The First Judge of the Northern District of Ohio: In the history and eminent success of a twenty years' practice at the Bar, we have the fullest assurance that whatever industry, talent, and integrity can achieve for the character of this long sought for court, will be accomplished by the gentleman who has been appointed to preside over its deliberations.

In responding to the toast, Judge Willson spoke highly of the character of the profession, and then made a warm appeal to the young lawyers. He said that all there had been young lawyers and knew the struggles and difficulties that hang around the lawyer's early path, and which cloud to him his future, and nothing is so welcome, so genial to a young lawyer's heart as to be taken in hand by an older legal brother. He said he could talk with feeling on the subject, for the memory was yet green of the days when two penniless young men came to Ohio to take life's start, and when as discouragements, and almost despair, seemed to lie in wait for them, there was an older lawyer who held out a friendly hand to aid them, and who bid them take courage and persevere. Who that friend was he signified by offering, with much feeling, a toast to the memory of Judge Willey.

But the young firm did not long need friendly counsel to cheer them in the midst of discouragements. Although they were but young men, and Willey, Congar, and Andrews were eminent lawyers in full practice, they soon took place in the front rank of the profession. Business flowed in upon them, and from 1837 to 1840, the number of suits brought by them in the Court of Common Pleas averaged two hundred and fifty per year; whilst during the same time they appeared for the defence in twice that number of cases annually. Briefs in all those cases were, to a great extent, prepared by Judge Willson. Upon Mr. Payne's retirement, a partnership was formed with Hon. Edward Wade and Reuben Hitchcock, and after a while the firm was changed to Willson, Wade & Wade. Under these partnerships the extensive business and high reputation of the old firm were preserved and increased.

In 1852, Judge Willson ran for Congress on the Democratic ticket, against William Case on the Whig and Edward Wade on the Free Soil tickets. Mr. Wade was elected, but Judge Willson received a very handsome vote.

In the Winter of 1854, a bill was introduced to divide the State of Ohio, for United States judicial purposes, into two districts. The members of the Cleveland Bar pressed the matter vigorously, and after a sharp struggle in Congress, the bill creating the United States Court for the Northern District of Ohio was passed. During the pendency of the measure, and when the prospects were unfavorable for its passage, Judge Willson was chosen by the Cleveland Bar to proceed to Washington and labor in the interest of the bill. This was done, and the final triumph of the bill was doubtless owing in great measure to his unwearied industry in its behalf. In March, 1855, President Pierce appointed Mr. Willson judge of the District Court just authorized.

The formation of the court and the appointment of Judge Willson as its presiding officer, gave general satisfaction. A banquet was held by the lawyers to celebrate the event, and although Judge Willson was a strong political partizan, the leading lawyers of all parties vied with each other in testifying their entire confidence in the ability and impartiality of the new judge. Nor was their confidence misplaced. In becoming a judge he ceased to be a politician, and no purely political, or personal, motives swayed his decisions. He was admitted by all to have been an upright judge.

The new court found plenty to do. In addition to the ordinary criminal and civil business, the location of the court on the lake border brought to it a large amount of admiralty cases. In such cases, the extensive knowledge and critical acumen of Judge Willson were favorably displayed. Many of his decisions were models of deep research and lucid statement. One of his earliest decisions of this character was in relation to maritime liens. The steamboat America had been abandoned and sunk, and only a part of her tackle and rigging saved. These were attached for debt for materials, and the question arose on the legality of the claim against articles no longer a part of the vessel. Judge Willson held that the maritime lien of men for wages, and material men for supplies, is a proprietary interest in the vessel itself, and can not be diverted by the acts of the owner or by any casualty, until the claim is paid, and that such lien inheres to the ship and all her parts wherever found and whoever may be the owner. In the case of L. Wick vs. the schooner Samuel Strong, in 1855, Judge Willson reviewed the history and intent of the common carrier act of Ohio, in an opinion of much interest. A case, not in admiralty, but in the criminal business of the court, gave the judge another opportunity for falling back on his inexhaustible stores of legal and historical knowledge. The question was on the point whether the action of a grand jury was legal in returning a bill of indictment found only by fourteen members, the fifteenth member being absent and taking no part in the proceedings. Judge Willson reviewed the matter at length, citing precedents of the English and American courts for several centuries to show that the action was legal.

A very noticeable case was what is known in the legal history of Cleveland as "The Bridge Case," in which Charles Avery sued the city of Cleveland, to prevent the construction of a bridge across the Cuyahoga, at the foot of Lighthouse street. The questions arising were: the legislative authority of the city to bridge the river, and whether the bridge would be a nuisance, damaging the complainant's private property. The decision of Judge Willson, granting a preliminary injunction until further evidence could be taken, was a thorough review of the law relating to water highways and their obstructions. In the opinion on the Parker water-wheel case, he exhibited a clear knowledge of mechanics, and gave an exhaustive exposition of the law of patents. In the case of Hoag vs the propeller Cataract, the law of collision was set forth and numerous precedents cited. In 1860, important decisions were given in respect to the extent of United States jurisdiction on the Western lakes and rivers. It was decided, and the decisions supported by voluminous precedents, that the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction possessed by the District Courts of the United States, on the Western lakes and rivers, under the Constitution and Act of 1789, was independent of the Act of 1845, and unaffected thereby; and also that the District Courts of the United States, having under the Constitution and Acts of Congress, exclusive original cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, the Courts of Common Law are precluded from proceeding in rem to enforce such maritime claims.

These are but a very few of the many important cases coming before Judge Willson's court and decided by him in a manner that made his decisions important precedents.

The judicial administration of Judge Willson was noticeable also for its connection with events of national importance. And here it should be again repeated, that in all his conduct on the bench he divested himself of personal or party predilections and prejudices. To him it was of no consequence who were parties to the case, or what the political effect of a decision would be; he inquired only what were the facts in the matter and what the law bearing upon them. The keynote of his character in this respect may be known from an extract taken from his charge to the grand jury in the Winter term of 1856, in which it was expected a case would come before that body of alleged impropriety or crime by a Government officer, growing out of party zeal during a very heated political canvass. The passions of men were intensely excited at the time of the delivery of the charge, and that address had the effect of suddenly cooling down the popular mind, in the city and vicinity at least, and of bringing about a better state of feeling. After referring impressively to the language of the oath taken by the grand jury, to present none through malice, and except none through favouritism, Judge Willson said: