The following is the further message which Her Majesty's Government desires to communicate to General Gordon in addition to that contained in my telegram of the 23rd ultimo, which should be repeated to him. Having regard to the time which has elapsed, Her Majesty's Government desires to add to their communication of the 23rd April as follows: As the original plan for the evacuation of the Soudan has been dropped, and as aggressive operations cannot be undertaken with the countenance of Her Majesty's Government, General Gordon is enjoined to consider and either to report upon, or, if feasible, to adopt, at the first proper moment, measures for his own removal and that of the Egyptians at Khartoum who have suffered for him or who have served him faithfully, including their wives and children, by whatever route he may consider best, having especial regard to his own safety and that of the other British subjects. With regard to the Egyptians above referred to, General Gordon is authorized to make free use of money rewards or promises at his discretion. For example, he is at liberty to assign to Egyptian soldiers at Khartoum sums for themselves and for persons brought with them per head, contingent on their safe arrival at Korosko, or whatever point he may consider a place of safety; or he may employ or pay the tribes in the neighbourhood to escort them. In the event of General Gordon having despatched any persons or agents to other points, he is authorized to spend any money required for the purpose of recalling them or securing their safety.
[GORDON'S POSITION (1884).]
I.
Source.—The Times, July 29.
Last night at eleven o'clock the British and African Royal Mail steamer Kinsembo arrived in Plymouth Sound, having on board Mr. H. M. Stanley, the African explorer. In the course of a conversation with a correspondent, Mr. Stanley declared that General Gordon might leave Khartoum whenever he chose, and had three routes of escape open to him. He was a soldier, but not a traveller. He would not leave Khartoum ingloriously. He could escape by means of the Congo, the Nile, and across the desert to Zanzibar. He could force his way through the country, because the people would be afraid of an armed force. He is perfectly well supplied with arms and ammunition, and is quite strong enough to meet the Mahdi. Mr. Stanley derides the suggested expedition to Khartoum, and says the men would die like flies when the summer is waning. He says that Gordon only requires to act like a soldier, as he believes he will, to settle the whole difficulty.
II.
Source.—Holland's Life of the Duke of Devonshire, vol. i., p. 472 et seq. (Longmans.)
On 29th July Lord Hartington circulated to the Cabinet his own final memorandum on the subject. He said: "I wish before Parliament is prorogued, and it becomes absolutely impossible to do anything for the relief of General Gordon, to bring the subject once more under the consideration of the Cabinet. On the last occasion when it was discussed, although an opinion was expressed that the balance of probability was that no expedition would be required to enable General Gordon and those dependent on him to leave Khartoum, I gathered that a considerable majority were in favour of making some preparations, and taking some steps which would make a relief expedition to Khartoum possible. I believe that I have already stated the grounds on which I think that if anything is now attempted it must be by the Valley of the Nile, and not by the Suakin-Berber line. The delay which has taken place makes it impossible that the railway should be constructed for any considerable distance on that line during the next autumn and winter, the period during which military operations would be practicable without great suffering and loss of life to the troops. The renewed concentration of the tribes under Osman Digna, near Suakin, and the fall of Berber, makes it inevitable that severe fighting would have to be done at both ends of the march, and, in consequence of the necessity of crossing the desert in small detachments, the engagement near Berber would be fought under great disadvantages. On the other hand, we have for the defence of the Nile itself been compelled to send a considerable force of British and Egyptian troops up the Nile; and the positions which are now occupied by those troops are so many stages on the advance by the Nile Valley.... The proposal which I make is that a brigade should be ordered to advance as soon as possible to Dongola by the Nile.... I have not entered into the question whether it is or is not probable that General Gordon can leave Khartoum without assistance. As we know absolutely nothing, any opinion on this subject can only be guess-work. But I do not see how it is possible to redeem the pledges which we have given, if the necessity should be proved to exist, without some such preparations and measures as those which I now suggest...." Mr. Chamberlain minuted that he was "against what is called an expedition, or the preparations for an expedition." He did not think that the information was sufficient to justify it. He thought that more information should first be obtained.... Mr. Gladstone minuted (July 31): "I confess it to be my strong conviction that to send an expedition either to Dongola or Khartoum at the present time would be to act in the teeth of evidence as to Gordon which, however imperfect, is far from being trivial, and would be a grave and dangerous error." Mr. Gladstone at the same time wrote to Lord Granville a letter, which the latter forwarded to Lord Hartington. He said: "I had intended to give much time to-day to collecting the sum of the evidence as to Gordon's position, which appears to me to be strangely underrated by some.... Undoubtedly I can be no party to the proposed despatch, as a first step, of a brigade to Dongola. I do not think the evidence as to Gordon's position requires or justifies, in itself, military preparations for the contingency of a military expedition. There are, however, preparations, perhaps, of various kinds which might be made, and which are matters simply of cost, and do not include necessary consequences in point of policy. To these I have never offered an insuperable objection, and the adoption of them might be, at the worst, a smaller evil than the evils with which we are threatened in other forms. This on what I may call my side. On the other hand, I hope I may presume that, while we are looking into the matters I have just indicated, nothing will be done to accelerate a Gordon crisis until we see, in the early days of next week, what the Conference crisis is to produce."