A TEXAS CRASH.
AT DESERONTO.
AT DESERONTO.
R.A.F. Can.—Crashes According to Causes
Total Crashes 174
It is important that “brain fatigue” should be sharply separated from “fear.” The latter is rarely experienced in the air on the first few solo flights, the pilot’s mind being far too much concerned with the details of flying, watching the various instruments, and in checking his position and direction in the air relative to the ground. Many confess to a lurking sense of danger, but all say that it rarely if ever asserts itself.
Turning again to the graph on [page 218], and now keeping in mind the classification of crashes, it is interesting to note that, owing to the introduction of the Armour Heights system, crashes in which the machine is totally wrecked were reduced from 53 in the month of June to 21 in part of the month of November. “B” and “C” crashes in which longerons are broken, were reduced from 43 in June to 12 in November. “D” crashes, which are those affecting only the undercarriage or planes, and are usually due to rough ground being insufficiently allowed for, or too late a pull back on the control ere the machine comes into contact with the earth, fell from 107 to 16. While the general reduction is most gratifying, the improvement in the acquirement of a delicate control necessary to make workmanlike landings is remarkable.
It will be observed that although training was continually being intensified, fatalities decreased from 1 in 1,760 hours’ flying in July 1918, to 1 in 5,300 hours’ flying in October, 1918, and this in spite of the fact that pilots were doing all aerial manoeuvres. Official data from other training centres, where work was done on varying types of machines, show 1 fatality for 1,170 hours’ flying.