The speakers during the day gave many delightful reminiscences of the noble men and women who had given their earnest efforts to promote this great reform, and dwelt with hope on the many encouraging steps of progress that had marked the years since the initiative steps were taken. The day before the Convention an elegant reception was held at the St. James Hotel. Nearly two hundred persons called during the afternoon, and about forty sat down to a sumptuous dinner.[137]
The Washington Convention of 1871[138] was thus described by The Republican of that city:
The third Annual National Woman's Suffrage Convention, held at Lincoln Hall, was an unprecedented success. Its leading spirit was Mrs. Isabella Beecher Hooker, who, together with Josephine S. Griffing, Paulina Wright Davis, and Susan B. Anthony, made all the preliminary arrangements, and managed the meeting. Mrs. Hooker's zeal, activity, and amiability gave her the power to make an easy conquest wherever she carries the banner of the good cause. Her generalship in Washington marshalled hosts of new and ardent friends into the movement. Five sessions were held, during each of which the Convention was presided over by some member of the Senate or House of Representatives; and it was a novel feature to see such men as Senators Nye, Warren, and Wilson sitting successively in the president's chair, apparently half unconscious that it was one of greater honor than their familiar seats in the Senate. Speeches were made by Adelle Hazlett, Olympia Brown, Lilie Peckham, Isabella B. Hooker, Lillie Devereux Blake, Cora Hatch Tappan, Susan B. Anthony, Kate Stanton, Victoria C. Woodhull, Hon. A. G. Riddle (of the Washington bar), Frederick Douglass, Senators Nye and Wilson, and Mara E. Post, who made a journey all the way from Wyoming to attend the Convention. A good deal was said by the speakers concerning the proposed interpretation of the existing constitutional amendments. It was thus a convention with a new idea. The reporters could not say that only the old, stock arguments were used. There was an air of novelty about the proceedings, indicating healthy life in the movement. The consequence was that the cause of woman's enfranchisement made a new, sudden, and profound impression at Washington.
This Convention was remarkable for the absence of the usual long series of resolutions covering every point of our demands.
Another peculiarity was the unusual amount of money that flowed into the treasury, as the following letter, among many others of the same character, shows:
Miss Anthony—I have this morning deposited $500 for the use of the N. W. S. A., and I will give a check for the amount as you desire it.
Mrs. M. M. Cartter.
Washington, D. C.
Letters were read from Mrs. Esther Morris,[139] Justice of the Peace in Wyoming Territory, and from Mrs. Jane Graham Jones, of Chicago. Senator Nye, who presided at the evening session, said, "He had not given much thought to the question of Woman Suffrage, but it was his opinion that in proportion as we elevated the mothers of voters, so were the voters themselves elevated." The audiences during this convention were large, and the press not only respectful but highly complimentary.
It was just before this enthusiastic convention that Victoria Woodhull presented her memorial to Congress and secured a hearing[140] before the Judiciary Committee of the House, which called out the able Minority Report, by William Loughridge, of Iowa, and Benjamin F. Butler, of Massachusetts. The following is from the Congressional Globe of Dec. 21, 1870.
In the Senate: Mr. Harris presented the memorial of Victoria C. Woodhull, praying for the passage of such laws as may be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the right vested by the Constitution in the citizens of the United States to vote without regard to sex; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, and ordered to be printed.
In the House: Mr. Julian—I ask unanimous consent to present at this time and have printed in the Globe the memorial of Victoria C. Woodhull, claiming the right of suffrage under the XIV. and XV. Articles of Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, and asking for the enactment of the necessary and appropriate legislation to guarantee the exercise of that right to the women of the United States. I also ask that the petition be referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.
No objection was made, and it was ordered accordingly.
THE MEMORIAL OF VICTORIA C. WOODHULL.
To the Honorable the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States in Congress assembled, respectfully showeth:
That she was born in the State of Ohio, and is above the age of twenty-one years; that she has resided in the State of New York during the past three years; that she is still a resident thereof, and that she is a citizen of the United States, as declared by the XIV. Article of the Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.
That since the adoption of the XV. Article of the Amendments to the Constitution, neither the State of New York nor any other State, nor any Territory, has passed any law to abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote, as established by said article, neither on account of sex or otherwise. That, nevertheless, the right to vote is denied to women citizens of the United States by the operation of Election Laws in the several States and Territories, which laws were enacted prior to the adoption of the said XV. Article, and which are inconsistent with the Constitution as amended, and, therefore, are void and of no effect; but which, being still enforced by the said States and Territories, render the Constitution inoperative as regards the right of women citizens to vote:
And whereas, Article VI., Section 2, declares "That this Constitution and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and all judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution and laws of any State to the contrary, notwithstanding."
And whereas, no distinction between citizens is made in the Constitution of the United States on account of sex; but the XV. Article of Amendments to it provides that "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
And whereas, Congress has power to make laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution all powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United States; and to make or alter all regulations in relation to holding elections for senators or representatives, and especially to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of the said XIV. Article:
And whereas, the continuance of the enforcement of said local election laws, denying and abridging the right of citizens to vote on account of sex, is a grievance to your memorialist and to various other persons, citizens of the United States,
Therefore, your memorialist would most respectfully petition your honorable bodies to make such laws as in the wisdom of Congress shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the right vested by the Constitution in the citizens of the United States to vote, without regard to sex.
Victoria C. Woodhull.
And your memorialist will ever pray.
New York City, Dec. 19, 1870.
ADDRESS OF VICTORIA C. WOODHULL JANUARY 11, 1871.
To the Honorable the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the United States:
Having most respectfully memorialized Congress for the passage of such laws as in its wisdom shall seem necessary and proper to carry into effect the rights vested by the Constitution of the United States in the citizens to vote, without regard to sex, I beg leave to submit to your honorable body the following in favor of my prayer in said memorial which has been referred to your Committee.
The public law of the world is founded upon the conceded fact that sovereignty can not be forfeited or renounced. The sovereign power of this country is perpetually in the politically organized people of the United States, and can neither be relinquished nor abandoned by any portion of them. The people in this republic who confer sovereignty are its citizens: in a monarchy the people are the subjects of sovereignty. All citizens of a republic by rightful act or implication confer sovereign power. All people of a monarchy are subjects who exist under its supreme shield and enjoy its immunities. The subject of a monarch takes municipal immunities from the sovereign as a gracious favor; but the woman citizen of this country has the inalienable "sovereign" right of self-government in her own proper person. Those who look upon woman's status by the dim light of the common law, which unfolded itself under the feudal and military institutions that establish right upon physical power, can not find any analogy in the status of the woman citizen of this country, where the broad sunshine of our Constitution has enfranchised all.
As sovereignty can not be forfeited, relinquished, or abandoned, those from whom it flows—the citizens—are equal in conferring the power, and should be equal in the enjoyment of its benefits and in the exercise of its rights and privileges. One portion of citizens have no power to deprive another portion of rights and privileges such as are possessed and exercised by themselves. The male citizen has no more right to deprive the female citizen of the free, public, political, expression of opinion than the female citizen has to deprive the male citizen thereof.
The sovereign will of the people is expressed in our written Constitution, which is the supreme law of the land. The Constitution makes no distinction of sex. The Constitution defines a woman born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, to be a citizen. It recognizes the right of citizens to vote. It declares that the right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of "race, color, or previous condition of servitude."
Women, white and black, belong to races, although to different races. A race of people comprises all the people, male and female. The right to vote can not be denied on account of race. All people included in the term race have the right to vote, unless otherwise prohibited. Women of all races are white, black, or some intermediate color. Color comprises all people, of all races and both sexes. The right to vote can not be denied on account of color. All people included in the term color have the right to vote unless otherwise prohibited.
With the right to vote sex has nothing to do. Race and color include all people of both sexes. All people of both sexes have the right to vote, unless prohibited by special limiting terms less comprehensive than race or color. No such limiting terms exist in the Constitution. Women, white and black, have from time immemorial groaned under what is properly termed in the Constitution "previous condition of servitude." Women are the equals of men before the law, and are equal in all their rights as citizens. Women are debarred from voting in some parts of the United States, although they are allowed to exercise that right elsewhere. Women were formerly permitted to vote in places where they are now debarred therefrom. The naturalization laws of the United States expressly provide for the naturalization of women. But the right to vote has only lately been definitely declared by the Constitution to be inalienable, under three distinct conditions—in all of which woman is clearly embraced.
The citizen who is taxed should also have a voice in the subject matter of taxation. "No taxation without representation" is a right which was fundamentally established at the very birth of our country's independence; and by what ethics does any free government impose taxes on women without giving them a voice upon the subject or a participation in the public declaration as to how and by whom these taxes shall be applied for common public use? Women are free to own and to control property, separate and free from males, and they are held responsible in their own proper persons, in every particular, as well as men, in and out of court. Women have the same inalienable right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness that men have. Why have they not this right politically, as well as men?
Women constitute a majority of the people of this country—they hold vast portions of the nation's wealth and pay a proportionate share of the taxes. They are intrusted with the most vital responsibilities of society; they bear, rear, and educate men; they train and mould their characters; they inspire the noblest impulses in men; they often hold the accumulated fortunes of a man's life for the safety of the family and as guardians of the infants, and yet they are debarred from uttering any opinion by public vote, as to the management by public servants of these interests; they are the secret counselors, the best advisers, the most devoted aids in the most trying periods of men's lives, and yet men shrink from trusting them in the common questions of ordinary politics. Men trust women in the market, in the shop, on the highway and railroad, and in all other public places and assemblies, but when they propose to carry a slip of paper with a name upon it to the polls, they fear them. Nevertheless, as citizens, women have the right to vote; they are part and parcel of that great element in which the sovereign power of the land had birth; and it is by usurpation only that men debar them from this right. The American nation, in its march onward and upward, can not publicly choke the intellectual and political activity of half its citizens by narrow statutes. The will of the entire people is the true basis of republican government, and a free expression of that will by the public vote of all citizens, without distinctions of race, color, occupation, or sex, is the only means by which that will can be ascertained. As the world has advanced into civilization and culture; as mind has risen in its dominion over matter; as the principle of justice and moral right has gained sway, and merely physical organized power has yielded thereto; as the might of right has supplanted the right of might, so have the rights of women become more fully recognized, and that recognition is the result of the development of the minds of men, which through the ages she has polished, and thereby heightened the lustre of civilization.
It was reserved for our great country to recognize by constitutional enactment that political equality of all citizens which religion, affection, and common sense should have long since accorded; it was reserved for America to sweep away the mist of prejudice and ignorance, and that chivalric condescension of a darker age, for in the language of Holy Writ, "The night is far spent, the day is at hand, let us therefore cast off the work of darkness and let us put on the armor of light. Let us walk honestly as in the day." It may be argued against the proposition that there still remains upon the statute books of some States the word "male" to an exclusion; but as the Constitution, in its paramount character, can only be read by the light of the established principle, ita lex Scripta est, and as the subject of sex is not mentioned, and the Constitution is not limited either in terms or by necessary implication in the general rights of citizens to vote, this right can not be limited on account of anything in the spirit of inferior or previous enactments upon a subject which is not mentioned in the supreme law. A different construction would destroy a vested right in a portion of the citizens, and this no legislature has a right to do without compensation, and nothing can compensate a citizen for the loss of his or her suffrage—its value is equal to the value of life. Neither can it be presumed that women are to be kept from the polls as a mere police regulation: it is to be hoped, at least, that police regulations in their case need not be very active. The effect of the amendments to the Constitution must be to annul the power over this subject in the States, whether past, present, or future, which is contrary to the amendments. The amendments would even arrest the action of the Supreme Court in cases pending before it prior to their adoption, and operate as an absolute prohibition to the exercise of any other jurisdiction than merely to dismiss the suit. 3 Dall., 382; 6 Wheaton, 405; 9 ib., 868; 3d Circ. Pa., 1832.
And if the restrictions contained in the Constitution as to color, race or servitude, were designed to limit the State governments in reference to their own citizens, and were intended to operate also as restrictions on the federal power, and to prevent interference with the rights of the State and its citizens, how, then, can the State restrict citizens of the United States in the exercise of rights not mentioned in any restrictive clause in reference to actions on the part of those citizens having reference solely to the necessary functions of the General Government, such as the election of representatives and senators to Congress, whose election the Constitution expressly gives Congress the power to regulate? S. C., 1847; Fox vs. Ohio, 5 Howard, 410.
Your memorialist complains of the existence of State laws, and prays Congress, by appropriate legislation, to declare them, as they are, annulled, and to give vitality to the Constitution under its power to make and alter the regulations of the States contravening the same.
It may be urged in opposition that the courts have power, and should declare upon this subject. The Supreme Court has the power, and it would be its duty so to declare the law: but the court will not do so unless a determination of such point as shall arise make it necessary to the determination of a controversy, and hence a case must be presented in which there can be no rational doubt. All this would subject the aggrieved parties to much dilatory, expensive and needless litigation, which your memorialist prays your honorable body to dispense with by appropriate legislation, as there can be no purpose in special arguments "ad inconvenienti," enlarging or contracting the import of the language of the Constitution.
Therefore, Believing firmly in the right of citizens to freely approach those in whose hands their destiny is placed under the Providence of God, your memorialist has frankly, but humbly, appealed to you, and prays that the wisdom of Congress may be moved to action in this matter for the benefit and the increased happiness of our beloved country.
SPEECH OF A. G. RIDDLE,
In Support of the Woodhull Memorial, before the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives, as Reproduced in the Convention on the Evening of the same Day.
Mr. Riddle spoke as follows: Mr. Chairman—(Senator Nye)—I have always thought that the questions involved in this movement could be the more effectively presented by ladies; and I have never appeared in their public discussions unless by special request, and for some special purpose. I have been asked to bring to your notice as well as I may this evening the argument: That the women of these United States are full and complete citizens. Citizens as fully, broadly, and deeply as it is possible for men to be, though not permitted to exercise the elective franchise.
As I arise I find between myself and this proposition, two or three questions, about which I am disposed to tax your patience for a moment, though there is nothing new to be said. In the outset, let me say that it is conceded by all, that the right of self-government, in America at any rate, is a natural right. You may select with care or at random, any one of the forty or fifty American constitutions that have been prepared with more or less pains, and promulgated with solemnity, and you will find there is not one that has assumed to create and confer this right of self-government. But they all declare, expressly or impliedly, that the right to govern is inherent in the people. Now, if these ladies are a portion of the people, this right resides in them. There is no new right to be conferred upon them. They are simply to go into the new exercise of an old franchise; for if the right of self-government is a natural right, then does it pertain to every human being alike. Such is the recognized theory of every American constitution, and such is its practice.
Take a step further and you find that starting with a recognition of this pre-existing right of government, Constitution makers have simply provided the means and machinery by which this right of government may work itself out. The only means placed in the hands of the individual citizen by which he may accomplish his portion of this great task is the ballot, or the viva voce vote. If this right of self-government is a natural right, and if it can be exercised alone by the ballot, then is the right to the ballot a natural right, and he who stands up against this everlasting right of nature, had better look to it, and take himself out of the way. As this is a political question I may venture a single word to politicians. We of the masculine gender, are all of us, more or less politicians; and of all the timid things in the world the professed politician (a member of Congress excepted) is the most timid. [Laughter.] He is afraid of his soul, as if he had one, or one large enough to occasion apprehension. [Laughter.] I have this thing to say to them, that when any great idea or great truth finds itself at large in this lower world, and is obliged to get itself incorporated into the working processes of a government, if it does not find a political party ready, willing, and worthy to receive it, it forthwith makes for itself a new party. [Applause.] And as it does not create new human beings to form a party of, it must necessarily gather them from the old parties. Just as the distinguished Senator (Senator Nye) will recollect the present Republican party was formed, and against which the two old fossil parties united, as they always do. Now, this new great idea, if rejected, will disintegrate these old parties; take that which is fit, proper, and deserving for its own great mission, leaving the residuum to unite, and crumble and pulverize together under the feet of the new.
The right of self-government, as I have said, is a natural right pertaining to all alike, and is to be exercised by the ballot. And the right to that is therefore a natural right, as is the right to wear clothes. Decency and comfort require that clothes should be worn; but they are artificial wholly. Just so is the right to vote a natural right, though the vote, or the mode of voting at least, is an artificial means. This logic can not be caviled with or gainsaid. The young man and the young woman outside of political considerations, in every other point of view, stand before the law on an equality, and what one may do, so may the other, each may govern him or herself. But not so politically; when the youth reaches the age of twenty-one the ballot comes to his hands by due course of law, protecting his natural right, he having grown to it. Why do you give him the ballot, pray, or permit him to take it for himself? Simply because it is the means by which he governs and protects himself. Nobody would start I suppose the terribly heterodox idea that it is not necessary for the young man to govern himself with the ballot. It would be one of those unheard-of atrocities that nobody would have the hardihood to promulgate in the presence of masculine associates at all. He is entitled to the right for the purpose of governing himself. Nobody was born to govern anybody else—man or woman. It is only because in political associations people become so united, that a man in order to govern himself is obliged to govern others, that we get the right to govern others at all. It grows out of our effort to govern ourselves. As an essential necessity we are obliged to govern others and to be governed by them. This is our only warrant for the government of others.
Now, I pray to know why a young maiden, when she approaches the same age, may not have accorded to her the same protection of her natural right that is accorded to the youth, and for the same purpose. In the name of all womanhood, and of all manhood, I beg to know why this may not be so? In the name of my own daughters whose whispered words haunt the chambers of my soul, asking to know why, if it is necessary for their brother to exercise this right, it is not necessary for them? Nobody need to argue to a father that his daughters are not the equals of his sons. I will never tolerate hearing it said, that my son is born to empire and sovereignty, while his sisters are born to be hidden away and yarded up in some solitary desert place, as their proper sphere. [Applause.] I do not propose to raise and educate my daughters to keep them cooped up with their feet tied until some masculine purveyor comes along with his market basket.
Oh! ye opponents of the rights of woman, why not be consistent. If, as you say, she has not the capacity to choose or exercise the elective franchise, why not choose for her in everything, and impose upon her the husband of your choice? Don't you represent her? You concede that the young woman has abundance of capacity to choose her lord and master to whom she shall be delivered, and yet she is not fit to vote for a constable. (Laughter.)
Be consistent, you who oppose us in this movement, and say she shall not have anything to do with the selection of her husband. If she is competent at an early age, in the vortex and whirlpool of life, to select him to whom first, last, and always she shall belong, may she not once in four years have the privilege of voting for President without any great hazard? Think of it. Oh! this terrible old question! We have been mining and drilling in the earth's crust, and we have got finally to the last question, or, rather, it has made its way to the surface. This question of woman's suffrage and woman's right at last comes up for final argument, and it will work its way along until it is definitely determined. Indeed, I believe it is already settled.
To return to these constitutions, from which I mean not to wander again. I said to you that these constitutions of the various American States have recognized as older than themselves the right of government. They have furnished the means, which were also older than themselves, the exercise of the elective franchise. They have not attempted to create and confer any right to govern. They simply regulate it; and they are framed upon this idea, that all people are equally entitled to govern themselves, women and men, and would all govern themselves if some were not excluded by the terms and provisions of these, their constitutions. Take up the whole thirty-five that can be found in the edition of 1864, and every one of them says that the elective franchise shall be exercised by the male white citizens. We have got rid of the "white." We have finally given color to the Constitution. (Laughter.) And, in getting rid of that "white," we got rid of more than was probably intended at the time. Good does get itself done by accident sometimes. It has to when bad men do it. (Laughter and applause.) Why is this term "male" used in the constitutions, pray? It was not by accident. Forty or fifty of them would not use it, except by design. It was because every mortal man knew when tinkering up a constitution that if he did not put male in, females would vote. They had the right, and there had to be a constitutional barrier erected to prevent their exercise of it. Now, the thing which we have to do is either to strike out this term "male," which, I trust, ladies (turning to the ladies on the platform), is not particularly odious anywhere else, except in the constitution.
Mrs. Davis and others—Not at all.
Mr. Riddle.—I repeat, that what we have to do is either to get rid of this word "male," or to convince Congress, the courts, and the rest of the world, that it is already gotten rid of, which, I think, is easier. If it remains it can be put out in a very summary way. It makes no difference in how many constitutions it is found, nor in how many carefully considered statutes it has been incorporated, for a single provision in the Constitution of the United States is of that potency that instantaneously all constitutions and all statutes are clarified of the exclusive "male" principle, and that without other change or repeal.
And this brings me to the immediate question to be discussed, the XIV. Amendment of the Constitution, which stands as the XIV. Article. And you will understand that when the people or the legislature speak by constitution or law, and use ordinary language, that they mean what they say, and nobody can get up and say they do not mean that, or that they mean something else. There is nobody that can be heard for a moment to argue against the plain, obvious, declared, well-ascertained meaning of words. And when such words are used, it is the end of argument and of construction. The great object to be achieved, so far as women are concerned, is to bring them into the possession of the rights of citizenship. "A person" is one thing, and naturally, "a citizen" is something a little more. He or she is the creature of a political compact, having the rights, the privileges, the franchises of that particular political association, whatever they are. A very ingenious, and at the same time a very meritorious writer, recently, in overhauling these English words—and it is a pretty good thing my honorable friends from the two Houses of Congress are not to be referred to—but it is a good thing for the rest of us who use words sometimes carelessly, to see how Mr. Grant White says some of them should be used, and what they really do mean. On page 100 of his recent work on "Words and their Uses," which, so far as I know, has received the highest commendation of the critics—in speaking of this term "citizen," and how it is used, or rather how it is misused, says:
Citizen is used by some newspaper writers with what seems like an affectation of the French usage of citoyen in the First Republic. For instance, "Gen. A. is a well-known citizen." "Several citizens carried the sufferer," etc. The writer might as well have said that the sufferer was carried off by several church members or several "Freemasons." Now mark, he says, that "a citizen is a person who has certain political rights, and the word is properly used only to imply or suggest the possession of those rights."
That is what we should use the term "citizen" for—apply it to a naturalized person in possession of certain political franchises, rights, and privileges. Thanking Mr. Grant White for that, let us, in its light, read the first clause of the XIV. Amendment, and see what it does say and mean. "Sec. 1st. All persons;" not all male persons, nor all white persons, but "all persons born or naturalized in the United States, subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States, and of the States where they reside." That is what they are. They are citizens. That is, "persons," are "citizens," which means naturalized persons, clothed and permeated with, surrounded by, and put in possession of, citizenship. The term is used in the sense in which Mr. White uses it. It is no new meaning; no new use of the word.
Now turn to Webster's Unabridged, where citizen is defined: "Citizen—a person," [in the United States,]—for he inserts in brackets the expressive "U. S." to indicate what he means,—"native or naturalized, who has the privilege of voting for public officers, and who is qualified to fill offices in the gift of the people."
Worcester says of "citizen":—"An inhabitant of a Republic who enjoys the rights of a citizen or freeman, and who has a right to vote for public officers, as a citizen of the United States."
Turn to Bouvier's Law Dictionary, in orthodox sheep skin, and see what he says a citizen is: "Citizen, one who, under the Constitution and laws of the United States has a right to vote for representatives in Congress and other public offices, and who is qualified to fill offices in the gift of the people."—4th ed., vol. 1, p. 221.
All known authority concurs in establishing this as the sole, proper signification of the word citizen; and in this sense, and in no other, is it used in the XIV. Amendment. I know that the term is sometimes used—is once used, perhaps, in the Constitution—to correspond somewhat with the term "inhabitant," as thus, "citizens of different States may sue each other in the courts of the United States," etc. But it was not necessary to shake the foundations of this great Republic, to formulate and get adopted this new amendment, for the purpose of stating that the people who were born and always had lived in the United States might be inhabitants of them. But it was necessary to say so, that cavaliers might be estopped from denying that they are citizens.
But to recur to the further clause of this XIV. Amendment. Let us see, now, really what the makers and promulgators of it did mean. "No State shall make or enforce any law"—neither make any new law, nor enforce any that had already been made—"which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." Is there any doubt now as to what "citizen" means? He, or she, or both, are persons in possession, and have by express declaration all the privileges and the immunities of citizens.
When I stated this before the Judiciary Committee this morning, a distinguished Representative from Illinois, and a very able lawyer, stopped me and said, "Mr. Riddle, babies would be citizens according to that, and would have the privilege of going straight to the ballot-box, the first thing." (Laughter.) Perhaps so; but I could not see it then, and can not see it now. All power is inherent in the people, and it is perfectly competent for this "all power" to declare at what age and under what circumstances the citizen shall vote; so that the rule applies uniformly, and excludes none. One-half of the people were excluded, and this article removes that exclusion—and that is all. Apply the gentleman's idea to other provisions of the Constitution; for instance, to this: "The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed." Would he contend that therefore every new-born baby might at once grasp a musket? This might be constitutional, but it would put the infantry on a war-footing before the commissariat could be mobilized, I fear. (Laughter and applause.)
Women are not only citizens, but the amendment further says, that no State shall pass any law or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of this citizenship. The privileges—not a part of them. What do we mean when we say the privileges? For instance, when we say "the ladies," do we not mean them all? "The Senators," we mean them all. We do not merely mean the Senator from Nevada (Mr. Nye), however he may have the right to be spoken of first. (Laughter and applause.) These terms, "privileges and immunities," are not now used for the first time in the American Constitution. They are old acquaintances of ours. They have done service a great while. They occur in this same Constitution, as will be seen by referring to the second section of Article IV, on page 38 of Paschal's admirably annotated Constitution of the United States: "Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States." Precisely, as the XIV. Amendment has it, but, as Judge Bradley recently said, with a much more enlarged meaning in the latter. They were old before the Constitution, and were incorporated into it from the fourth article of the Old Confederation, which provided, "that the free inhabitants of each of the States shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of the free citizens of the several States."
If you would see a comment upon these terms, read the forty-second number of the Federalist, or a tumefied and diluted edition of it, in Story on the Constitution, which, like some other of his books, contains some remarks of his own, and are not always the best things in them. For the benefit of the Judiciary Committee, made up, as you know, of some of the ablest lawyers and best men of the country, I procured a judicial definition of these terms, "privileges, and immunities," although Mr. Attorney Bates said none exists, and my friend Judge Paschal, a more learned man, repeated it. I referred them to the case of Corfield vs. Coryell, 4th vol. of the so-called "Washington Circuit Court Reports," p. 371, where these terms came up, away back in the old time. Bushrod Washington, the favorite nephew of our Washington, made the decision, ladies. He was the Washington who got all of the brains of the family outside of its great chief; and he put them to a most admirable use. He was one of the judges of the Supreme Court of the United States, and he judicially defined the meaning of these "privileges and immunities," and said that they included such privileges as are fundamental in their nature. And among them he says, is the right to exercise the elective franchise, and to hold offices, as provided for by the laws of the various States. And the great Chancellor Kent, quoting this case, thus approvingly incorporates its very language into his text, where it stands unchallenged, unquestioned, and uncontradicted.
"It was declared in Corfield vs. Coryell, that the privileges and immunities conceded by the Constitution of the United States to citizens in the several States, were to be confined to those which were in their nature fundamental, and belonged of right to the citizens of all free governments. Such are the rights of protection of life and liberty, and to acquire and enjoy property, and to pay no higher impositions than other citizens, and to pass through or reside in the State at pleasure, and to enjoy the elective franchise according to the regulations of the law of the State" (2 Kent Com., p. 71).
Why, the gentlemen of the Upper and of the Lower House, who are familiar with that decision and with its canonization by Kent, are not obliged to resort to Webster (not Daniel) and Worcester, nor to Grant White, nor even to Bouvier's Law Dictionary. They may overrule them all if they will. But they must go back to these sometimes forgotten decisions, which rest in the leaves of these dusty volumes, to these witnesses of the law, who declare that these expressions, "privileges, and immunities" include the elective franchise. And the whole people of these United States have solemnly declared "that all persons are citizens, and no State shall make or enforce any law to abridge the privileges and immunities of the citizens." If such authority and such reasoning were presented to a court on the trial of any other case in the wide world, save that of women and their rights, an advocate would be stopped by the court before he had gone half the length I have in this argument. The court would say that they would hear from the other side. (Laughter.) But this thing of opposition to woman's rights does not rest in intelligence so that it can be grasped in argument. It has no intellectual foundation anywhere. No logic supports it. No reason or argument sustains it. It rests upon no foundation of the human understanding; hence, it can not be combated; for, as Mr. Mills says, the worse it is beaten in argument the stronger it is fortified in prejudice. Men seem to think that inasmuch as this thing has always been, somehow or other, in some way or other, there was somewhere, at some time some reason for it, which could be shown now if somebody could only think of it or find it; but, of course, nobody ever did and nobody ever will. There never was any. (Laughter.)
One consideration alone is absolutely conclusive of this argument, and from it escape is impossible. "Persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof," were already in the full and complete enjoyment of every privilege and immunity known to our political system, except the elective franchise and its correlative, the right to hold office. The only difference between the naturalized and unnaturalized individual is this right of voting. I pray our opponents to tell us then what is conferred by this first section of this wonderful article, if it be not these rights? Nothing else remained that it could confer; and this view alone silences cavil, even. If this section does not confer or guarantee the exercise of the elective franchise, then at infinite pains have we mined among the foundations of our marvelous structure, and have deposited there as one of them an utter sham, full of the emptiness of nothing. Let him escape this who may.
If there can still remain a question of doubt about this, I beg the attention of the doubters to the further words of the Constitution, to be found in the XV. Amendment. And here I am met with the apt inquiry, "Why, Mr. Riddle, if women are a part of 'all persons,' colored men are also a part of the same 'all persons,' and if women are made citizens and clothed with the immunities and privileges of citizenship by the XIV. Amendment, so were colored men; why, then, was it necessary to enact the XV. Amendment? This fact is fatal to your argument." Well, there was no necessity for it. It was a stupid piece of business, very stupid, and when we recover the lost art of blushing, some faces will color when that XV. Amendment is recalled. But it does us this good service; it settles the construction of this XIV. Amendment, as we contend for it, beyond all cavil. The general impression is, that the XV. Amendment confers the elective franchise upon the colored man. If it does not, then our opposers must give it up, for colored men rightfully vote. What does this article say? That the elective franchise is conferred upon persons of African descent, or those who have suffered from a previous condition of servitude? Not a word of it. It does say: "The right of citizens"—not the right of persons of African descent—"the right of citizens of the United States to vote, shall not be denied." That is what it says—"Shall not be denied or abridged, by the United States or by the several States." That does not confer suffrage; it recognizes a right already conferred, and says that it shall not be denied or abridged. A gentleman of the committee this morning took the ground that this amendment granted the franchise because it declares that the right to it shall not be denied! This is in effect that when a thing can not be denied, the lack of power to deny it creates it. (Laughter.) I confess I could not see it. (Laughter.) I have thought of it since, and I do not see it now. "Shall not be denied or abridged." How can you abridge a thing that does not exist? And would the gentleman also contend that a lack of power to cut off a thing not in existence also creates the thing? This XV. Article then treats the right of the citizen to vote as already existing, and it specifies classes, as persons of color, of certain race, and of previous servitude, as especially having the right to vote.
Where, when, and how did they get it? Was it by virtue of the XIV. Amendment? If so, it was because they were a part of the "all persons" named in it, of whom women are also a much larger and much more important part. So, past cavil, if the African received this franchise by the XIV. Article, then did women also receive it, and more abundantly! If you go back to the starting point of American politics, and say that the right is inherent in the colored man, then by the law of nature it is inherent in woman. I do not care which of these formulas you adopt. Not at all. In either event it is recognized as existing in a citizen of the United States. But my learned and subtle friend from Illinois said to me to-day, "Why, don't you see, Mr. Riddle, that they have limited the franchise in this XV. Amendment, so that it shall not be denied in the case of persons of color, and of a certain race, and previous condition of servitude, and does that not permit the States to deny it in other cases?" Well, the XV. Amendment alone would, perhaps, under the artificial rules of law, but I referred the gentleman immediately, as I refer you now, back to the XIV. Amendment where the right is conferred, and where in its great, broad, sweeping language it is declared that no State shall either enact or enforce any law that abridges the privileges and immunities of any citizen.
The XV. Amendment in no way changes the XIV., nor does it add an iota to the privileges and immunities of the citizen. It could not. It reiterates for the benefit of these classes the declaration of the XIV.; and as that declares that no State shall deny the rights of the citizen, this adds to the list the United States, and its real force is spent in conferring upon Congress power to legislate in favor of the classes named in it, a power not granted by the XIV. Well, really, this must be the end of the argument. And I repeat, you find the XIV. Amendment declares that all persons are citizens; that they have the privilege and immunities of citizens, and the XV. declares that among the privileges and immunities of citizens is the right to suffrage, because it says in words that that shall not be denied, though men do deny it. How is the XV. Amendment declaring that it shall not be denied on account of either race, color, or previous condition of servitude, to be regarded? It spends its force in these two things. The XIV. Amendment only denied the power to the several States to abridge the privileges of citizenship. The XV. Amendment goes further, and says that neither any State nor the United States shall do it, using the term "deny" with the term "abrogate" of the other. It goes further; for the purposes of these three conditions it confers express power upon Congress to legislate, while the XIV. Amendment does not. But there is just one little thing further that I drop for the henpecked to pick at. There are three classes whose right to vote shall not be denied according to the XV. Amendment—persons of color, persons on account of race, and persons who have suffered from previous condition of servitude. Now, ladies, what is really the legal status of marriage, so far as the condition of the wife is concerned?
Susan B. Anthony.—One of servitude, and of the hardest kind, and just for board and clothes, at that, too. (Laughter and applause.)
Mr. Riddle.—And they frequently have to make and pay for their clothes, and board themselves—(renewed laughter)—and not only themselves, but board also the lord and master, who calls himself the head of the family. But that is not all of it. It is not cant; it is not popular phraseology, but it is the language of the law. The condition of the married woman is that of servitude. The law calls her husband "baron," and she is simply a woman—"feme." The law gives her to the man, not the man to her, nor the two mutually to each other. They become one, and that one is the husband—such as he is. Her name is blotted out from the living, or at best it is appended to that of the husband. She belongs to her master; all that she has belongs to him. All that she earns is his, because she is his. If she does anything that binds him, it is simply as his servant. If she makes a contract that is binding even upon herself, it is because he consents to it. She does not own anything; she does not own the children that are born of her. The husband exclusively controls them while living, and by his will he may, and often does, bequeath to somebody else the custody and care of them after his death. And the law which we men make enforces all this to-day. I trust that most of us are a great deal better than the law. If the wife of a man should suffer by an accident on a railroad, and suit should be brought to recover against the company for injury to her person, the suit brought by the husband would be upon the ground that his wife was his servant, and he had lost her service. If he did not, he could not recover.
Mrs. Stanton.—Is such the law in case of a daughter?
Mr. Riddle.—So far as that is concerned, where the daughter is a minor, it is the same as the case of a son a minor; but the wife is always the servant of the husband; she never graduates from him; she never becomes of age or arrives at the years of discretion. (Sotto voce.) If she had, she never would have entered into that condition. Miss Anthony would say the law pronounces the state of matrimony to be a condition of servitude for the wife in express terms. How does the XV. Amendment apply to her? Here is the previous condition of servitude provided for; and this XV. Amendment in its effect was but to enforce the XIV. in favor of persons held in a previous and, of course, a continuing condition of servitude. Does this really abrogate the servitude of the wife, and invoke in her favor the action of Congress? My distinguished brother, Butler, said this morning, that the clause relative to the previous condition of servitude applied only to widows. (Laughter.)
But, ladies and gentlemen, aside from badinage, for the subject is too grave and too solemn, it comes back to this thing. The Constitution of the United States solemnly declares that every person born and naturalized in the United States, and within its jurisdiction, are citizens; and that no State shall pass, or enforce a law to abrogate the privileges and immunities of citizenship. We do not need any XVI. Amendment. We need only intelligent, firm decisive, and deciding—reasonably brave courts, and to have a question made and brought to their adjudication. I propose to offer Mrs. Griffing and two or three other ladies for registration, two or three months hence, when the time comes, here. (Applause.) If they are not registered, I propose to try the strength of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, composed of five intelligent gentlemen, and known not to be conservatives on some questions, whatever they will prove to be on this, and see whether they will issue a mandamus. If they won't, I will take the case to the Supreme Court of the United States, and one of the present judges of that Court, who is not pre-eminently in favor of what is called woman's rights, recently passed upon this XIV. Amendment. In the case of the "Live Stock Dealers" et al. vs. "The Crescent City Live Stock Company," in the circuit court of the United States, at New Orleans, Judge Bradley, of the Supreme Court of the United States, said of the XIV. Amendment:
"It is possible that those who framed the article were not themselves aware of the far-reaching character of its terms. They may have had in mind but one particular phase of social and political wrong, which they desired to redress. Yet, if the amendment, as framed and expressed, does, in fact, bear a broader meaning, and does extend its protecting shield over those who were never thought of when it was conceived and put in form, and does reach such social evils which were never before prohibited by Constitutional Amendment, it is to be presumed that the American people, in giving it their imprimatur, understood what they were doing, and meant to decree what has, in fact, been done.
"It embraces much more. The 'privileges and immunities' secured by the original Constitution were only such as each State gave to its own citizens. Each was prohibited from discriminating in favor of its own citizens, and against the citizens of other States.
"But the XIV. Amendment prohibits any State from abridging the privileges or immunities of the citizens of the United States, whether its own citizens or any others. It not merely requires equality of privileges, but it demands that the privileges and immunities of all citizens shall be absolutely unabridged, unimpaired."—Mrs. Bradwell's Legal News.
What "particular phase of social and political wrong" could have been in the mind of the clear-seeing judge when he gave forth these utterances?
Gentlemen and ladies, when I stand in the presence of and contemplate for a moment this great XIV. Article, the crown of the now perfected Constitution, I bow with amazed reverence to it. It shines upon me with the light of a new revelation. And this argument is great from no effort of mine, but great in its power of self-enunciation. This article is one of those great principles that come, Messiah like, to announce themselves. It needed no forerunner, and it works its own miracles in its own good time, and will convert all to its own sway, and to its own purposes. And, I trust that ere long we shall hear from the committee of the House upon this question, and that we shall get enlightened and intelligent discussion of it in the House of the American Representatives.
Here the argument closes, but suffer a word further. It is said that woman does not want the suffrage. Who says that she does not want it? Man says so and nobody else. Man asks the question, and answers it himself. I know it often comes from female lips, but it is man's answer.
I deny that women have declared that they don't want the ballot. They have never been asked whether they want it. When we want a response from men how do we propound the question? We submit it formally to be voted upon by the ballot. That is the way we propound a political question to men. How do they answer it? They answer it by their solemn votes at the ballot box. Propound this question, and in this solemn way to the women of the United States. Pass a law to that effect and take a vote, or else forever stop—close up all gabble on this subject, that women do not want it. Offer her the chance by which she can speak and see whether she wants it or not, and let her vote "yes" or "no." Then from that we will take another start. But don't refuse to let her answer, and assume to answer for her, and say you represent her. You barely succeed in misrepresenting men at your best, let alone this atrocious twaddle about representing women. Let her vote, and then we can tell whether you have a right to represent her or not.
We men have made the institutions for men, and for men alone; never consulted woman. We have said she was nobody, and nowhere, or, if she was found anywhere she was out of her sphere, (laughter) and must go back to nowhere immediately, and to nobody. We have gravely assumed that we understood her nature and character better than she did herself. It is one of the wondrous elements of the sexes that they shall perpetually reveal themselves to each other, and neither shall ever fully comprehend the other. Let woman speak for herself. Give her a chance to speak as man speaks, by precisely the same language, and in the same manner, and then reverently incline your heads, and listen to what she says.
I have said this great question is up for final argument. My mission was simply to present to you this dry, but very interesting question of woman's rights, under the XIV. Amendment. To my mind, the argument is perfectly invincible. It never can be met, and never will be, and it will, ultimately work out its own end.
Thanking you for the kindness with which you have listened to me, I leave this matter with you.
ADDRESS OF MRS. ISABELLA BEECHER HOOKER.
Mrs. Hooker said: We are told by men themselves that there are too many voters already; restriction is what we want, not enlargement of the suffrage. Let us see how this is, my friends—let us reason together on this point for a few moments. The one great propelling power of this Government that moves the great political engine, and that keeps us alive as a Nation on the face of the earth, is God's own doctrine of personal liberty and personal responsibility. That is all we have to go upon. It is, in fact, fuel and steam. Liberty is the steam, responsibility puts on the brakes, and then what is the safety-valve, I ask you? Is it not our election day? Look at it in this way. Every honest lawyer will tell you that the next best thing to settling a quarrel between two belligerents is to bring the parties into court. Because the court-room is a great cooling off place, a perfect refrigerator. A man who has quarreled with his neighbor comes into court, and, before the lawyers get through with him, he wishes he hadn't quarreled. How is it that our courts act in this way? What do we gain in this? Everything. In old times a dispute between man and man was settled by blows—fisticuffs—gradually superseded by the sword, at last by the pistol; and now we have thrown that out, and established a system of jurisprudence. Now all these petty grievances must be settled in court. Private violence must no longer be permitted, and that is a great march in civilization.
The parallel case is this: We in this country—we men, I mean, for women are nobodies and nowhere when you come to the discussion of great questions like these, but I use the conventional we—we in this country are attempting to carry our ideas of liberty and responsibility into legislation, and we don't agree—we quarrel bitterly and almost come to blows again—but election days cool us off, acting like a court-room itself. We accept their judgment, and go about our business quietly till next time. Now if we were all Americans, acting under an intelligent sense of responsibility, everything might be expected to run smoothly under this regime; but the trouble is when the foreigner comes in who does not understand our institutions, who is, perhaps, ignorant, debased, and superstitious. But the foreigner is, it seems to me, the very man who needs this safety-valve of the election day more than any other on the face of the globe. We ourselves could run our own nationality; but here comes this man from the principalities of the old world—from Europe we will say, to begin with—and he has an idea that he is going to be richer, smarter, happier, more on an equality with every other man than ever he was before. He comes here, and what does he find? He finds a ladder, reaching higher into the clouds, perhaps, but the lower rounds are just as near the earth as over there, and he is on the lowest round still. He sees his next-door neighbor has more money than he has, is better educated, and commands the respect of the community, as he does not, and he is filled with disappointment, and sometimes with rage. What would he naturally do, with his old world antecedents and training, when he is thus aggrieved as he conceives himself to be? Why, burn your barn, break into your house, steal all he could from you. But what does election day do for him? On that day he is as good as anybody. He goes to the polls side by side with the first man in the land, and he rides in a carriage there, if he is too drunk to walk, and he can vote the first man in the line, if he chooses. The richest man in the country must walk behind him and wait for his turn. He drops his ballot and he is cooled off. He soon begins to get hold a little of this idea of responsibility that I am speaking of, and after a while it will come into his head—very slowly, perhaps, for we are all slow to learn these things—that he has got to work himself up and get on a par with those intelligent and influential people who are so powerful in making laws and customs.
Now, gentlemen, it seems to me if you could disfranchise every foreigner to-day who was not intelligent, or if you could make intelligence the test of voting, you would have ten barns burned where you have one now. I believe it firmly. Being naturally conservative, as I think all women are, a few years ago I really thought that ten, even twenty years' residence might be required of foreigners before they should be allowed to vote. I said they did not know enough, and so ought to be kept out as long as that. To-day I am inclined not to limit the time a moment longer than it is necessary for men to get their naturalization papers out, and go through the required legal formalities. If disfranchisement meant annihilation, selfishly, I might be glad to get rid of this troublesome question in that way, the task of ruling this country would then be a far easier one than it is; but it does not mean annihilation. So when gentlemen talk with me, and say we have too many voters already, I reply, do not disfranchise these men, enlighten them, for God has sent them here for a purpose of His own. And I say to you gentlemen the ballot in the hands of every man is the only thing that saves us from anarchy to-day, that keeps us alive as a republic—the ballot in the hands of these ignorant men, and the more ignorant they are the more they need it, and the more we need they should have it. And let me say, in passing, that reconstruction at the South is hindered to-day for the same reason, responsibility is taken away from a large class of citizens. A disfranchised class is always a restless class; a class that, if it be not as a whole given up to deeds of violence, will at least wink at them, when committed by men either in or out of its own ranks. What the South needs to-day is ballots, not bullets.
I leave out of the question the ultimate educating power of the ballot, though I would like to make you an argument upon that alone. But I say give the poor men, ignorant men the ballot for purposes of self-defense, and because we could not live in safety in our homes otherwise. New York is poorly governed, we say, to-day, and getting to be a pretty dangerous place to live in. But what would it be if every foreigner and every ignorant man could not go out on election day, and prove that he was as good as anybody? That is human nature, and it is human nature, and plenty of it too, that we have to deal with. And now, let me ask you, what are these men sent here for and who sent them? We have got all Europe, and all Asia is coming, and who sends them? When God put into that good ship Mayflower those two great ribs of oak, personal liberty and personal responsibility, He knew the precious freight she was to bear, and all the hopes bound up in her, and He pledged Himself by both the great eternities, the past and the future, that that ship should weather all storms and come safe to port with all she had on board. And what God has promised He will perform. So I beg of you not to think for a moment of limiting manhood suffrage.
And if men can not live in this country in safe homes, except their neighbor men are enfranchised, can they live without enfranchised women any more? If you can not live in safety with irresponsible men in your midst, how can you live with irresponsible women? Much more, how can you grow into the stature of perfect men in Christ Jesus our Lord; how can you become perfect legislators, except your mothers are instructed on these great subjects you are called to legislate upon, that they may instruct you in their turn? You do not know anything so well as what your mothers have taught you; but they have not taught you political economy. It is not their fault that they have not, nor yours, perhaps. No man nor woman studies a subject profoundly except he or she is called upon to act upon it. What business man studies a business foreign to his own? What woman studies a business foreign to her own? In past ages this woman, in the providence of God, we will say, has been shut out from political action, for, so long as the sword ruled and man had to get his liberty by the sword, so long woman had all she could do to guard the home, for that was her part of the work; and she did it bravely and well, you will say. But now men are not fighting for their liberty with the gun by the door and the Indians outside. You are fighting for it in halls of legislation, with the spirit of truth—with spiritual weapons—and woman would be disloyal to her womanhood if she did not ask to share these heavy responsibilities with you. And she has really been training herself all these years she has seemed so indifferent; she has neglected her duty in part—I confess it freely—it is not your fault alone, gentlemen, that we are not with you to-day. If we had been as conscious of our duty and privilege years ago as we are to-day, if we had known our birthright, we should have stood by your side, welcome coadjutors, long since. So we will take the blame of the past alike—we have all been walking very slowly this path of Christian civilization. But in the greatest conflict of modern times, you announced great principles and fought for them on the field, and we stood by them in the home, and we stand by them still there. And when we come to deliberate with you in solemn council as to how these principles shall be carried into legislation, your task will be easier, our opportunities will be larger, and still our hearts will be where they have ever been—in our homes.
Forty-first Congress, 3d Session, House of Representatives, Report, No. 22, Jan. 30, 1871, recommitted to the Committee on Judiciary and ordered to be printed. Mr. Bingham, from the Committee on the Judiciary, made the following report.
The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the Memorial of Victoria C. Woodhull, having considered the same, make the following report:
The Memorialist asks the enactment of a law by Congress which shall secure to citizens of the United States in the several States the right to vote "without regard to sex." Since the adoption of the XIV. Amendment of the Constitution, there is no longer any reason to doubt that all persons, born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside, for that is the express declaration of the amendment.
The clause of the XIV. Amendment, "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States," does not, in the opinion of the Committee, refer to privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States other than those privileges and immunities embraced in the original text of the Constitution, article IV., section 2. The XIV. Amendment, it is believed, did not add to the privileges or immunities before mentioned, but was deemed necessary for their enforcement, as an express limitation upon the powers of the States. It has been judicially determined that the first eight articles of amendment of the Constitution were not limitations on the power of the States, and it was apprehended that the same might be held of the provision of section 2, article iv.
To remedy this defect of the Constitution, the express limitations upon the States contained in the first section of the XIV. Amendment, together with the grant of power in Congress to enforce them by legislation, were incorporated in the Constitution. The words "citizens of the United States," and "citizens of the States," as employed in the XIV. Amendment, did not change or modify the relations of citizens of the State and Nation as they existed under the original Constitution.
Attorney-General Bates gave the opinion that the Constitution uses the the word "citizen," only to express the political quality of the individual in his relation to the Nation; to declare that he is a member of the body politic, and bound to it by the reciprocal obligation of allegiance on the one side and protection on the other. The phrase "a citizen of the United States," without addition or qualification, means neither more nor less than a member of the Nation. (Opinion of Attorney-General Bates on citizenship.)
The Supreme Court of the United States has ruled that, according to the express words and clear meaning of the section 2, article iv. of the Constitution, no privileges are secured by it except those which belong to citizenship. (Connor et al. vs. Elliott et al., 18 Howard, 593). In Corfield vs. Coryell, 4 Washington Circuit Court Reports, 380, the Court say:
The inquiry is, what are the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States? We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges and immunities which are in their nature fundamental; which belong of right to the citizens of all free governments; and which have at all times been enjoyed by the citizens of the several States which compose this Union, from the time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign. What these fundamental principles are would, perhaps, be more tedious than difficult to enumerate. They may, however, be all comprehended under the following general heads: Protection by the Government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety, subject, nevertheless, to such restraints as the Government may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole; the right of a citizen of one State to pass through or to reside in any other State, for the purpose of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus; to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the State; to take, hold, and dispose of property, either real or personal; and an exemption from higher taxes or impositions than are paid by the other citizens of the State, may be mentioned as some of the particular privileges and immunities of citizens which are clearly embraced by the general description of privileges deemed to be fundamental; to which may be added the elective franchise, as regulated and established by the laws or Constitution of the State in which it is to be exercised.... But we can not accede to the proposition which was insisted on by the counsel, that under this provision of the Constitution, sec. 2, art. 4, the citizens of the several States are permitted to participate in all the rights which belong exclusively to the citizens of any other particular State.
The learned Justice Story declared that the intention of the clause—"the citizens of each State shall be entitled, to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States"—was to confer on the citizens of each State a general citizenship, and communicated all the privileges and immunities which a citizen of the same State would be entitled to under the circumstances. (Story on the Constitution, vol. 2, p. 605).
In the case of the Bank of the United States vs. Primrose, in the Supreme Court of the United States, Mr. Webster said:
That this article in the Constitution (art. 4, sec. 2) does not confer on the citizens of each State political rights in every other State, is admitted. A citizen of Pennsylvania can not go into Virginia and vote at any election in that State, though when he has acquired a residence in Virginia, and is otherwise qualified, is required by the Constitution (of Virginia), he becomes, without formal adoption as a citizen of Virginia, a citizen of that State politically. (Webster's Works, vol. 6, p. 112).
It must be obvious that Mr. Webster was of opinion that the privileges and immunities of citizens, guaranteed to them in the several States, did not include the privilege of the elective franchise otherwise than as secured by the State Constitution. For, after making the statement above quoted, that a citizen of Pennsylvania can not go into Virginia and vote, Mr. Webster adds, "but for the purposes of trade, commerce, buying and selling, it is evidently not in the power of any State to impose any hindrance or embarrassment, etc. upon citizens of other States, or to place them, going there, upon a different footing from her own citizens." (Ib.) The proposition is clear that no citizen of the United States can rightfully vote in any State of this Union who has not the qualifications required by the Constitution of the State in which the right is claimed to be exercised, except as to such conditions in the constitutions of such States as deny the right to vote to citizens resident therein "on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."
The adoption of the XV. Amendment to the Constitution imposing these three limitations upon the power of the several States, was by necessary implication, a declaration that the States had the power to regulate by a uniform rule the conditions upon which the elective franchise should be exercised by citizens of the United States resident therein. The limitations specified in the XV. Amendment exclude the conclusion that a State of this Union, having a government republican in form, may not prescribe conditions upon which alone citizens may vote other than those prohibited. It can hardly be said that a State law which excludes from voting women citizens, minor citizens, and non-resident citizens of the United States, on account of sex, minority, or domicil, is a denial of the right to vote on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.
It may be further added that the 2d section of the XIV. Amendment, by the provision that "when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors of President and Vice-President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, or executive and judicial officers of the State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, a citizen of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State," implies that the several States may restrict the elective franchise as to other than male citizens. In disposing of this question effect must be given, if possible, to every provision of the Constitution. Article 1, section 2, of the Constitution provides:
That the House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen every second year by the people of the several States, and the electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State Legislature.
This provision has always been construed to vest in the several States the exclusive right to prescribe the qualifications of electors for the most numerous branch of the State Legislature, and therefore for Members of Congress. And this interpretation is supported by section 4, article 1, of the Constitution, which provides:
That the time, places, and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by law make or alter such regulations except as to the place of choosing Senators.
Now it is submitted, if it had been intended that Congress should prescribe the qualifications of electors, that the grant would have read: The Congress may at any time by law make or alter such regulations, and also prescribe the qualifications of electors, etc. The power, on the contrary, is limited exclusively to the time, place, and manner, and does not extend to the qualification of the electors. This power to prescribe the qualification of electors in the several States has always been exercised, and is, to-day, by the several States of the Union; and we apprehend, until the Constitution shall be changed, will continue to be so exercised, subject only to express limitations imposed by the Constitution upon the several States, before noticed. We are of opinion, therefore, that it is not competent for the Congress of the United States to establish by law the right to vote without regard to sex in the several States of this Union, without the consent of the people of such States, and against their constitutions and laws; and that such legislation would be, in our judgment, a violation of the Constitution of the United States, and of the rights reserved to the States respectively by the Constitution. It is undoubtedly the right of the people of the several States so to reform their constitutions and laws as to secure the equal exercise of the right of suffrage at all elections held therein under the Constitution of the United States, to all citizens, without regard to sex; and as public opinion creates constitutions and governments in the several States, it is not to be doubted that whenever, in any State, the people are of opinion that such a reform is advisable, it will be made.
If however, as is claimed in the memorial referred to, the right to vote "is vested by the Constitution in the citizens of the United States without regard to sex," that right can be established in the courts without further legislation.
The suggestion is made that Congress, by a mere declaratory act, shall say that the construction claimed in the memorial is the true construction of the Constitution, or in other words, that by the Constitution of the United States the right to vote is vested in citizens of the United States "without regard to sex," anything in the constitution and laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding. In the opinion of the Committee, such declaratory act is not authorized by the Constitution nor within the legislative power of Congress. We therefore recommend the adoption of the following resolution:
Resolved, That the prayer of the petitioner be not granted, that the memorial be laid on the table, and that the Committee on the Judiciary be discharged from the further consideration of the subject.
Citizen is used by some newspaper writers with what seems like an affectation of the French usage of citoyen in the First Republic. For instance, "Gen. A. is a well-known citizen." "Several citizens carried the sufferer," etc. The writer might as well have said that the sufferer was carried off by several church members or several "Freemasons." Now mark, he says, that "a citizen is a person who has certain political rights, and the word is properly used only to imply or suggest the possession of those rights."