The legislature of 1884 showed a marked gain; Hon. Erastus Brooks, General George A. Sharpe, and other prominent opponents had been retired, and their seats filled by active friends. Our bill was introduced by Mr. William Howland of Cayuga, and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. Mr. Howland also secured the passage of a special act, granting women the right to vote at the charter elections of Union Springs, Cayuga county. Under similar enactments women have the right to vote for municipal officers in Dansville, Newport and other villages and towns in the State.
On March 11, 12, the annual meeting of the State society was held in the City Hall, Albany, with a good representation[250] from the National Convention at Washington, added to our own State speakers.[251] On the last evening there was an overflow meeting held in Geological Hall, presided over by Mrs. Matilda Joslyn Gage.
Governor Cleveland accorded the delegates a most courteous reception in his room in the capitol. A hearing was had before the Judiciary Committee March 13. The assembly-chamber was crowded. General Husted, chairman of the committee, presided, and Mrs. Blake, the president of the society, introduced the speakers.[252] A few days later the same committee gave a special hearing to Mrs. Gougar, who made the journey from Indiana to present the case. The committee reported adversely, but by the able tactics of General Husted, after an animated debate the bill was placed on the calendar by a vote of 66 to 62, and shortly after ordered to a third reading by a vote of 74 to 39. On May 8 the bill was reached for final action. Frederick B. Howe of New York was the principal opponent, trying to obstruct legislation by one and another pretext. General Husted took the floor in an able speech on the constitutionality of the bill, and the vote stood 57 ayes to 61 noes, lacking eight votes of the requisite 65.
While the right of suffrage is still denied, gains in personal and property rights have been granted:
In 1880, the law requiring the private acknowledgment by a married woman of her execution of deeds, or other written instruments, without the "fear or compulsion" of her husband, was abolished, leaving the wife to make, take and certify in the same manner as if she were a feme sole.
March 21, 1884, the penal code of the State was amended, raising the age of consent from ten to sixteen years, and also providing penalties[253] for inveigling or enticing any unmarried woman, under the age of twenty-five years, into a house of ill-fame or assignation.
Under the act of May 28, 1884, a married woman may contract to the same extent, with like effect and in the same form as if unmarried, and she and her separate estate shall be liable thereon, whether such contract relates to her separate business or estate, or otherwise, and in no case shall a charge upon her separate estate be necessary.
It is by court decisions that we most readily learn the legal status of married women, under the favorable legislation of the period covered by this History. While referring the reader to Abbott's Digest of New York Laws for full knowledge upon this point, we give a few of the more recent decisions as illustrating general legal opinion:
Troy, March 23, 1882.—The Court of Appeals decided that married women are the rightful owners of articles of personal adornment or convenience coming from husbands, and can bequeath them to their heirs. The court held that separate and personal possession by a wife of articles specially fitted for and adapted to her personal use, and differing in that respect from household goods kept for the common use of husband and wife, would draw after it a presumption of the executed gift if the property came from the husband, and of the wife's ownership, but for disabilities of the marital relations. Now that these disabilities are removed the separate existence and separate property of the wife are recognized, and her capacity to take and hold as her own the gift in good faith and fairly made to her by her husband established, it seemed to the court time to clothe her right with natural and proper attributes, and apply to the gift to her, although made by her husband, the general rules of law unmodified and unimpaired by the old disabilities of the marriage relations.
This decision was important as further destroying the old common-law theory of the husband's absolute ownership of his wife's person, property, services and earnings. The same year (1882) the Supreme Court, at its general term, rendered a decision that a married woman could sue her husband for damages for assault and battery; that by the act of 1860 the legislature intended to, and did, change the common-law rule, that a wife could not sue her husband. Judge Brady rendered the opinion, Judge Daniels concurring; Presiding Judge Noah Davis dissenting. Judge Brady said:
To allow the right (to sue) in an action of this character, in accordance with the language of the statute, would be to promote greater harmony by enlarging the rights of married women and increasing the obligations of husbands, by affording greater protection to the former, and by enforcing greater restraint upon the latter in the indulgence of their evil passions. The declaration of such a rule is not against the policy of the law. It is in harmony with it, and calculated to preserve peace and, in a great measure, prevent barbarous acts, acts of cruelty, regarded by mankind as inexcusable, contemptible, detestable. It is neither too early nor too late to promulgate the doctrine that if a husband commits an assault and battery upon his wife he may be held responsible civilly and criminally for the act, which is not only committed in violation of the laws of God and man, but in direct antagonism to the contract of marriage, its obligations, duties, responsibilities, and the very basis on which it rests. The rules of the common law on this subject have been dispelled, routed, and justly so, by the acts of 1860 and 1862. They are things of the past which have succumbed to more liberal and just views, like many other doctrines of the common law which could not stand the scrutiny and analysis of modern civilization.