Harvard Psychological Studies, Volume 1 / Containing Sixteen Experimental Investigations from the Harvard Psychological Laboratory.

by Unknown

There are several important matters which might properly have been mentioned in an earlier part of this paper, in connection with the experiments to which they relate, but which I have designedly omitted, in order not to disturb the continuity in the development of the central object of the research. The first of these is the question of the influence of visualization on the judgments of cutaneous distances. This is in many ways a most important question, and confronts one who is making studies in tactual space everywhere. The reader may have already noticed that I have said but little about the factor of visualization in any of my experiments, and may have regarded it as a serious omission. It might be offered as a criticism of my work that the fact that I found the tactual illusions to exist in the same sense as the optical illusions was perhaps due to the failure to exclude visualization. All of the subjects declare that they were unable to shut out the influence of visualizing entirely. Some of the subjects who were very good visualizers found the habit especially insistent. I think, however, that not even in these latter cases does this factor at all vitiate my conclusions.

It will be remembered that the experiments up to this time fall into two groups, first, those in which the judgments on the cutaneous distances were reached by direct comparisons of the sensations themselves; and secondly, those in which the sensations were first localized and then the judgment of the distance read from these localizations. Visualizing, therefore, entered very differently into the two groups. In the first instance all of the judgments were made with the eyes closed, while all of the localizations were made with the eyes open. I was uncertain through the whole of the first group of experiments as to just how much disturbance was being caused in the estimation of the distance by visualizing. I therefore made a series of experiments to determine what effect was produced upon the illusion if in the one set of judgments one purposely visualized and in the other excluded visualizing as far as possible. In my own case I found that after some practice I could give very consistent judgments, in which I felt that I had abstracted from the visualized image of the arm almost entirely. I did not examine these results until the close of the series, and then found that the illusion was greater for those judgments in which visualization was excluded; that is, the filled space seemed much larger when the judgment was made without the help of visualization. It is evident, therefore, that the tactual illusion is influenced rather in a negative direction by visualization.

In the second group of experiments, where the judgments were obtained through the localization of the points, it would seem, at first sight, that the judgments must have been very largely influenced by the direct vision used in localizing the points. The subject, as will be remembered, looked down at a card of numbered points and named those which were directly over the contacts beneath. Here it should seem that the optical illusion of the overestimation of filled spaces, filled with points on the card, would be directly transmitted to the sensation on the skin underneath. Such criticism on this method of getting at the illusion has already been made orally to me. But this is obviously a mistaken objection. The points on the card make a filled space, which of course appears larger, but as the points expand, the numbers which are attached to them expand likewise, and the optical illusion has plainly no influence whatever upon the tactual illusion.

A really serious objection to this indirect method of approaching the illusion is, that the character of the cutaneous sensation is never so distinctly perceived when the eyes are open as when they are closed. Several subjects often found it necessary to close their eyes first, in order to get a clear perception of the locality of the points; they then opened their eyes, to name the visual points directly above. Some subjects even complained that when they opened their eyes they lost track of the exact location of the touch points, which they seemed to have when their eyes were closed. The tactual impression seems to be lost in the presence of active vision.

On the whole, then, I feel quite sure in concluding that the overestimation of the filled cutaneous spaces is not traceable to the influence of visualization. Parrish has explained all sporadic cases of overestimation as due to the optical illusion carried over in visualization. I have already shown that in my experiments visualization has really the opposite effect. In Parrish's experiments the overestimation occurred in the case of those collections of points which were so arranged as to allow the greatest differentiation among the points, and especially where the end-points were more or less distinct from the rest. This, according to my theory, is precisely what one would expect.

Those who have made quantitative studies in the optical illusion, especially in this particular illusion for open and filled spaces, have observed and commented on the instability of the illusion. Auerbach[11] says, in his investigation of the quantitative variations of the illusion, that concentration of attention diminishes the illusion. In the Zöllner figure, for instance, I have been able to notice the illusion fluctuate through a wide range, without eye-movements and without definitely attending to any point, during the fluctuation of the attention. My experiments with the tactual illusion have led me to the conclusion that it fluctuates even more than the optical illusion. Any deliberation in the judgment causes the apparent size of the filled space to shrink. The judgments that are given most rapidly and naïvely exhibit the strongest tendency to overestimation; and yet these judgments are so consistent as to exclude them from the category of guesses.

In most of my experiments, however, I did not insist on rapid and naïve judgments; but by a close observation of the subject as he was about to make a judgment I could tell quite plainly which judgments were spontaneous and which were deliberate. By keeping track of these with a system of marks, I was able to collect them in the end into groups representing fairly well the different degrees of attention. The illusion is always greatest for the group of spontaneous judgments, which points to the conclusion that all illusions, tactual as well as visual, are very largely a function of attention.

In Section II. I told of my attempt to reproduce the optical illusion upon the skin in the same form in which we find it for sight, namely, by presenting the open and filled spaces simultaneously, so that they might be held in a unitary grasp of consciousness and the judgment pronounced on the relative length of these parts of a whole. However, as I have already said, the filled space appears longer, not only when given simultaneously, but also when given successively with the open space. In the case of the optical illusion I am not so sure that the illusion does not exist if the two spaces are not presented simultaneously and adjacent, as Münsterberg asserts. Although, to be sure, for me the illusion is not so strong when an interval is allowed between the two spaces, I was interested to know whether this was true also in the case of a touch illusion. My previous tables did not enable me to compare the quantitative extent of the illusion for successive and simultaneous presentation. But I found in two series which had this point directly in view, one with the subject F and one in which G served as subject, that the illusion was emphatically stronger when the open and filled spaces were presented simultaneously and adjacent. In this instance, the illusion was doubtless a combination of two illusions—a shrinking of the open space, on the one hand, and a lengthening of the filled space on the other hand. Binet says, in his studies on the well-known Müller-Lyer illusion, that he believes the illusion, in its highest effects at any rate, to be due to a double contrast illusion.

This distortion of contrasted distances I have found in more than one case in this investigation—not only in the case of distances in which there is a qualitative difference, but also in the case of two open distances. In one experiment, in which open distances on the skin were compared with optical point distances, a distance of 10 cm. was given fifty times in connection with a distance of 15 cm., and fifty times in connection with a distance of 5 cm. In the former instance the distance of 10 cm. was underestimated, and in the other it was overestimated.

The general conclusion of the entire investigation thus far may be summed up in the statement: Wherever the objective conditions are the same in the two senses, the illusion exists in the same direction for both sight and touch.