hear it told by me. I have much to say to you, and to some others, but I should not like to hold forth before a Cabinet.

I am infinitely obliged to you (in the strict sense of the word) for your very friendly and attentive goodness in endeavouring to replace all that I lost by the cruel accident which has happened to poor Brooks. Your principal does not partake of this sort of feeling; and he has as few of this species of human imperfections as any being called human can pretend to.

Let us hear from you on our arrival. I shall drive at once to my own house, and if possible, before twelve o’clock on Wednesday.

I am, &c.
(Signed) Malmesbury.

Extract of a Despatch from Lord Malmesbury to Lord Grenville, Calais, 19th Sept., 1797.

There can be little doubt, from the language and manner of the French Plenipotentiaries, that there is a fixed determination on the part of the French Government to continue war with England; and that if in any part of their behaviour or conversation with me there appeared a contrary intention, it was solely with a view to avoid, if possible, that the odium of breaking off the Negotiation should be imputed entirely to them. They, however, have managed this with so very little ability—what they have done has been so positive, and what they have said so vague—that it is difficult even for the most prejudiced minds to entertain a doubt on this subject.

The whole of my official Correspondence since the event of the 4th of September will, I trust, have so far prepared your Lordship for what has now happened, that, although it may very justly cause concern, it will not create surprise. Disposed as I was to pay attention to whatever I heard from the late members of the French Legation, as well from their knowledge of their own country, as from my having, on every important point, always found their information correct, I could never allow my opinion to go with them on this particular point; and although the satisfaction of having judged rightly cannot, on an occasion like this, be very great, yet the not having misled your Lordship diminishes, to a certain degree, the regret I feel on having failed in the great end of my Mission.

It would be vain to search for any rational motive for such a conduct as the Directory have thought proper to adopt, or to endeavour to explain on what grounds they can prefer a hazardous and unpromising continuation of a war, become extremely unpopular, to an advantageous and honourable peace, and one which, I am confident, would have had the approbation of the whole French nation. The solution of this difficulty cannot be found either in the internal situation of France, or in its present relative position to other powers, but must be sought for in the daring and inconsiderate character of the two governing members of the Directory, Barras and Rewbell. The success which has attended their late very bold undertaking appears to have given them the most implicit confidence in their own abilities, and in the strength of their party; and they never at any time appeared to have any fixed system, or to look forward beyond the circumstances of the moment.