The world is already familiar with the several crises which arose during the course of the Peace Conference. The so-called Fiume crisis, when the Italian delegation walked out and returned to Rome, was regarded as the most serious. I am not sure it was, although it was generally so considered. I believe most of Italy's warmest friends maintain that her action in going home was a mistake. The question of putting Fiume under Italian sovereignty was not covered nor even touched upon in the Treaty of London. In face, the question of Fiume arose long after the Peace Conference was under way. Signor Orlando, the Italian Premier, was accused of fostering Italian feeling on Fiume and of fanning it into flame. I believe there is no truth in this. At any rate, if the Italians had been wise, they would have prevented the matter of Fiume from becoming such a cause celèbre. I think that by judicious work they could have prevented it. Then, too, probably the difficulty would have been lessened if President Wilson's statement to the Italian people had previously met Signor Orlando's approval. Mr. Wilson made his statement with the best will in the world, with the intent to allay and not inflame Italian public opinion. It should have been possible to coördinate his idealism with Signor Orlando's position.

Later on the Italian delegation returned to Paris, realizing that the question of Fiume, which was formerly an Austrian port, did not bear one way or another upon the Treaty with Germany. But the Italians had lost a certain tactical position which was important to them, and in my judgment the move cost Italy much more than the whole question of Fiume amounted to.

Copyright Underwood & Underwood

Awaiting the Decision of the German Peace Delegates.

President Clemenceau is shown standing. Next to him from right to left are: President Wilson, Secretary of State Robert Lansing, Commissioner Henry White, Colonel House, Gen. Tasker H. Bliss, Stephen Pichon, French Minister of Foreign Affairs; Louis Klotz, French Minister of Finance, and André Tardieu, French High Commissioner. From Clemenceau, left to right: Premier Lloyd George, Bonar Law and A. J. Balfour.

[Click for a larger image.]

THE QUESTION OF SHANTUNG

The Shantung crisis was another serious one. It was so realized at the time by the conferees at Paris. The Japanese delegation considered that it had already suffered one or two rebuffs. Their clause to embody race equality in the League of Nations Covenant had not been accepted. They, as the leading Far Eastern Power, were being urged to take an active part in the organization and development of the League of Nations, yet they could see nothing for Japan in the idea except a chance to help the other fellow. It was at this time that the Treaty clause was being drafted covering the disposition of German rights in the Far East, including those on the Shantung Peninsula. It will be remembered that at the outbreak of the war Germany, by reason of treaty rights with China, had possession of Kiauchau, upon the neck of the Shantung Peninsula. Back in 1916, at a time when the war was going badly, after Japan had driven the Germans out of the Far East and had prevented German submarines from getting a base there to prey upon British troop ships from Australia, Japan had demanded from England and France that she become the inheritor of whatever rights Germany had in Shantung. England and France readily granted this request, as America probably would have done if she had been in the war at the time. Later on, according to the record, China confirmed Japan in these rights.

President Wilson's idea, however, was "China for Chinamen"; therefore Shantung should be turned over to China. This was a proper point of view. It was a great pity that it could not be made to prevail. The difficulty, however, was two-fold: first, the agreement which I have just cited between England and France on one hand, and Japan on the other; second, Japan's statement to President Wilson that if he began his League of Nations by forcing England and France to break a solemn agreement with Japan, then Japan would have no use for such a faithless confederation and would promptly withdraw. At the same time, however, Japan reiterated that her inheritance of Shantung was largely a formal matter, and that if the Allies gave her that recognition, she would feel in honor bound to withdraw from Shantung in the near future. This statement, made repeatedly by the Japanese delegates to President Wilson, finally led him to refrain from forcing Great Britain and France to break their agreement, as he might perhaps otherwise have done. The climax, of course, came when Japan gave her ultimatum and said that unless she had her rights she would retire from the Conference.