No person shall be permitted to practice as an attorney or counselor-at-law, or to commence, conduct, or defend any action, suit, or plaint, in which he is not a party concerned, in any court of record within this State, either by using or subscribing his own name or the name of any other person without having previously obtained a license for that purpose from some two of the Justices of the Supreme Court, which license shall constitute the person receiving the same an attorney and counselor-at-law, and shall authorize him to appear in all the courts of record within this State, and there to practice as an attorney and counselor-at-law, according to the laws and customs thereof, for and during his good behavior in said practice, and to demand and receive all such fees as are or hereafter may be established for any services which he shall or may render as an attorney or counselor-at-law in this State.
When any party or person is described or referred to by words importing the masculine gender, females as well as males shall be deemed to be included.
Secondly, who are capable of becoming agents? And here it may be stated that there are few persons who are excluded from acting as agents, or from exercising an authority delegated to them by others. Therefore, it is by no means necessary for a person to be sui juris or capable of acting in his or her own right, in order to qualify himself or herself to act for others. Thus, for example, monks, infants, femes covert, persons attainted, outlawed, or excommunicated villains, and aliens, may be agents for others.... A feme covert may be an attorney of another, to make livery to her husband upon a feoffment; and a husband may take such livery to his wife, although they are generally deemed but one person in law. She may also act as agent or otherwise of her own husband, and as such, with his consent, bind him by her contract, or other act; or she may act as the agent of another, in a contract, with her own husband.
Even before the late statute respecting married women, they were regarded as femes sole in respect to their separate property, and were as to such property liable on their contracts respecting the same, to the same extent and as though they were not under the disability of coverture. It was held by Lord Mansfield and his associates, in Corbett vs. Poelnitz, 1 T. R., 5, that if a husband and wife choose to separate, and the husband allows the wife a separate maintenance, she may contract and be sued as though she were unmarried, and may be held to bail and imprisoned on a ca. sa. without her husband. The court made this innovation on the ground that "the times alter new customs, and new manners arise, which require new exceptions, and a different application of the general rule.
If she acts as a feme sole, she ought, in justice to the public, to be subjected to all the duties and liabilities of a feme sole.
Under the statute she is entitled to the benefits it confers, and must be held liable for her acts performed in pursuance of the authority it confers. If it gives the rights of a sole ownership, it must impose the liabilities incident to such an act.
It may be said that a married woman can not adequately enjoy her separate property unless she can make contracts in regard to it. This is true, and hence her power to make contracts, so far as may be necessary for the use and enjoyment of her property, must be regarded as resulting by implication from the statute. If she owns houses she must be permitted to contract for their repair or rental. If she owns a farm she must be permitted to bargain for its cultivation, and to dispose of its products. We give these as illustrations of the power of contracting which is fairly implied in the law.
Words importing the singular number only, may be extended to several persons or things; and words importing the plural number only may be applied to one person, or thing; and words importing the masculine gender only may be extended to females.
And all the real and personal estate of said Myra Bradwell shall be liable for the debts of said company, contracted while she is a stockholder therein, and all stock of said company owned by her, and the earnings thereof, shall be her sole and separate property, the same as if she were an unmarried woman; and she shall have the same right to hold any office or offices in said company, or transact any of its business that a feme sole would have.—Legal News, Edition Laws of 1869, p. 93. Sec. 4, p. 93.
I allow a writ of error from the Supreme Court of the United States to the Supreme Court of Illinois, in the suit and judgment of which the foregoing record is a transcript.
Sam. F. Miller, Asso. Jus. Sup. Court U. S.
August 16, 1870.
CITATION TO THE STATE OF ILLINOIS TO APPEAR AT WASHINGTON.
The United States of America to the State of Illinois:—The State of Illinois is hereby cited and admonished to appear and be at the Supreme Court of the United States to be holden at Washington City in the District of Columbia, on the first Monday of December next, pursuant to a writ of error filed in the clerk's office of the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois, wherein Myra Bradwell is plaintiff in error, and the State of Illinois is defendant in error, to show cause, if any there be, why the judgment in the said writ of error mentioned should not be corrected, and speedy justice should not be done to the parties in that behalf.
Witness the Honorable Salmon P. Chase, Chief-Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States this 16th day of August, a.d. 1870.
Sam. F. Miller, Asso. Jus. Sup. Court U. S.