Harvard Psychological Studies, Volume 2

by Unknown

Having given, then, these relatively fixed temperamental conditions of reactions to different stimuli, which remain after practice (training in the control of attention) has reduced the reactions to their lowest terms, and has secured the conditions which are favorable for the best balancing of the attention, there is yet one other question very germane to the subject. It will have occurred already to any one reading the above, that while the response to one stimulus is being made, the other may be held in abeyance in the fringe region of the attention-field, and that it is only brought up to clear perception when the first has been disposed of. In other words, it may well be that the first of two simultaneous but disparate stimuli, which gets a start at setting-off its appropriate response in its sense-organ, will bring out this response and be perceived before the other one gets started,—that we do only one thing at a time,—that even in such minute processes as this there is no possibility of division of attention. It is hardly probable on the basis of the experimentation already reported, that this is the case. There is some division of attention. Otherwise there would be an equal certainty of judgment in every case, no matter how small the separating interval. But still the question as to how two mental processes, starting at the same moment of time, do proceed, as compared to the progress of each of the same processes when it holds the field alone, is very vital to the understanding of the psychology of interval-discrimination. And thus the question of objective time-relations is necessarily involved in that of making judgments of the time-relations of simple mental processes (subjective time-relations). The question is, Do these processes, starting simultaneously, proceed just as freely as if they were the sole occupants of the field of attention and so had the whole energy of attention concentrated upon the single process, or do they interfere with each other?

Distribution of attention, of some sort, is granted. It is generally conceded that there must be some sort of overlapping of the processes in any complex mental operation. But there is the greatest lack of information as to how this overlapping takes place,—as to the mechanism of the distribution of attention. Fechner held to the notion of a fixed maximum of available psychophysical energy. If this energy is being consumed in a single process, that process is very vivid, and all other processes are below the threshold. If, on the other hand, it is distributed over several simultaneous processes, they are all of diminished vividness. Distribution of attention always means diminution of vividness, and concentration of attention, increase of vividness. (See Elemente der Psychophysik, vol. 2, p. 451, 1860.) There is no question of the truth of the last statement, and very likely Fechner's fundamental concept is a true one; but there is need of more definite data on the conditions and nature of simple mental processes occurring at the same time, before it is considered proved.

Such researches as those of Paulhan,[115] Jastrow,[116] Loeb,[117] and De Sanctis[118] all dealt with the combination of processes which were themselves quite complex. It may well be that such processes as reciting a poem, performing a subtraction or multiplication of long numbers on paper, or keeping time with a metronome with the hand, seem to go along together when combined, so that the time taken to do the two of them together is much less than the sum of the times required for their separate performance, and, in some cases, no greater than the time required for either alone, and yet there may be no real proceeding together. The apparent saving of time may be due, as Paulhan suggested, to a rapid oscillation from one to the other of the two complex processes which are largely automatic and can proceed, to such extent as they are automatic, without any attention. This illustrates how these investigations have probably missed the real point at issue with regard to the division and distribution of attention. The attention might be distributed over several of the minuter part-processes of these processes so that many were proceeding at the same time, and yet the method of these experiments would not reveal it. They were not planned with sufficient precision. There is a problem in the division of attention which they did not come within sight of, and this is the real question of division in case of the simplest processes.

This problem is really that of the mechanism of mental assimilation. The process it investigates is illustrated by the maturing collective idea, as a melody or a spoken sentence. There is a gradual enrichment or growth in meaning, as such a process goes on toward its completion. At any instant during the process, implicit associative and nascent perceptive elements are working together to their own mutual clarification and explication. All focal content is the result of complicated interworkings of such fringe material. It is impossible, it seems to me, to question the causal relation of the fringe elements or processes of one moment to the focal of the next; and it is equally impossible to deny the complication of these same fringe processes. They must go on at the same time in order to enter into one and the same resultant process. The question of direct interest at this point in the discussion is, To what extent do they proceed at the same time?

It would seem from the way in which this question, of the relationship and interference of mental processes which proceed or start to proceed at the same time, has come up in this investigation, that the natural method of pursuing it would be that of comparing reaction times for cognition reactions to the single and combined stimuli. But we are warned against this by very clear inferences from an investigation of Professor Münsterberg's in which he used the reaction method.[119] By an ingenious use of the reaction experiment, the author shows that two-part processes in a reaction, as, for example, a restricted judgment of class and a subjective preference, occupy about the same time when combined in a single reaction as when either is performed in a separate reaction. In other words, two judgments of distinctly different kinds can be made in the same time as either can be made when it has all the attention concentrated upon it. The conclusion that these elementary processes go on together—that at least there is some degree of overlapping—seems unavoidable.

But when the first part of the same report is considered in relation to the second, it is clearly shown that the reaction experiment is not adapted to the finer investigation of this problem. For the first part shows that no matter how much a motor reaction is complicated by choices or other judgments, it always takes place in just about the same time as the simple reaction. The complications may be such as actually to double the reaction time in the case of a sensory reaction, and yet a motor reaction, under precisely the same conditions as far as they may be the same for a motor, shows no increase in time. The "set" of the attention in the motor reaction is, no doubt, such a change in the order of succession of the parts of the process that some of those, which come after the stimulus is received in the case of the sensory reaction, are made to come before the stimulus in the motor. When, however, it is found that the motor response to the question, "Is this the name of a scientist, philosopher, poet, statesman, or musician,—Sappho?" is made by the appropriate finger, as previously agreed upon, in just as short a time as the observer can make a motor response with any finger to a simple auditory stimulus, it indicates, either that the whole of the choice judgment has been made before the stimulus was received, or that the judgment itself is so automatic that it is practically a reflex. This latter cannot be true. The judgment, as conscious choice, cannot be made before the stimulus is given, i. e., until the question is completed. And judgment cannot be made automatic and yet be a judgment. In fact both alternatives are untenable, and there is no other course than to hold the situation which gave rise to them at fault. If the judgment process here required previous to the reaction does take time apart from the processes of the simple reaction, the reaction process is shown by these experiments to be unable to exhibit it. A more microscopic method is demanded before the matter can be settled.

The Leipsic method of measuring the scope of attention by means of the tachistoscope is the standard means of securing data as to the number of elementary processes which can go on at the same time in consciousness. The same question, with which we are here concerned, grows directly out of the investigation of the number of processes which can go on together. Wundt acknowledges the great difficulty which inheres in the investigation of this problem.[120] Cattell's early work with the tachistoscope showing the numbers of letters, syllables, and words, which could be apperceived under the same objective conditions, indicated the great importance of what we may best call meaning, in apperception, and its influence on the number of different processes which may proceed together. In fact the number depends upon the definition of the unit with which the investigator starts out. Wirth, the latest emendator of the tachistoscopic method, has shown,[121] in a very thoroughgoing and genuinely constructive criticism of earlier work, that the one question of primary importance in investigations of the content of the moment of consciousness, i. e., scope of attention, is to set forth the relative clearnesses of the elementary processes there proceeding together. He shows that the different grades of clearness which may present themselves in the field of consciousness of a momentary act indicate, on the one hand, the impossibility of sharply distinguishing the "scope of attention" from the "scope of consciousness" as Wundt uses these terms, and, on the other, the serious indefiniteness of any merely numerical statement of the scope of attention. His main purpose is to set forth a method by which this field can be enriched by exhaustive statements of the relative clearnesses of the processes going on at the same time. All the work of the present study had been performed before the publication of Wirth's work. Otherwise some of his suggestions would have been used in the plan of the experiments following. I may say, however, that I believe the method here used has its own distinctive merits.

GENERAL METHOD FOR TESTS IN COEXISTENCE

Taking the suggestions offered by Professor Münsterberg's study of apperceptive and associative processes, I selected simple judgments of comparison as the best means of trying-out this question of coexistence. The perceptive act itself is made up of judgments, and these may very properly be the processes studied in combination as in the tachistoscopic experiment. But the judgment which has a previous perceptive act as its condition, determining its start, seems to be better under control. It is itself a central process, not dependent upon the variations of the objective factors in sensation. My plan was to have the stimuli so arranged as to give rise to two or more perceived conditions at the same moment, and so have one or more judgments of comparison between the perceived features made at the moment the perceptions were completed and immediately stated. If one makes two series of single judgments of comparison, and a series wherein these two judgments are combined in a single act, all three under precisely the same objective conditions, and the same subjective conditions, saving only the necessary changes in the direction of the attention, and the percentage of correct judgments is recorded in each case, providing always that in no single series of judgments were the conditions such that all judgments could be correctly given, he would then have reasonable grounds for making inferences with respect to the interference of simple mental processes going on at the same time,—whether there is any, and, if there is, how much there is. Interference would be indicated by the falling-off in percentage of correct judgments as the combinations were increased.

Such relative accuracy of judgments, single and combined, was the test sought after and relied upon in the following experiments. It was very necessary to have the objective conditions such that the results in cases of single judgments, later to be combined, should be short of absolute correctness, in order that interference from the combination should show itself in impaired accuracy. Otherwise there might be some free energy of attention, which could readily take up the extra work when the judgments were combined, and so there would be no impairment of accuracy. It was the aim to have the objective conditions, such as duration and extent, so regulated that about ninety per cent correct judgments resulted in the series of single judgments. If, then, when two were combined, eighty per cent were given correctly, and when three were combined, seventy per cent, the inference would seem reasonable that this falling-off in correctness was due to interference. The failure of the perceptive process, indicated by the ten per cent incorrect judgments in the series of singles, would remain a constant source of error throughout.