My own opinion certainly was contrary to any such resolution. For, first, it was in evidence that the wind and weather did not prevent Lord Huntley from landing in Cadsand, in good time to have destroyed the batteries of Breskens, and opened a passage for the fleet up the Wieling Channel, clear of Flushing. And, secondly, there was no evidence to prove that the whole fleet might not have gone up that channel with Lord Gardner’s squadron, instead of going originally into the Stonediep: the further deviation into the Roompot, which ruined the whole prospect of getting to Antwerp up the West Scheldt, was probably inevitable after the fleet had once missed their entrance by Cadsand and the Wieling Channel.
It suited the Opposition to exculpate the land and naval service, because then the failure (by their reasoning) exclusively followed from the plan, and the plan only. It also suited the Ministers, partly because they had advised the King to tell the City of London that there was no ground for military inquiry (they then not knowing of Lord Chatham’s narrative); and partly from a proper desire to avoid throwing blame upon those who served under them by their own appointment.
WELLINGTON’S DIFFICULTIES IN SPAIN (1810).
Source.—Selections from the Wellington Despatches. Gurwood. P. 409.
I. To the Right Hon. H. Wellesley.
Cartaxo,
2nd Dec., 1810.
I am afraid that the Spaniards will bring us all to shame yet. It is scandalous that in the third year of their war, and having been more than a year in a state of tranquillity, and having sustained no loss of importance since the battle of Ocaña, they should now be depending for the safety of Cadiz, the seat of their Government, upon having one or two more or less British regiments; and that after having been shut in for 10 months, they have not prepared the works necessary for their defence, notwithstanding the repeated remonstrances of General Graham and the British officers on the danger of omitting them. The Cortes appear to suffer under the national disease in as great a degree as the other authorities, that is, boasting of the strength and power of the Spanish nation, till they are seriously convinced they are in no danger, and then sitting down quietly and indulging their national indolence.
II. To the Right Hon. H. Wellesley.
Cartaxo,
16th Dec., 1810.
I have had some difficulties lately with the Spanish muleteers attached to the British army, in consequence of the general requisition which is said to be made of all individuals of the military ages for the army.
I doubt very much whether this requisition is or can be enforced; and I believe that the magistrates in the different districts are very glad to show the activity and steadiness with which they execute the law, by calling for these people who they know will quit with reluctance the lucrative business in which they are engaged, to serve as soldiers. However, I cannot encourage them to stay away when they are called for; and I very much apprehend that the army will be reduced to the greatest distress if they should leave us, notwithstanding the pains which I have taken, and the expense which I have incurred, to have it equipped as it ought to be with the means of transport.