For instance, in my bank,—supposing I wanted to take a man from the Discount Department, from the Foreign Exchange Department, or the Real Estate Department,—what folly to say that I would be justly afraid that he would not be my loyal and faithful agent in the imposition of a plan for the interest of the institution as a whole because of his former connection with those departments of the bank. What folly to say that the President of the United States with all his power over personnel can not receive from men detailed for co-ordinating work the same loyalty as he would receive from men appointed from the outside to come into this complex machine. And I say now that the plan must stand or fall upon that proposition. Regarding Colonel Smither, the Chief Coordinator, or Commander Stanley, or any of these men who have been connected with the Army or Navy,—so far as this work is concerned, as agents for the President of the United States, they are as independent as if they had never been in the Army or Navy. If anybody thinks they are not, let us give him an example. We have not found anything but cooperation from the heads of these departments and the heads of these services because their personal interests lie parallel now with the unified plan of the government since the President of the United States to whom they are responsible, is behind that plan.
If the President becomes indifferent,—if he loses his eyes, and ears and fingers in matters of routine business in the shape of the Chief Coordinators of the Boards,—if he lets them drift, immediately there will come the effort from you and everybody else to pull to pieces this coordinating machinery which alone is able to impose a unified plan upon the governmental business.
Now why is it necessary for you to accept, without mental reservation, the necessity of the existence of this coordinating board under which you act and the authority of the Chief Coordinator of that board as representing the President? Let me say in connection with this that the rights of the independent departments and establishments are jealously regarded under these executive orders.
What I want to impress upon the minds of all is the necessity of these co-ordinating boards to enable you to do your work properly.
Take it in ships. In coordinating shipping transportation, you have got to have Mr. Weeks, Mr. Denby and Mr. Lasker in contact in connection with a decision involving the economical use of ships. How can anybody get them together without the authority of the President? Suppose I was expected to call them together without the authority of the President. I would go to Mr. Weeks for example and wait until the Senators were through seeing him, and then perhaps because of his personal friendship persuade him to go over with me to see Mr. Denby. When we had seen Denby how could we get the two together with Lasker? You could not get anywhere in this co-ordinating work without a delegated authority from the President to compel contact between high officials.
In connection with this great work of yours in which you spent last year three-fourths of a billion dollars, you cannot have it run right without the existence of this co-ordinating Board,—without that authority to make a bird’s-eye view of the whole situation,—without that authority to say why this building, for example, is unnecessary, because there exists a superfluity of this sort of building in another department. What’s the use of endeavoring to catalogue those activities in which there is duplication, in which you have got to have the bird’s-eye view, and would never get proper action taken, unless you have in existence this Board created by the authority of the President!
In connection with the rights of your department, for instance, there is preserved for you at all times in connection with the coordinating order of the Federal Board of Hospitalization, a right of appeal to the President of the United States. If this Coordinating Board interferes to such an extent with the plans of your unit that you think the disadvantage so great that it counterbalances the beneficial effect to the government as a whole, the right of appeal to the President is with you. But for the first time in the government, as you know, there will be presented to the President by the Chief Coordinator the interests of the government treated from the standpoint of the Coordinating Board, so that the President of the United States in making his decision on your matter has the strongest possible statement of the needs of the unit from you, and the strongest possible statement of the needs of the government as a whole from the President of the Board. But the final authority, of course, is in the President of the United States and he will exercise it. In all of these orders the right of the head of the independent unit to a proper examination, by the supreme authority, of his plan is preserved, and it has been so in connection with all of these coordinating agencies and with the Director of the Budget.
Let me tell you something as to the spirit of cooperation shown. I have never had a contest before the President with a cabinet officer or head of a department in connection with a coordinating action. I have never had one for this reason. Take in connection with the transfer of ships,—we have independent agencies for the examination of conditions. We have the right, as agents of the President, of obtaining information from any bureau chief or head of a department.
We have, through Colonel Smither’s wonderful organization of course, the means for securing essential knowledge about these things.
Regarding ships,—we asked the Navy the other day for a couple of mine sweepers for the Coast and Geodetic Survey. They refused. That was always the case in the old days. Of course, everybody looks out for the interest of his own department. Well I called over one of the Assistant Secretaries of the Navy, and gave him a bird’s-eye view of the situation.