House of Representatives (46th Congress, 3d Session. Report No. 386).
Anna Ella Carroll.
March 3, 1881.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House, and ordered to be printed.
Mr. Bragg, from the Committee on Military Affairs, submitted the following Report (to accompany bill H. R. 7,256):
The Committee on Military Affairs, to whom the memorial of Anna Ella Carroll was referred, asking national recognition and reward for services rendered the United States during the war between the States, after careful consideration of the same, submit the following:
In the autumn of 1861 the great question as to whether the Union could be saved, or whether it was hopelessly subverted, depended on the ability of the Government to open the Mississippi and deliver a fatal blow upon the resources of the Confederate power. The original plan was to reduce the formidable fortifications by descending this river, aided by the gun-boat fleet, then in preparation for that object.
President Lincoln had reserved to himself the special direction of this expedition, but before it was prepared to move he became convinced that the obstacles to be encountered were too grave and serious for the success which the exigencies of the crisis demanded, and the plan was then abandoned, and the armies diverted up the Tennessee River, and thence southward to the center of the Confederate power.
The evidence before this Committee completely establishes that Miss Anna Ella Carroll was the author of this change of plan, which involved a transfer of the National forces to their new base in North Mississippi and Alabama, in command of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad; that she devoted time and money in the autumn of 1861 to the investigation of its feasibility is established by the sworn testimony of L. D. Evans, Chief-Justice of the Supreme Court of Texas, to the Military Committee of the United States Senate in the 42d Congress (see pp. 40, 41 of memorial); that after that investigation she submitted her plan in writing to the War Department at Washington, placing it in the hands of Thomas A. Scott, Assistant Secretary of War, as is confirmed by his statement (see p. 38 of memorial), also confirmed by the statement of Hon. B. F. Wade, Chairman of the Committee on the Conduct of the War, made to the same Committee (see p. 38), and of President Lincoln and Secretary Stanton (see p. 39 of memorial); also by Hon. O. H. Browning, of Illinois, Senator during the war, in confidential relations with President Lincoln and Secretary Stanton (see p. 39, memorial); also that of Hon. Elisha Whittlesey, Comptroller of the Treasury (see p. 41, memorial); also by Hon. Thomas H. Hicks, Governor of Maryland, and by Hon. Frederick Feckey's affidavit, Comptroller of the Public Works of Maryland (see p. 127 of memorial); by Hon. Reverdy Johnson (see pp. 26 and 41, memorial); Hon. George Vickers, United States Senator from Maryland (see p. 41, memorial); again by Hon. B. F. Wade (see p. 41, memorial); Hon. J. T. Headley (see p. 43, memorial); Rev. Dr. R. J. Breckinridge on services (see p. 47, memorial); Prof. Joseph Henry, Rev. Dr. Hodge, of Theological Seminary at Princeton (see p. 30, memorial); remarkable interviews and correspondence of Judge B. F. Wade (see pp. 23-26 of memorial).
That this campaign prevented the recognition of Southern independence by its fatal effects on the Confederate States is shown by letters from Hon. C. M. Clay (see pp. 40-43 of memorial), and by his letters from St. Petersburgh; also those of Mr. Adams and Mr. Dayton from London and Paris (see pp. 100-102 of memorial).
That the campaign defeated National bankruptcy, then imminent, and opened the way for the system of finance to defend the Federal cause, is shown by the debates of the period in both Houses of Congress (see utterances of Mr. Spalding, Mr. Diven, Mr. Thaddeus Stevens, Mr. Roscoe Conkling, Mr. John Sherman, Mr. Henry Wilson, Mr. Fessenden, Mr. Trumbull, Mr. Foster, Mr. Garrett Davis, Mr. John J. Crittendon, etc., found for convenient reference in appendix to memorial, pp. 47-59. Also therein the opinion of the English press as to why the Union could not be restored).