"Disputes as to the interpretation of a treaty, as to any question of international law, as to the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of any international obligation, or as to the extent and nature of the reparation to be made for any such breach," to be among those which are generally suitable for submission to arbitration. Disputes of the character thus enumerated are what are known as justiciable, i. e., subject to be decided by a Court by the application of the recognized principles of international law.
Mr. Root recommended that such disputes should be required to be arbitrated. The Conference at Paris, like those at the two Hague Conferences, would not agree to that. But in view of the declaration just quoted, any power which should bring before the Council a dispute of the character mentioned, but which it was unwilling to submit to arbitration, would have the burden of showing convincing reason for such attitude.
When the first draft of the Covenant was before the country, American critics objected that it would compel the United States to submit to arbitration on inquiry by the Council purely domestic questions such as tariff, immigration and coastwise traffic. To meet this objection, there was inserted in Art. XV the following paragraph:
"If the dispute between the parties is claimed by one of them, and is found by the Council to arise out of a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of that party, the Council shall so report, and shall make no recommendation as to its settlement."
To this it is objected that the determination of the question whether or not a matter of dispute is by the rules of international law solely with the domestic jurisdiction of a member is left to the Council and not to the member. Surely, it requires no explanation to demonstrate, that if a member State may oust the Council of jurisdiction to inquire into a given dispute which threatens the peace of the world merely by itself asserting that it arises out of a matter within its exclusive domestic jurisdiction, a very imperfect means of averting war will have been provided, and the League Covenant will hardly have more efficacy than the second Hague Convention. Remember too, that the reports of the Council must be unanimous, and the unreasonableness of the objection to the provisions cited will appear.
MEANS TO PREVENT WAR
Articles XI to XVI constitute the heart of the Covenant, the most effective means ever formulated to prevent war. The agreements of the nations not to resort to war until the processes of arbitration or inquiry are exhausted, are buttressed by the provision that should any member violate these agreements it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all the other members of the League, entailing as a consequence commercial boycott, expulsion and the application of armed force, if the members shall so determine. The employment of force in this case, as in every other contemplated by the Covenant, is not left to the decision of Council or Assembly. They can only recommend. The member States agree not to go to war. There is nowhere in the document any provision compelling them to go to war. Even where one State in violation of its Covenant threatens the peace of the world, the utmost the Council can do is
"To recommend to the several governments concerned what effective military or naval forces the members of the League shall severally contribute to the armaments of forces to be used to protect the covenants of the League."
Much heated objection has been directed against Article X, which reads as follows:
"The members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression, the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.'