Cotton is King, and Pro-Slavery Arguments / Comprising the Writings of Hammond, Harper, Christy, Stringfellow, Hodge, Bledsoe, and Cartrwright on this Important Subject

by Unknown

Having noticed the political and economical relations of slavery, it may be expected that we shall say something of its moral relations. In attempting this, we choose not to traverse that interminable labyrinth, without a thread, which includes the moral character of the system, as it respects the relation between the master and the slave. The only aspect in which we care to consider it, is in the moral relations which the consumers of slave labor products sustain to slavery: and even on this, we shall offer no opinion, our aim being only to promote inquiry.

This view of the question is not an unimportant one. It includes the germ of the grand error in nearly all anti-slavery effort; and to which, chiefly, is to be attributed its want of moral power over the conscience of the slaveholder. The abolition movement, was designed to create a public sentiment, in the United States, that should be equally as potent in forcing emancipation, as was the public opinion of Great Britain. But why have not the Americans been as successful as the English? This is an inquiry of great importance. When the Anti-Slavery Convention, which met, December 6, 1833, in Philadelphia, declared, as a part of its creed: "That there is no difference in principle, between the African slave trade, and American slavery," it meant to be understood as teaching, that the person who purchased slaves imported from Africa, or who held their offspring as slaves, was particeps criminis—partaker in the crime—with the slave trader, on the principle that he who receives stolen property, knowing it be such, is equally guilty with the thief.

On this point Daniel O'Connell was very explicit, when, in a public assembly, he used this language: "When an American comes into society, he will be asked, 'are you one of the thieves, or are you an honest man? If you are an honest man, then you have given liberty to your slaves; if you are among the thieves, the sooner you take the outside of the house, the better.'"

The error just referred to was this: they based their opposition to slavery on the principle, that it was malum in se—a sin in itself—like the slave trade, robbery and murder; and, at the same time, continued to use the products of the labor of the slave as though they had been obtained from the labor of freemen. But this seeming inconsistency was not the only reason why they failed to create such a public sentiment as would procure the emancipation of our slaves. The English emancipationists began their work like philosophers—addressing themselves, respectfully to the power that could grant their requests. Beside the moral argument, which declared slavery a crime, the English philanthropists labored to convince Parliament, that emancipation would be advantageous to the commerce of the nation. The commercial value of the Islands had been reduced one-third, as a result of the abolition of the slave trade. Emancipation, it was argued, would more than restore their former prosperity, as the labor of freemen was twice as productive as that of slaves. But American abolitionists commenced their crusade against slavery, by charging those who sustained it, and who alone, held the power to manumit, with crimes of the blackest dye. This placed the parties in instant antagonism, causing all the arguments on human rights, and the sinfulness of slavery, to fall without effect upon the ears of angry men. The error on this point, consisted in failing to discriminate between the sources of the power over emancipation in England and in the United States. With Great Britain, the power was in Parliament. The masters, in the West Indies, had no voice in the question. It was the voters in England alone who controlled the elections, and, consequently, controlled Parliament. But the condition of things in the United States is the reverse of what it was in England. With us, the power of emancipation is in the States, not in Congress. The slaveholders elect the members to the State Legislatures; and they choose none but such as agree with them in opinion. It matters not, therefore, what public sentiment may be at the North, as it has no power over the Legislatures of the South. Here, then, is the difference: with us the slaveholder controls the question of emancipation, while in England the consent of the master was not necessary to the execution of that work.

Our anti-slavery men seem to have fallen into their errors of policy, by following the lead of those of England, who manifested a total ignorance of the relations existing between our General Government and the State Governments. On the abolition platform, slaveholders found themselves placed in the same category with slave traders and thieves. They were told that all laws, giving them power over the slave, were void in the sight of heaven; and that their appropriation of the fruits of the labor of the slave, without giving him compensation, was robbery. Had the preaching of these principles produced conviction, it must have promoted emancipation. But, unfortunately, while these doctrines were held up to the gaze of slaveholders, in the one hand of the exhorter, they beheld his other hand stretched out, from beneath his cloak of seeming sanctity, to clutch the products of the very robbery he was professing to condemn! Take a fact in proof of this view of the subject.

At the date of the declarations of Daniel O'Connell, on behalf of the English, and by the Philadelphia Anti-Slavery Convention, on the part of Americans, the British manufacturers were purchasing, annually, about 300,000,000 lbs. of cotton, from the very men denounced as equally criminal with slave traders and thieves; and the people of the United States were almost wholly dependent upon slave labor for their supplies of cotton and groceries. It is no matter for wonder, therefore, that slaveholders, should treat, as fiction, the doctrine that slave labor products are the fruits of robbery, so long as they are purchased without scruple, by all classes of men, in Europe and America. The pecuniary argument for emancipation, that free labor is more profitable than slave labor, was also urged here, but was treated as the greatest absurdity. The masters had, before their eyes, the evidence of the falsity of the assertion, that, if emancipated, the slaves would be doubly profitable as free laborers. The reverse was admitted, on all hands, to be true in relation to our colored people.

But this question, of the moral relations which the consumers of slave labor products sustain to slavery, is one of too important a nature to be passed over without a closer examination; and, beside, it is involved in less obscurity than the morality of the relation existing between the master and the slave. Its consideration, too, affords an opportunity of discriminating between the different opinions entertained on the broad question of the morality of the institution, and enables us to judge of the consistency and conscientiousness of every man, by the standard which he himself adopts.

The prevalent opinions, as to the morality of the institution of slavery, in the United States, may be classified under three heads: 1. That it is justified by Scripture example and precept. 2. That it is a great civil and social evil, resulting from ignorance and degradation, like despotic systems of government, and may be tolerated until its subjects are sufficiently enlightened to render it safe to grant them equal rights. 3. That it is malum in se, like robbery and murder, and can not be sustained, for a moment, without sin; and, like sin, should be immediately abandoned.

Those who consider slavery sanctioned by the Bible, conceive that they can, consistently with their creed, not only hold slaves, and use the products of slave labor, without doing violence to their consciences, but may adopt measures to perpetuate the system. Those who consider slavery merely a great civil and social evil, a despotism that may engender oppression, or may not, are of opinion that they may purchase and use its products, or interchange their own for those of the slaveholder, as free governments hold commercial and diplomatic intercourse with despotic ones, without being responsible for the moral evils connected with the system, But the position of those who believe slavery malum in se, like the slave trade, robbery and murder, is a very different one from either of the other classes, as it regards the purchase and use of slave labor products. Let us illustrate this by a case in point.

A company of men hold a number of their fellow men in bondage under the laws of the commonwealth in which they live, so that they can compel them to work their plantations, and raise horses, cattle, hogs, and cotton. These products of the labor of the oppressed, are appropriated by the oppressors to their own use, and taken into the markets for sale. Another company proceed to a community of freemen, on the coast of Africa, who have labored voluntarily during the year, seize their persons, bind them, convey away their horses, cattle, hogs, and cotton, and take the property to market. The first association represents the slaveholders; the second a band of robbers. The commodities of both parties, are openly offered for sale, and every one knows how the property of each was obtained. Those who believe the per se doctrine, place both these associations in the same moral category, and call them robbers. Judged by this rule, the first band are the more criminal, as they have deprived their victims of personal liberty, forced them into servitude, and then "despoiled them of the fruits of their labor."[92] The second band have only deprived their victims of liberty, while they robbed them; and thus have committed but two crimes, while the first have perpetrated three. These parties attempt to negotiate the sale of their cotton, say in London. The first company dispose of their cargo without difficulty—no one manifesting the slightest scruple at purchasing the products of slave labor. But the second company are not so fortunate. As soon as their true character is ascertained, the police drag its members to Court, where they are sentenced to Bridewell. In vain do these robbers quote the Philadelphia Anti-Slavery Convention, and Daniel O'Connell, to prove that their cotton was obtained by means no more criminal than that of the slaveholders, and that, therefore, judgment ought to be reversed. The Court will not entertain such a plea, and they have to endure the penalty of the law. Now, why this difference, if slavery be malum in se? And if the receiver of stolen property is particeps criminis with the thief, why is it, that the Englishman, who should receive and sell the cotton of the robbers, would run the risk of being sent to prison with them, while if he acted as agent of the slaveholders, he would be treated as an honorable man? If the master has no moral right to hold his slaves, in what respect can the products of their labor differ from the property acquired by robbery? And if the property be the fruits of robbery, how can any one use it, without violating conscience?