The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 392)
Tuesday, December 18, 1787.
For the Massachusetts Gazette.
To the Inhabitants of this State.
(Continued from our last.)
Section 5, of the new constitution, says, Each house shall be a judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its own members—a majority shall constitute a quorum, and be authorized to compel the attendance of absent members, in such manner and under such penalties as the law may provide. Each house shall determine the rules of its proceedings—punish its members for disorderly behaviour—and with the consent of two-thirds, expel a member. Each house shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, &c. No one, who professes to be governed by reason, will dispute the propriety of any assembly's being the judge of the qualifications requisite to constitute a member of their own body. That part of the fifth section which says a majority shall constitute a quorum, has been an object against which many anti-federal shafts have been levelled. It has been asserted by some, that this clause empowers a majority of members present, to transact any business relating to the affairs of the United States, and that eight or ten members of the house of representatives, and an equal number of the senate, might pass a law which would benefit themselves, and injure the community at large. The fallacy of such assertions is sufficiently [pg 033] conspicuous to render them ridiculous and contemptible in the eyes of every unprejudiced mind—for the section further expresses, That a smaller number than a quorum may adjourn from day to day, and be authorised to compel attendance of absent members. This is all the power that is vested in a smaller number than the majority. It is therefore evident, that when it says a majority shall constitute a quorum to do business, it means a majority of the whole number of members that belong to either house.
Sect. 5, further provides, That each house shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, &c. This clause is so openly marked with every feature of republicanism, and expressed in such liberal and comprehensive terms, that it needs no comment to render it acceptable to the enlightened citizens of Massachusetts.
Sect. 6, provides, That the senators and representatives shall receive a compensation for their services, to be ascertained by law—they shall, except in cases of treason, felony, or breach of peace, be privileged from arrest during their session.—The necessity of such regulations must appear plain to every one; the inhabitants of Massachusetts, fully convinced of the justness of such provision, made it in the constitution of this state. The 6th section further says, No member shall be called to account for sentiments delivered in either house, at any other place. In this clause, the freedom of debate, so essential to the preservation of liberty and the support of a republican form of government, is amply provided for. Impeded by no obstacle whatever, the patriot may here proclaim every sentiment that glows within his breast. How far despotism can encroach upon such a government I leave the antifederal junto to declare.
The 6th section further provides, that no senator or representative shall, during the time he is in office, be elected or appointed to any office under the United States—nor shall any person, holding any office under the government, be elected a member of either house during his continuance in that station.
This clause at once confutes every assertion of the antifederalists respecting the new congress being able to secure to themselves [pg 034] all offices of power, profit and trust. This section is even more rigidly republican than the constitution of this commonwealth; for in the general assembly of Massachusetts, a civil officer is not excluded a seat; whereas the new constitution expressly asserts that no person in civil office under the United States shall be eligible to a seat in either house.