THE ÆSTHETICS OF UNEQUAL DIVISION.
BY ROSWELL PARKER ANGIER.
PART I.
The present paper reports the beginnings of an investigation designed to throw light on the psychological basis of our æsthetic pleasure in unequal division. It is confined to horizontal division. Owing to the prestige of the golden section, that is, of that division of the simple line which gives a short part bearing the same ratio to the long part that the latter bears to the whole line, experimentation of this sort has been fettered. Investigators have confined their efforts to statistical records of approximations to, or deviations from, the golden section. This exalts it into a possible æsthetic norm. But such a gratuitous supposition, by limiting the inquiry to the verification of this norm, distorts the results, tempting one to forget the provisional nature of the assumption, and to consider divergence from the golden section as an error, instead of another example, merely, of unequal division. We have, as a matter of fact, on one hand, investigations that do not verify the golden section, and, on the other hand, a series of attempts to account for our pleasure in it, as if it were, beyond dispute, the norm. In this way the statistical inquiries have been narrowed in scope, and interpretation retarded and misdirected. Statistically our aim should be to ascertain within how wide limits æsthetically pleasing unequal divisions fall; and an interpretative principle must be flexible enough to include persistent variations from any hypothetical norm, unless they can be otherwise accounted for. If it is not forced on us, we have, in either case, nothing to do with the golden section.
Since Fechner, the chief investigation in the æsthetics of simple forms is that of Witmer, in 1893.[1] Only a small part of his work relates to horizontal division, but enough to show what seems to me a radical defect in statistical method, namely, that of accepting a general average of the average judgments of the several subjects, as 'the most pleasing relation' or 'the most pleasing proportion.'[2] Such a total average may fall wholly without the range of judgments of every subject concerned, and tells us nothing certain about the specific judgments of any one. Even in the case of the individual subject, if he shows in the course of long experimentation that he has two distinct sets of judgments, it is not valid to say that his real norm lies between the two; much less when several subjects are concerned. If averages are data to be psychophysically explained, they must fall well within actual individual ranges of judgment, else they correspond to no empirically determinable psychophysical processes. Each individual is a locus of possible æsthetic satisfactions. Since such a locus is our ultimate basis for interpretation, it is inept to choose, as 'the most pleasing proportion,' one that may have no correspondent empirical reference. The normal or ideal individual, which such a norm implies, is not a psychophysical entity which may serve as a basis of explanation, but a mathematical construction.
This criticism would apply to judgments of unequal division on either side the center of a horizontal line. It would apply all the more to any general average of judgments including both sides, for, as we shall soon see, the judgments of individuals differ materially on the two sides, and this difference itself may demand its explanation. And if we should include within this average, judgments above and below the center of a vertical line, we should have under one heading four distinct sets of averages, each of which, in the individual cases, might show important variations from the others, and therefore require some variation of explanation. And yet that great leveller, the general average, has obliterated these vital differences, and is recorded as indicating the 'most pleasing proportion.'[3] That such an average falls near the golden section is immaterial. Witmer himself, as we shall see,[4] does not set much store by this coincidence as a starting point for explanation, since he is averse to any mathematical interpretation, but he does consider the average in question representative of the most pleasing division.
I shall now, before proceeding to the details of the experiment to be recorded, review, very briefly, former interpretative tendencies. Zeising found that the golden section satisfied his demand for unity and infinity in the same beautiful object.[5] In the golden section, says Wundt,[6] there is a unity involving the whole; it is therefore more beautiful than symmetry, according to the æsthetic principle that that unification of spatial forms which occurs without marked effort, which, however, embraces the greater manifold, is the more pleasing. But to me this manifold, to be æsthetic, must be a sensible manifold, and it is still a question whether the golden section set of relations has an actual correlate in sensations. Witmer,[7] however, wrote, at the conclusion of his careful researches, that scientific æsthetics allows no more exact statement, in interpretation of the golden section, than that it forms 'die rechte Mitte' between a too great and a too small variety. Nine years later, in 1902, he says[8] that the preference for proportion over symmetry is not a demand for an equality of ratios, but merely for greater variety, and that 'the amount of unlikeness or variety that is pleasing will depend upon the general character of the object, and upon the individual's grade of intelligence and æsthetic taste.' Külpe[9] sees in the golden section 'a special case of the constancy of the relative sensible discrimination, or of Weber's law.' The division of a line at the golden section produces 'apparently equal differences' between minor and major, and major and whole. It is 'the pleasingness of apparently equal differences.'
These citations show, in brief form, the history of the interpretation of our pleasure in unequal division. Zeising and Wundt were alike in error in taking the golden section as the norm. Zeising used it to support a philosophical theory of the beautiful. Wundt and others too hastily conclude that the mathematical ratios, intellectually discriminated, are also sensibly discriminated, and form thus the basis of our æsthetic pleasure. An extension of this principle would make our pleasure in any arrangement of forms depend on the mathematical relations of their parts. We should, of course, have no special reason for choosing one set of relationships rather than another, nor for halting at any intricacy of formulæ. But we cannot make experimental æsthetics a branch of applied mathematics. A theory, if we are to have psychological explanation at all, must be pertinent to actual psychic experience. Witmer, while avoiding and condemning mathematical explanation, does not attempt to push interpretation beyond the honored category of unity in variety, which is applicable to anything, and, in principle, is akin to Zeising's unity and infinity. We wish to know what actual psychophysical functionings correspond to this unity in variety. Külpe's interpretation is such an attempt, but it seems clear that Weber's law cannot be applied to the division at the golden section. It would require of us to estimate the difference between the long side and the short side to be equal to that of the long side and the whole. A glance at the division shows that such complex estimation would compare incomparable facts, since the short and the long parts are separated, while the long part is inclosed in the whole. Besides, such an interpretation could not apply to divisions widely variant from the golden section.
This paper, as I said, reports but the beginnings of an investigation into unequal division, confined as it is to results obtained from the division of a simple horizontal line, and to variations introduced as hints towards interpretation. The tests were made in a partially darkened room. The apparatus rested on a table of ordinary height, the part exposed to the subject consisting of an upright screen, 45 cm. high by 61 cm. broad, covered with black cardboard, approximately in the center of which was a horizontal opening of considerable size, backed by opal glass. Between the glass and the cardboard, flush with the edges of the opening so that no stray light could get through, a cardboard slide was inserted from behind, into which was cut the exposed figure. A covered electric light illuminated the figure with a yellowish-white light, so that all the subject saw, besides a dim outline of the apparatus and the walls of the room, was the illuminated figure. An upright strip of steel, 1½ mm. wide, movable in either direction horizontally by means of strings, and controlled by the subject, who sat about four feet in front of the table, divided the horizontal line at any point. On the line, of course, this appeared as a movable dot. The line itself was arbitrarily made 160 mm. long, and 1½ mm. wide. The subject was asked to divide the line unequally at the most pleasing place, moving the divider from one end slowly to the other, far enough to pass outside any pleasing range, or, perhaps, quite off the line; then, having seen the divider at all points of the line, he moved it back to that position which appealed to him as most pleasing. Record having been made of this, by means of a millimeter scale, the subject, without again going off the line, moved to the pleasing position on the other side of the center. He then moved the divider wholly off the line, and made two more judgments, beginning his movement from the other end of the line. These four judgments usually sufficed for the simple line for one experiment. In the course of the experimentation each of nine subjects gave thirty-six such judgments on either side the center, or seventy-two in all.
In Fig. 1, I have represented graphically the results of these judgments. The letters at the left, with the exception of X, mark the subjects. Beginning with the most extreme judgments on either side the center, I have erected modes to represent the number of judgments made within each ensuing five millimeters, the number in each case being denoted by the figure at the top of the mode. The two vertical dot-and-dash lines represent the means of the several averages of all the subjects, or the total averages. The short lines, dropped from each of the horizontals, mark the individual averages of the divisions either side the center, and at X these have been concentrated into one line. Subject E obviously shows two pretty distinct fields of choice, so that it would have been inaccurate to condense them all into one average. I have therefore given two on each side the center, in each case subsuming the judgments represented by the four end modes under one average. In all, sixty judgments were made by E on each half the line. Letter E¹ represents the first thirty-six; E² the full number. A comparison of the two shows how easily averages shift; how suddenly judgments may concentrate in one region after having been for months fairly uniformly distributed. The introduction of one more subject might have varied the total averages by several points. Table I. shows the various averages and mean variations in tabular form.