It was found, also, that even in the case of most experienced pilots, who had been flying fast machines overseas, great advantage was secured by taking the course, since it was required that they depend to a much greater extent upon correct flying, far more skill being required to do higher manoeuvres on a low-powered machine.
The dual time put in by instructors who passed out for wing duty was reduced from fourteen hours to eight hours in the course of four or five months, as a result of better instruction at the wings, this being indirectly due to the fact that the instructors under whom they had flown in each squadron had themselves been through the Armour Heights course. It was found that three hours’ solo to one hour of dual instruction was most advantageous.
The above notes give very baldly an outline of the purpose of the School, and it will be found necessary to take them in conjunction with the chapter on the [Armour Heights system] in order that the essential elements of this tuition may be fully realized.
[FLYING ACCIDENTS.]
The “crash” diagram is, after all, the most definite and conclusive record of the success or failure of any system of flying instruction. Its facts are incontrovertible.
During the earlier period of the history of the Corps in Canada, there was, of course, in use a constantly broadening system whereby the details of all aerial accidents were instantly forwarded to headquarters. It was not, however, until the Armour Heights method had been in definite operation for some months that it became possible to re-analyse the then existing procedure in the light of new knowledge, and evolve a form of records which completely reflected all the various instrumentalities which required diagnosis.
This statement carries no reflection on either the instructors or the methods of instruction pertaining to the first year’s operation of the unit. As in all its other activities, out of experience came knowledge, the application of which was instantly undertaken. We find, then, that during the summer of 1918 not only were the salient features of the crash carefully investigated, but also all those possibly contributory causes in some one of which will almost certainly be found some vitally important feature.
The first procedure was to classify the crash. The method adopted will be seen in the index of the graph on [page 229]. Prior, however, to this classification, which of course is only established by means of close technical examination of the damaged machine, the unit to which the machine belonged sent to headquarters by telegraph or telephone, whichever was the faster, the following information:—