[1] Man is the noblest work of God—but nobody ever said so but man.—Fra Elbertus. [↑]
CHAPTER III.
What God Is.
I.
Until now we have fought the popular idea concerning the Divinity, but we have not yet said what God is, and if we were asked, we should say that the word represents to us an Infinite Being, of whom one of his attributes is to be a substance of extent and consequently eternal and infinite. The extent or the quantity not being finite or divisible, it may be imagined that the matter was everywhere the same, our understanding not distinguishing parts. For example, water, as much as water is imagined, is divisible, and its parts separable from one another, though as much as a corporeal substance it is neither separable nor divisible.[1] Thus neither matter or quantity have anything unworthy of God, for if all is God, and all comes surely from his essence, it follows quite absolutely that He is all that he contains, since it is incomprehensible that Beings quite material should be contained in a Being who is not. That we may not think that this is a new opinion, Tertullian, one of the foremost men among the Christians, has pronounced against Apelles, that, “that which is not matter is nothing,” and against Praxias, that “all substance is matter,” without having this doctrine condemned in the four first Councils of the Christian Church, œcumenical and general.[2]