And when we at last stand man to man in full freedom, no longer as psycho-physical constructions but as free personalities, and when we debate and try to convince each other, will you deny that Jove stands behind each of us and Jove nods to Jove when we meet? Would it even have a meaning for us to go on with our talk, should we try at all to convince each other if you thought and I thought, each one for himself, that our will is only our personal will, that there is no over-individual will, no Oversoul behind us? Can we discuss at all if we do not presuppose that there is really a truth which we are seeking in common, that there are certain judgments which we are bound to will, which we are obliged to affirm, which we will, but not as individuals, and of which we take for granted that every one whom we acknowledge at all as a personality must will them too; and if you come with the flippant air of the sceptic and tell me, "No, there is no truth, all is only as it appears to me, there is no objective truth," do you not contradict yourself, are you not saying that at least this, your own statement, expresses objective truth; that you will this with a faith and belief that this will of yours is an over-individual will which is, as such, a duty, an obligation for every one who thinks? Every escape is futile. And all the over-individuality that lives in our will towards truth comes to us again in our will towards morality. Do not say sceptically that there is no absolute obligation, that you do not feel bound by an over-individual will in your action, that you will do in every moment what pleases you individually. You cannot even speak this sceptical word without contradicting yourself again, as you demand through the fact of your saying it that we believe that you speak the truth and that you thus feel yourself bound not to lie. If you leave us doubtful whether your word was not a lie, the word itself cannot have any meaning. Do not try to dodge the Oversoul. Men live and fight in its purposes, and men descend to meet. It is as Emerson said, "At first delighted with the triumph of the intellect, we are like hunters on the scent and soldiers who rush to battle; but when the game is run down, when the enemy lies cold in his blood at our feet, we are alarmed at our solitude." Let the sociologists triumphantly reduce the ideals to necessary social products of evolution in the same spirit in which the psychologist eliminates the freedom of the individual; but let us never forget that such a social mechanism is as much an artificial construction necessary for its purposes as is the psycho-physical mechanism of individuality. In that reality with which history deals, in which our freedom lies, there our over-individual will comes from deeper ground than from the soil and the food and the climate. Our logical obligations, our ethical duties, our æsthetic appreciations, our religious revelations, in reality they do not come from without, they come from within; but from within as far as we are souls in the Oversoul. There is no duty in the world but the duty which we will ourselves; no outer force, no training, no custom, no punishment can make us have duties. Duty is our will, it may be the duty to think for the ideal of truth, the duty to feel for the ideal of æsthetics, the duty to act for the idea of morality, the duty to have faith in the ideal of religion; but it is always our own will, and yet not our fanciful, personal, individual will. It is a system of purposes upon whose reality all knowledge of the world, and thus the world as we know it, is dependent forever. The wave of Idealism is rising. The short-sighted superstition of Positivism will not lurk under the roof of a new hall of philosophy. To be a true student of the most scientific, of the most scholarly, of the most insistent philosophy means to respect and to study the sciences, the physical and the psychical sciences, but at the same time to understand that natural science is not the science of reality, that psychology does not touch the freedom of man, that no life has a meaning without the relation to the Oversoul. We cannot write a whole system and a whole text-book on the front of the new building. It must be enough to write there a symbolic word; happy, forever happy, the university which can write over the door of its temple of philosophy the name: Ralph Waldo Emerson.
IV. THE PLACE OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY
[At the opening of Emerson Hall, December 27, 1905, the American Psychological Association discussed the relation of psychology to philosophy; I opened the discussion with the following remarks:]
From the whole set of problems which cluster about psychology and its relation to neighboring sciences, this hour, in which Emerson Hall is completed, and this room, in which I hope to teach psychology to the end of my life, suggest to me most forcibly to-day the one question: Have I been right in housing psychology under this roof? I might have gone to the avenue yonder and might have begged for a psychological laboratory in the spacious quarters of the Agassiz Museum, to live there in peaceful company with the biologists; or I might have persuaded our benefactors to build for me a new wing of the physical laboratory. But I insisted that the experimental psychologists feel at home only where logic and ethics, metaphysics and epistemology keep house on the next floor.
I certainly do not mean that the psychologist ought to mix the records of his instruments with the demands of his speculations, and that he may seek help from the Absolute when the figures of the chronoscope or the curves of the kymograph are doubtful. Experimental psychology is certainly to-day and will be for all future an independent exact discipline with its own problems and methods. No one can insist more earnestly than I do on the demarcation line between the empirical study of mental phenomena and the logical enquiry into the values of life.
Yet I deny that it is a personal idiosyncrasy of mine to try to combine vivid interest in both. There is no antagonism between them; a man may love both his mother and his bride. I am devoted to philosophy, just as I love my native country; and I am devoted to psychology, just as I love the country in which I do my daily work; I feel sure there is no reason for any friction between them.
Of course, on the surface a psychological laboratory has much more likeness to the workshop of the physicist. But that has to do with externalities only. The psychologist and the physicist alike use subtle instruments, need dark rooms and sound-proof rooms, and are spun into a web of electric wires. And yet the physicist has never done anything else than to measure his objects, while I feel sure that no psychologist has ever measured a psychical state. Psychical states are not quantities, and every so-called measurement thereof refers merely to their physical accompaniments and conditions. The world of mental phenomena is a world of qualities, in which one is never a multiple of the other, and the deepest tendencies of physics and psychology are thus utterly divergent.
The complicated apparatus is therefore not an essential for the psychologist. Of course, we shall use every corner of our twenty-four laboratory-rooms upstairs, and every instrument in the new cases—and yet much of our most interesting work is done without any paraphernalia. Three of the doctor-dissertations which our psychological laboratory completed last year consisted of original research in which no instruments were involved; they dealt with memory-images, with associations, with æsthetic feeling, and so on. Yes, when, a short time ago, a Western university asked me how much it would cost to introduce a good practical training-course in experimental psychology, I replied that it would cost them the salary of a really good psychologist, and besides, perhaps, one dollar for cardboard, strings, rulers, colored paper, wire, and similar fancy articles at five cents apiece.
On the other hand, I do not know a psychological experiment which does not need a philosophical background to bring its results into sharp relief. Of course, you will say, the psychologist deals with facts, not with theories, and has to analyze and to describe and to explain those facts. Certainly he has to do all that; only he must not forget that the so-called "fact" in psychology is the product of complex transformations of reality. A will, an emotion, a memory-image, a feeling, an act of attention, of judgment, of decision—these are not found in the way in which stones and stars are noticed. Even if I choose perceptions or sensations as material for my psychological study, and still more when I call them my perceptions and my sensations, I mean something which I have found at the end of a long logical road, not at its starting-point, and that road certainly leads through philosophy. Emerson said wisely, "A philosopher must be more than a philosopher;" we can add: A psychologist must be more than a psychologist. First of all, he must be a philosopher.
What would be the result if our laboratory had moved to the naturalistic headquarters? It would be the beginning of a complete separation from philosophy. Our graduate students would flock to psychological research work without even being aware that without philosophical training they are mere dilettantes. And soon enough a merely psychological doctorate would be demanded. I do not deny at all that such pure psychologists would find enough to do; I should doubt only whether they know what they are doing. There are too many psychologists already who go their way so undisturbed only because they walk like somnambulists on the edge of the roof; they do not even see the real problem; they do not see the depths to which they may fall.