Lord Beaconsfield to Mr. Gathorne Hardy.
It certainly is a relief that the drenching rhetoric has at length ceased—but I have never read a word of it. "Satis eloquentiæ sapientiæ parum."
[THE MAIWAND DISASTER (1880).]
Source.—Parliamentary Publications, "Afghanistan," C 2,736 of 1880, p. 3.
Telegram from Viceroy, June 27, 1880, to Secretary of State.
Telegram from Thomson at Teheran says: Ayub Khan marching against Candahar with large force. I think we should leave Shere Ali to defend himself beyond the Helmund, but it seems to me, after communicating with Stewart, that it would be inconsistent with security of our military position at Candahar to allow hostile forces to cross that river. I propose, therefore, to instruct Primrose, if Ayub reaches Furrah, to advance towards Girishk with sufficient force to prevent passage of Helmund....
Telegram dated August 2, 1880, from Colonel St. John, Candahar, to Foreign, Simla (p. 33).
29th.—Arrived here yesterday afternoon with General Burrows and Nuttall and remnant of force. Telegraph has been interrupted ever since my arrival. No chance of restoration, so send this by messenger to Chaman. Burrows marched from Kushk-i-Nakhud on morning 27th, having heard from me that Ayub's advanced guard had occupied Maiwand, about three miles from the latter place. Enemy's cavalry appeared advancing from direction of Haidrabad, their camp on Helmund ten miles above Girishk. Artillery and cavalry engaged them at 9 a.m., so shortly afterwards whole force of enemy appeared, and formed line of battle—seven regiments, regulars in centre, three others in reserve; about 2,000 cavalry on right; 400 mounted men and 2,000 Ghazis and irregular infantry on left; other cavalry and irregulars in reserve; five or six batteries of guns, including one of breechloaders, distributed at intervals. Estimated total force, 12,000. Ground slightly undulating, enemy being well posted. Till 1 p.m. action confined to artillery fire, which so well sustained and directed by enemy that our superior quality armament failed to compensate for inferior number of guns. After development of rifle fire, our breechloaders told; but vigorous advance of cavalry against our left, and Ghazis along the front, caused native infantry to fall back in confusion on 66th, abandoning two guns. Formation being lost, infantry retreated slowly; and in spite of gallant efforts of General Burrows to rally them, were cut off from cavalry and artillery. This was at 3 p.m., and followers and baggage were streaming away towards Candahar. After severe fighting in enclosed ground, General Burrows succeeded in extricating infantry and brought them into line of retreat. Unfortunately no effort would turn fugitives from main road, waterless at this season. Thus majority casualties appear to have occurred from thirst and exhaustion. Enemy's pursuit continued to ten miles from Candahar, but was not vigorous. Cavalry, artillery, and a few infantry reached banks of Argandab, forty miles from scene of action, at 7 a.m., many not having tasted water since previous morning. Nearly all ammunition lost, with 400 Martini, 700 Sniders, and 2 nine-pounder guns. Estimated loss, killed, and missing: 66th, 400; Grenadiers, 350; Jacob's Rifles, 350; artillery, 40; sappers, 21; cavalry, 60.... Preparations being now made for siege....
Extract from General Burrows's Report on the Action (p. 101).