Upon the principles of etymology alone, the term citizen, as derived from civitas, conveys the idea of connection or identification with the State or Government, and a participation in its functions. But beyond this, there is not, it is believed, to be found in the theories of writers on government, or in any actual experiment heretofore tried, an exposition of the term citizen, which has not been understood as conferring the actual possession and enjoyment, or the perfect right of acquisition and enjoyment of an entire equality of privileges, civil and political.
It was very ably contended on the part of the defendants that the XIV. Amendment was intended only to secure to all citizens equal capacities before the law. That was at first our view of it. But it does not so read. The language is: "No State shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." What are the privileges and immunities of citizens? Are they capacities merely? Are they not also rights?
The XIV. Amendment executes itself in every State of the Union.... It is thus the will of the United States in every State, and silences every State Constitution, usage, or law which conflicts with it.... And if this provision does protect the colored citizen, then it protects every citizen, black or white, male or female.... And all the privileges and immunities which I vindicate to a colored citizen, I vindicate to our mothers, our sisters, and our daughters.—Chicago Legal News, vol. IV., No. 15.
It is possible that those who framed the article were not themselves aware of the far-reaching character of its terms. They may have had in mind but one particular phase of social and political wrong, which they desired to redress—yet, if the Amendment, as framed and expressed, does, in fact, have a broader meaning, and does extend its protecting shield over those who were never thought of when it was conceived and put in form, and does reach such social evils which were never before prohibited by constitutional amendment, it is to be presumed that the American people, in giving it their imprimatur, understood what they were doing, and meant to decree what has, in fact, been done.... It embraces much more. The "privileges and immunities" secured by the original Constitution were only such as each State gave its own citizens. Each was prohibited from discriminating in favor of its own citizens, and against the citizens of other States. But the XIV. Amendment prohibits any State from abridging the privileges or immunities of the citizens of the United States, whether its own citizens or any others. It not merely requires equality of privileges, but it demands that the privileges and immunities of all citizens shall be absolutely unabridged, unimpaired. (1 Abbott's U. S. Rep., 397).
Woman suffrage is, to a certain extent, established in England, with the result as detailed in the London Examiner, that in 66 municipal elections, out of every 1,000 women who enjoy equal rights with men on the register, 516 went to the poll, which is but 48 less than the proportionate number of men. And out of 27,949 women registered, where a contest occurred, 14,416 voted. Of men there were 166,781 on the register, and 90,080 at the poll. The Examiner thereupon draws this conclusion: "Making allowance for the reluctance of old spinsters to change their habits, and the more frequent illness of the sex, it is manifest that women, if they had opportunity, would exercise the franchise as freely as men. There is an end, therefore, of the argument that women would not vote if they had the power."
There can be no crime unless a culpable intent accompanies the criminal act. The same author (1 Cr. Prac. § 521), repeated in other words, the same idea: In order to render a party criminally responsible, a vicious will must concur with a wrongful act.
Felony is always accompanied with an evil intention, and therefore shall not be imputed to a mere mistake or misanimadversion, as where persons break open a door, in order to execute a warrant, which will not justify such proceeding: Affectio enim tua nomen imponit operi tuo: item crimen non contrahitur nisi nocendi, voluntas intercedat, which, as I understand, may read: For your violation puts the name upon your act; and a crime is not committed unless the will of the offender takes part in it. (1 Hawk. P. C., p. 99, Ch. 25, § 3.)
The doctrine of the intent as it prevails in the criminal law, is necessarily one of the foundation principles of public justice. There is only one criterion by which the guilt of man is to be tested. It is whether the mind is criminal. Criminal law relates only to crime. And neither in philosophical speculation, nor in religious or moral sentiment, would any people in any age allow that a man should be deemed guilty unless his mind was so. It is, therefore, a principle of our legal system, as probably it is of every other, that the essence of an offense is the wrongful intent without which it can not exist. (1 Bishop's Crim. Law, § 287.)
It is absolutely necessary to constitute guilt, as in indictments for uttering forged tokens, or other attempts to defraud, or for receiving stolen goods, and offenses of a similar description. (1 Crim. Prac. § 504.)
The indictment must allege that the defendant knew the pretenses to be false. This is necessary upon the general principles of the law, in order to show an offense, even though the statute does not contain the word "knowingly." (2 Id. § 172.)