The three preceding decisions of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts against the rights of the women of the commonwealth were as follows:

The first decision was in the case of Sarah E. Wall of Worcester, who had refused to pay her taxes under the following protest:

Believing with the immortal Declaration of Independence that taxation and representation are inseparable; believing that the constitution of the State furnishes no authority for the taxation of woman; believing also that the constitution of the higher law of God, written on the human soul, requires us, if we would be worthy the rich inheritance of the past and true to ourselves and the future, to yield obedience to no statute that shall tend to fetter its aspirations, I shall henceforth pay no taxes until the word male is stricken from the voting clauses of the constitution of Massachusetts.

Sarah E. Wall.

Worcester Daily Spy, October 5, 1858.

Miss Wall was prosecuted by the city collector, and she carried her case before the Supreme Court, where she appeared for herself, W. A. Williams appearing for the collector. In an account of this matter in 1881, Miss Wall says: "Although it was in 1858 that my resistance to taxation commenced, it was not until 1863 that the contest terminated and the decision was rendered. I think the Supreme Court would always find some way to evade a decision on this question."

Wheeler vs. Wall, 6 Allen, 558: By the constitution of Massachusetts, c. 1, § 1, article 4, the legislature has power to impose taxes upon all the inhabitants of and persons resident, and estates lying within the said commonwealth. By the laws passed by the legislature in pursuance of this power and authority, the defendant is liable to taxation, although she is not qualified to vote for the officers by whom the taxes were assessed. The Court, acting under the constitution, and bound to support it and maintain its provisions faithfully, cannot declare null and void a statute which has been passed by the legislature, in pursuance of an express authority conferred by the constitution.—[Opinion by the chief-justice, George Tyler Bigelow.

The second decision on the will of Francis Jackson is copied verbatim from Allen's Reports:

Jackson vs. Phillips and others, 14 Allen, 539: A bequest to trustees, to be expended at their discretion, * * * * "to secure the passage of laws granting whether women, married or unmarried, the right to vote, to hold office, to hold, manage and devise property, and all other civil rights enjoyed by men," is not a charity.

Bill in equity by the executor of the will of Francis Jackson of Boston, for instructions as to the validity and effect of the following bequests and devises:

Art. 6th. "I give and bequeath to Wendell Phillips of said Boston, Lucy Stone, formerly of Brookfield, Mass., now the wife of Henry Blackwell of New York, and Susan B. Anthony of Rochester, N. Y., their successors and assigns, $5,000, not for their own use, but in trust, nevertheless, to be expended by them without any responsibility to any one, at their discretion, in such sums, at such times and in such places as they may deem fit, to secure the passage of laws granting women, whether married or unmarried, the right to vote, to hold office, to hold, manage and devise property, and all other civil rights enjoyed by men; and for the preparation and circulation of books, the delivery of lectures, and such other means as they may judge best; and I hereby constitute them a board of trustees for that intent and purpose, with power to add two other persons to said board if they deem it expedient. And I hereby appoint Wendell Phillips president and treasurer, and Susan B. Anthony secretary of said board. I direct the treasurer of said board not to loan any part of said bequest, but to invest, and, if need be, sell and reïnvest the same in bank or railroad shares, at his discretion. I further authorize and request said board of trustees, the survivor and survivors of them, to fill any and all vacancies that may occur from time to time by death or resignation of any member or any officer of said board. One other bequest, hereinafter made, will, sooner or later, revert to this board of trustees. My desire is that they may become a permanent organization, until the rights of women shall be established equal with those of men; and I hope and trust that said board will receive the services and sympathy, the donations and bequests, of the friends of human rights. And being desirous that said board should have the immediate benefit of said bequest, without waiting for my exit, I have already paid it in advance and in full to said Phillips, the treasurer of said board, whose receipt therefor is on my files."

Opinion.—Gray, J. IV. It is quite clear that the bequest in trust to be expended "to secure the passage of laws granting women, whether married or unmarried, the right to vote, to hold office, to hold, manage and devise property, and all other civil rights enjoyed by men," cannot be sustained as a charity. No precedent has been cited in its support. This bequest differs from the others, in aiming directly and exclusively to change the laws; and its object cannot be accomplished without changing the constitution also. Whether such an alteration of the existing laws and frame of government would be wise and desirable, is a question upon which we cannot, sitting in a judicial capacity, properly express any opinion. Our duty is limited to expounding the laws as they stand. And those laws do not recognize the purpose of overthrowing or changing them, in whole or in part, as a charitable use. This bequest, therefore, not being for a charitable purpose, nor for the benefit of any particular persons, and being unrestricted in point of time, is inoperative and void. For the same reason, the gift to the same object, of one-third of the residue of the testator's estate after the death of his daughter, Mrs. Eddy, and her daughter, Mrs. Bacon, is also invalid, and will go to his heirs-at-law as a resulting trust.

Decision third was on the right of women to hold judicial offices. To quote again from Allen's Reports:

On June 8, 1871, the following order was passed by the governor and council, and on June 10 transmitted to the Justices of the Supreme Judicial Court, who, on June 29, returned the reply which is annexed. Ordered, That the opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court be requested as to the following questions: First—Under the constitution of this commonwealth, can a woman, if duly appointed and qualified as a justice of the peace, legally perform all acts appertaining to that office? Second—Under the laws of this commonwealth, would oaths and acknowledgments of deeds, taken before a married or unmarried woman duly appointed and qualified as a justice of the peace, be legal and valid?

Opinion.—By the constitution of the commonwealth, the office of justice of the peace is a judicial office, and must be exercised by the officer in person, and a woman, whether married or unmarried, cannot be appointed to such an office. The law of Massachusetts at the time of the adoption of the constitution, the whole frame and purport of the instrument itself, and the universal understanding and unbroken practical construction for the greater part of a century afterwards, all support this conclusion, and are inconsistent with any other. It follows that, if a woman should be formally appointed and commissioned as a justice of the peace, she would have no constitutional or legal authority to exercise any of the functions appertaining to that office. Each of the questions proposed must, therefore, be respectfully answered in the negative.

[Signed:]Reuben A. Chapman,Horace Gray, Jr.,
John Wells,James D. Colt,
Seth Ames,Marcus Morton.

Boston, June 29, 1871.

[Signed:]Reuben A. Chapman,Horace Gray, Jr.,
John Wells,James D. Colt,
Seth Ames,Marcus Morton.