For the strength of France. It is at this day, the greatest united force of Christendom. The particulars in which it consists, are these. The shape of the country; which being round, no one part is far from succouring another. The multitude of good towns and places of strength therein are able to stay an army, if not to waste it; as Metz did the Emperor's. The mass of treasure which the King hath in the Bastille. The number of arsenals distributed upon the frontiers, besides that of Paris: all which are full of good arms and artillery. And for ready men, the five Regiments bestowed up and down in garrisons, together with the 2,000 of the Guard [and] the troops of Ordinary and Light Horse: all ever in pay. Besides their Gentry, all bred soldiers; of which they think there are, at this present, 50,000 fit to bear arms. And to command all these, they have, at this day, the best Generals of Christendom; which were the only commodity the Civil Wars did leave them.
The weaknesses of it are, First, the want of a sufficient Infantry, which proceeds from the ill distribution of their wealth: for the peasant having no share allowed him, is heartless and feeble; and consequently unserviceable for all military uses. By reason of which, they are, first, forced to borrow aid of the Switzers at a great charge; and secondly, to compose their armies, for the most part, of Gentlemen: which makes the loss of a battle there almost irrecoverable. The Second, is the unproportionable part of the land which the Church holds, all which is likewise dead to military uses: for as they say there, "The Church will lose nothing, nor defend nothing." The Third, is the want of a competent number of ships and galleys: by reason of which defect, first, the Spaniard overmasters them upon the Mediterranean, and the English and Hollander upon the Ocean; and secondly, it renders them poor in foreign trade; so that, all the great actions of Christendom for these fifty years having been bent upon the [West] Indies, they, only, have sat idle. The Fourth, is the weakness of their frontiers: which is so much the more dangerous because they are possessed, all but the Ocean, by the Spaniard; for Savoy hath been always as his own, for all uses against France. The Last, is the difference of religion among themselves; which will ever yield matter of civil dissension, and consequently cause the weaker to stand in need of foreign succours.
The ordinary revenue of the King is, as they say now, some 14,000,000 of crowns [= £4,200,000 sterling, or in present value, about £18,000,000]; which arise principally from the domains of the Crown, the gabel of salt, tallies [taxes] upon the country, customs upon the merchandise, sale of offices, the yearly tithe of all that belongs to the Church, the rising and falling of money, fines and confiscations cast upon him by the law: but as for Wardships, they are only known in Normandy.
His expense is, chiefly, Ambassadors, munition, building, fortifying, and maintaining of galleys, (as for ships when he needs them, he makes an embarque [embargo]); in pay for soldiers, wages for officers, pensions at home and abroad; upon the entertaining his House, his State, and his private pleasures. And all the first, but the domains, were granted in the beginning upon some urgent occasion; and afterwards by Kings made perpetual, the occasion ceasing: and the domains themselves granted because the King should live upon his own without oppressing his subjects. But at this day, though the revenue be thus great, and the taxes unsupportable; yet do they little more than serve for necessary public uses. For the King of Spain's greatness and neighbourhood forceth the King there to live continually upon his guard: and the treasure which the Spaniard receives from his Indies, constrains him to raise his revenue thus by taxes, so to be able, in some proportion, to bear up against him; for fear, else, he should be bought out of all his confederates and servants.
For the relation of this State to others. It is first to be considered that this part of Christendom is balanced betwixt the three Kings of Spain, France, and England; as the other part [is] betwixt the Russian, the Kings of Poland, Sweden, and Denmark. For as for Germany, which if it were entirely subject to one Monarchy, would be terrible to all the rest: so being divided betwixt so many Princes and those of so equal power, it serves only to balance itself, and entertain easy war with the Turk; while the Persian withholds him in a greater. And every one of those first three hath his particular strength, and his particular weakness. Spain hath the advantage of both the rest in treasure, but is defective in men: his dominions are scattered and the conveyance of his treasure from the Indies lies obnoxious to [at the mercy of] the power of any nation that is stronger by sea. France abounds with men, lies close together, and hath money sufficiently. England, being an island, is hard to be invaded, abounds with men, but wants money to employ them. For their particular [several] weakness, Spain is to be kept busy in the Low Countries, France to be afflicted with the Protestants, and England, in Ireland. England is not able to subsist against any [either] of the other [two] hand in hand; but joined with the Low Countries it can give law to both by sea: joined with either of them two, it is able to oppress the third, as Henry VIII. did.
Now the only entire body in Christendom that makes head against the Spanish Monarchy is France: and therefore they say in France, that, "The day of the ruin of France is the eve of the ruin of England." And thereupon England hath ever, since the Spanish greatness, inclined rather to maintain France, rather than to ruin it: as when King Francis [I.] was taken prisoner, the King of England lent money towards the payment of his ransom; and the late Queen [Elizabeth], when the Leaguers, after the Duke of Guise's death, had a design to Cantonize France, though offered a part of that country, would not consent. So then, this reason of State, of mutual preservation, conjoining them; England may be accounted a sure confederate of France; and Holland, by reason it partly subsists by it; the Protestant Princes of Germany, because they have countenance from it, against the house of Austria; the Protestant Switzers, for religion and money; and the Venetians, for protection against the Spaniard in Italy. So that all their [the French's] friends are either Protestants or inclining thereto; and whosoever is extremely Catholic is their enemy, and factor for the Spanish Monarchy: as the Pope and Cardinals, for the most part; and totally, the Jesuits, the Catholic Princes of Germany, and the Catholics of England and Ireland. For the Jesuits, which are the Ecclesiastical Strength of Christendom, France—notwithstanding the many late obligations—hath cause to despair of them. For they intending as "one Pope, so one King" to suppress the Protestants; and for the better support of Christendom against the Turks: and seeing Spain the likelier to bring this to pass, they follow the nearer probability of effecting their end.
No addition could make France so dangerous to us, as that of our Low Countries; for so it were worse, than if the Spaniard himself had them entirely. As for their hopes of regaining Italy; it concerns the Spaniard immediately, rather than us.
Concerning the state of the Protestants in France. During peace, they are protected by their Edict [of Nantes]. For their two Agents at Court defend the general from wrong; and their chambres impartis every particular person. And if troubles should arise, some scattered particulars might be in danger; but the main body is safe. Safe to defend themselves, though all France join against them! and if it break out into factions, the safest; because they are both ready and united.