The New York Journal, (Number 2320)
Friday, June 13, 1788.
For the Daily Patriotic Register.
To the Citizens of the State of New York.
Although a variety of objections to the proposed new constitution for the government of the United States have been laid before the public by men of the best abilities, I am led to believe that representing it in a point of view which has escaped their observation may be of use, that is, by comparing it with the constitution of the State of New York.
The following contrast is therefore submitted to the public, to show in what instances the powers of the state government will be either totally or partially absorbed, and enable us to determine whether the remaining powers will, from those kind of pillars, be capable of supporting the mutilated fabric of a government, which even the advocates for the new constitution admit excels “the boasted models of Greece or Rome, and those of all other nations, in having precisely marked out the power of the government and the rights of the people.”
It may be proper to premise that the pressure of necessity and distress (and not corruption) had a principal tendency to induce the adoption of the state constitutions and the existing confederation, that power was even then vested in the rulers with the greatest caution, and that, as from every circumstance we have reason to infer that the new constitution does not originate from a pure source, we ought deliberately to trace the extent and tendency of [pg 298] the trust we are about to repose, under the conviction that a reassumption of that trust will at least be difficult, if not impracticable. If we take a retrospective view of the measures of Congress who have their secret journals, the conduct of their officers, at home and abroad, acting under an oath of secrecy, as well as of individuals who were intimately connected with them, from the year 1780 to the last convention, who also acted under an injunction of secrecy (and whose journals have not been published even to this day, but will no doubt continue buried in the dark womb of suspicious secrecy), we can scarcely entertain a doubt but that a plan has long since been framed to subvert the confederation; that that plan has been matured with the most persevering industry and unremitted attention, and that the objects expressed in the preamble to the constitution, that is “to promote the general welfare and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity,” were merely the ostensible, and not the real reasons of its framers. That necessity and danger have been the moving causes to the establishment of the confederation will appear from the words of Congress recommending its formation to the several legislatures which are “under a conviction of the absolute necessity of uniting all our councils and all our strength to maintain our common liberties. Let them be examined with liberality becoming brethren and fellow-citizens, surrounded by the same iminent dangers, contending for the same illustrious prize, and deeply interested in being forever bound and connected together by the ties the most intimate and indissoluble.”
That these principles equally applied to the formation of our state constitution no person can seriously doubt who recollects the rapid progress of the British troops in this state and in Jersey in the year 1776, and the despondence which prevailed among the people on that occasion. The convention of this state, about that period, in explaining to the people the justice of the American cause, addressed them as follows: “You and all men were created free and authorised to establish civil government for the preservation of our rights against civil oppression, and the security of that freedom which God had given you, against the rapacious hand of tyranny and lawless power. If then God hath given [pg 299] us freedom, are we not responsible to him for that as well as other talents? If it is our birth-right, let us not sell it for a mess of pottage, nor suffer it to be torn from us by the hand of violence.”
The omission of a bill of rights in this State has given occasion to an inference that the omission was equally warrantable in the constitution for the United States. On this it may be necessary to observe that while the constitution of this State was in agitation, there appeared doubts upon the propriety of the measure, from the peculiar situation in which the country then was; our connection with Britain dissolved, and her government formally renounced—no substitute devised—all the powers of government avowedly temporary, and solely calculated for defence; it was urged by those in favor of a bill of rights that the power of the rulers ought to be circumscribed, the better to protect the people at large from the oppression and usurpation of their rulers. The English petition of rights, in the reign of Charles the First, and the bill of rights in the reign of king William, were mentioned as examples to support their opinions. Those in opposition admitted that in established governments, which had an implied constitution, a declaration of rights might be necessary to prevent the usurpation of ambitious men, but that was not our situation, for upon the declaration of independence it had become necessary that the exercise of every kind of authority “under the former government should be totally suppressed, and all the power of government exerted under the authority of the people of the colonies;” that we could not suppose that we had an existing constitution or form of government, express or implied, and therefore our situation resembled a people in a state of nature, who are preparing “to institute a government, laying its foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers in such form as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness,” and as such, the constitution to be formed would operate as a bill of rights.
These and the like considerations operated to induce the convention of New York to dismiss the idea of a bill of rights, and the more especially as the legislative state officers being elected by the people at short periods, and thereby rendered from time to [pg 300] time liable to be displaced in case of mal-conduct. But these reasons will not apply to the general government, because it will appear in the sequel that the state governments are considered in it as mere dependencies, existing solely by its toleration, and possessing powers of which they may be deprived whenever the general government is disposed so to do. If then the powers of the state governments are to be totally absorbed, in which all agree, and only differ as to the mode, whether it will be effected by a rapid progression, or by as certain, but slower, operations: what is to limit the oppression of the general government? Where are the rights, which are declared to be incapable of violation? And what security have people against the wanton oppression of unprincipled governors? No constitutional redress is pointed out, and no express declaration is contained in it, to limit the boundaries of their rulers; beside which the mode and period of their being elected tends to take away their responsibility to the people over whom they may, by the power of the purse and the sword, domineer at discretion; nor is there a power on earth to tell them, What dost thou? or, Why dost thou so?