The above reference, reader, enjoins the duty of two relations, which God ordained, but does not abolish a third relation which God has ordained; as the Scripture will prove, to which I have referred you, under the first reference made by my correspondent.
4th. His fourth Scripture reference is, to the intention of Abraham to give his estate to a servant, in order to prove that servant was not a slave. "What," he says, "property inherit property?" I answer, yes. Two years ago, in my county, William Hansbrough gave to his slaves his estate, worth forty or fifty thousand dollars. In the last five or six years, over two hundred slaves, within a few miles of me, belonging to various masters, have inherited portions of their masters' estates.
To render slaves valuable, the Romans qualified them for the learned professions, and all the various arts. They were teachers, doctors, authors, mechanics, etc. So with us, tradesmen of every kind are to be found among our slaves. Some of them are undertakers—some farmers—some overseers, or stewards—some housekeepers—some merchants—some teamsters, and some money-lenders, who give their masters a portion of their income, and keep the balance. Nearly all of them have an income of their own—and was it not for the seditious spirit of the North, we would educate our slaves generally, and so fit them earlier for a more improved condition, and higher moral elevation.
But will all this, when duly certified, prove they are not slaves? No. Neither will Abraham's intention to give one of his servants his estate, prove that he was not a slave. Who had higher claims upon Abraham, before he had a child, than this faithful slave, born in his house, reared by his hand, devoted to his interest, and faithful in every trust?
5th. His fifth reference, my correspondent says, "forever sets the question at rest." It is this: "Thou shalt not deliver unto his master, the servant which is escaped from his master unto thee—he shall dwell with thee, even in that place which he shall choose, in one of thy gates, where it liketh him best; thou shalt not oppress him."
This my distinguished correspondent says, "forever puts the question at rest." My reader, I hope, will ask himself what question it puts to rest. He will please to remember, that it is brought to put this question to rest, "Is slavery sinful in the sight of God?" the Bible being judge—or "did God ever allow one man to hold property in another?"
My correspondent admits this to be the question at issue. He asks, "What is slavery?" And thus answers: "It is the principle involved in holding man as property." "This," he says: "is the point at issue." He says, "if it be right to hold man as property, it is right to treat him as property," etc. Now, conceding all in the argument, that can be demanded for this law about run-away slaves, yet it does not prove that slavery or holding property in man is sinful—because it is a part and parcel of the Mosaic law, given to Israel in the wilderness by the same God, who in the same wilderness enacted "that of the heathen that were round about them, they should buy bond-men and bond-women—also of the strangers that dwelt among them should they buy, and they should pass as an inheritance to their children after them, to possess them as bond-men forever."—Levit. xxv: 44.
How can I admit that a prohibition to deliver up a run-away slave, under the law of Moses, is proof that there was no slavery allowed under that law? Here is the law from God himself,—Levit. xxv: 44, authorizing the Israelites to buy slaves and transmit them and their increase as a possession to their posterity forever—and to make slaves of their captives taken in war.—Deut. xx: 10-15. Suppose, for argument's sake, I admit that God prohibited the delivery back of one of these slaves, when he fled from his master—would that prove that he was not a slave before he fled? Would that prove that he did not remain legally a slave in the sight of God, according to his own law, until he fled? The passage proves the very reverse of that which it is brought to prove. It proves that the slave is recognized by God himself as a slave, until he fled to the Israelites. My correspondent's exposition of this law seems based upon the idea that God, who had held fellowship with slavery among his people for five hundred years, and who had just given them a formal statute to legalize the purchase of slaves from the heathen, and to enslave their captives taken in war, was, nevertheless, desirous to abolish the institution. But, as if afraid to march directly up to his object, he was disposed to undermine what he was unwilling to attempt to overthrow.
Upon the principle that man is prone to think God is altogether such an one as himself, we may account for such an interpretation at the present time, by men north of Mason & Dixon's line. Our brethren there have held fellowship with this institution, by the constitutional oath they have taken to protect us in this property. Unable, constitutionally, to overthrow the institution, they see, or think they see, a sanction in the law of God to undermine it, by opening their gates and letting our run-away slaves "dwell among them where it liketh them best." If I could be astonished at any thing in this controversy, it would be to see sensible men engaged in the study of that part of the Bible which relates to the rights of property, as established by the Almighty himself, giving in to the idea that the Judge of the world, acting in the character of a national law-giver, would legalize a property right in slaves, as he did—give full power to the master to govern—secure the increase as an inheritance to posterity for all time to come—and then add a clause to legalize a fraud upon the unsuspecting purchaser. For what better is it, under this interpretation?
With respect to slaves purchased of the heathen, or enslaved by war, the law passed a clear title to them and their increase forever. With respect to the hired servants of the Hebrews, the law secured to the master a right to their service until the Sabbatic year or Jubilee—unless they were bought back by a near kinsman at a stated price in money when owned by a heathen master. But these legal rights, under these laws of heaven's King, by this interpretation, are all canceled—for the pecuniary loss, there is no redress—and for the insult no remedy, whenever a "liketh him best" man can induce the slave to run away. And worse still, the community of masters thus insulted and swindled, according to this interpretation, are bound to show respect and afford protection to the villains who practice it. Who can believe all this? I judge our Northern brethren will say, the Lord deliver us from such legislation as this. So say we. What, then, does this run-away law mean? It means that the God of Israel ordained his people to be an asylum for the slave who fled from heathen cruelty to them for protection; it is the law of nations—but surrendered under the Constitution by these States, who agreed to deliver them up. See, says God, ye oppress not the stranger. Thou shalt neither vex a stranger, nor oppress him.—Exod. xxii: 21.