... The general result of his reasoning was, in the first place, that it was quite impossible for us safely to rely on a foreign import. If they so did, a necessary result would be a diminution of our own produce, which would become more and more extensive every year, and consequently call for a greater annual supply from foreign countries—a supply which must progressively increase as the agriculture of the kingdom became less encouraged; and that, when the fatal moment arrived, the system of foreign supply would prove completely illusory.

The next point to be considered was the extent to which protection should be given. That was a point on which, undoubtedly, a difference of opinion was most likely to prevail. Some gentlemen would be for going considerably higher than others. Many thought the prohibition ought to be carried to a price considerably above that, without he obtained which it was conceived the agriculturalist could not cultivate. Others would wish that it should be placed much lower; and contend that because a particular species and degree of burden was likely to be removed, the protecting price ought to be much reduced. Now he would be inclined to agree to the first of these propositions, if the necessary effect of it would not be to bring up the price of corn to the highest possible rate, within the limits of the sum at which importation should commence. This certainly might be the case at the first moment, but he believed the ultimate result would not be so. He thought the final effect of the system would be to give such a powerful support to our own agriculture as would greatly increase the general produce of the country. It would excite a strong competition between the different parts of England, and between England and Ireland; so that the growth of corn, if Providence blessed us with favourable seasons, would be sufficiently large to afford an ample supply for the people of this country, and would enable them to be fed at a much cheaper rate, in the long run, than could be effected by the adoption of any other system.


Mr. Philips professed himself equally inclined either to proceed with, or defer the discussion, as might be most agreeable to the wishes of the House. Several members calling out "Go on," he began by stating his entire concurrence in the opinion of the right hon. gentleman who had moved the resolutions, that this was not a question on which the interests of the commercial and agricultural classes were at variance, but one in which those interests, when fairly and liberally considered, would be found to accord; for no resolution upon it calculated to promote the general prosperity of the country could be adopted without materially benefiting both classes. But if this were not the case, if the question were one in which the interests of two or more descriptions of our fellow-subjects were opposed, he should say that it was the duty of parliament not to legislate for the advantage of one class in contradistinction to, or at the expense of another, but to legislate for the benefit of the whole community. Looking at the question under the influence of this principle, he could not help feeling and expressing some surprise at the occasion of their present deliberations. What was the object of their deliberations? To provide a remedy for the low price of corn. That which all ages and countries had considered as a great national benefit was now discovered to be a great evil, against which we were imperiously called to legislate in self-defence. The real object of the resolutions, however disguised and disavowed, was to raise the price of corn. [Here Mr. Robinson expressed his dissent.] Mr. Philips proceeded to say that this not only was their object, but if that object were not attained, the advocates of the resolutions would regard them as nugatory. The right hon. gentleman must at least allow that their object was to raise the present price of grain; but he contended that moderation and uniformity of price would be their ultimate effect. It did seem somewhat inconsistent, on the part of the hon. gentleman, to tell the House that the effectual way to lower price was to acquiesce in a measure expressly intended to raise it. But how are this moderation and uniformity of price to be produced? By contracting the market of supply. Thus, while in all other instances moderation and uniformity of price are found to be in proportion to the extent of the market of supply, in the instance of corn they are to be in proportion to the limitation of it: and in a commodity peculiarly liable to be affected by the variation of seasons, moderation and uniformity of price, and abundance, are to be attained by preventing importations from foreign countries correcting the effect of varieties of climate, and of a scanty harvest in our own. To him it appeared that no measure could be better calculated to produce directly opposite consequences.


In considering the relation between the price of provisions and of labour, Mr. Philips observed that it was necessary to distinguish the countries and the trades from which examples were taken. In a new country where the value of land is extremely low, and agriculture rapidly progressive, in a new and thriving manufacture, the price of labour may be so high in proportion to that of the necessaries of life as to be little affected by their fluctuations.... But this state of things cannot exist in old manufactures, such as those generally established in this country, where competition has reduced profits, and that reduction of profit has brought the wages of the labourer to a level with his subsistence in tolerable comfort. In such manufactures if you raise the price of provisions without proportionately raising that of labour, to what privations and evils must you necessarily expose the labourer! He was ready to admit with the noble lord[395] that, ceteris paribus, the immediate effect of a high advance of provisions might probably be a reduction of the price of labour; because labourers being desirous of obtaining the same comforts that they had been used to, might be stimulated to more diligence. They might work sixteen hours a day instead of ten, and thus the competition for employment being increased among the same number of workmen, without any increase of demand, the price of labour might fall. But will any person contend that this state of affairs can long continue? The labourer must go to the parish, or turn to some more profitable employment, if by chance any can be found, or he must emigrate, or work himself out by overstrained exertion. The proportion being then altered between the demand for labour and the supply, its price will rise. This effect sooner or later must happen, but till it has actually taken place how dreadful must be the situation of the labourer!


Having thus shown both by reasoning and by reference to facts, that the price of provisions must ultimately and on the average regulate that of labour, he proceeded to show the effect that an advance of provisions must have on our manufacturing interests. And here Mr. Philips said that he wished on such topics, to reduce his reasoning as much as possible to numerical calculation. He would suppose, for the sake of argument, without at all entering into the enquiry, that three-fifths, or 60 per cent. of the labourer's wages were spent in provisions, and that provisions were 80 per cent. dearer here than they were in France, or any manufacturing country on the continent. By multiplying 60 by 80, and dividing by 100, the committee would see that the excess of the price of labour here above that of France would, from these datas, and according to his reasoning, be 48 per cent. He wished the committee to consider what must be the effect of such an excessive price of labour employed in our manufactures, when compared with the low price of labour employed in the manufactures of France, and what an advantage it must give to the French manufacturers in their attempts to rival us on the continent.


[After quoting Malthus] he observed that there were two ways of equalising subsistence and population, one by increasing food, the other by limiting population, and warned the committee against being led into measures whose tendency might be to produce that effect in the latter way. Why (said Mr. Philips) should a commercial and manufacturing country like this have such a jealousy and dread of the importation of corn? An importation of corn cannot take place without a corresponding export of commodities on which British industry has been employed. The export will increase your wealth, that wealth will increase your population, and that increased population will produce an increased demand for your agricultural produce.... Mr. Philips observed that no country in the world was so interested as this in establishing the principle of free trade, because no other country could profit equally by the general recognition of that principle. Foreign nations, mistaking, like the advocates of the regulation before the committee, the circumstances which have operated against our wealth for the causes of it, are now following our example. They are prohibiting or imposing restraints on the import of our fabrics, in order to encourage their own manufactures, from which they will receive inferior fabrics at a higher price. Let us convince them, by an example, of their mistake. Let us convince them that by leaving industry and enterprise unfettered, and by allowing capital to take its natural and voluntary direction, we are persuaded that the true interests of this country and of every other will be most effectually promoted.