Japan: From the Japanese Government History

by Unknown

Chapter XIX

THE CHINO-JAPANESE WAR. 1894-1895

Seldom does history offer a more dramatic unfolding of international relations than the evolution of the East Asiatic question, of which the China-Japan War of 1894-1895, the Boxer campaign of 1900, and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 are but successive stages of a continuous and broadening process. The scene of this development now covers those countries which are among the most resourceful in the world and which comprise one-third of the human race. The future is unknown. The origin of the drama, however, may at least in part be traced to the adoption of a new career by Japan. Having been singularly well trained by her long history in the past, and impelled by the dictates of her vital interests, Japan had resolutely entered upon the new career, and had step by step committed herself to an open and progressive policy from which there could be no return, and which had to be carried forward against all obstacles, if she would exist and grow as a nation. This change of Japan's course of life was a cause of her wars with China and Russia; by it the history of the Far East radically changed its character and opened its new volume. At first, the determined attitude of new Japan immediately caused a breach which continued to widen until the war of 1894-1895 came as a logical result—for it at once appeared that Japan had torn herself away from the ancient East Asiatic civilization, of which China was the mentor and Korea the greatest pupil, but of which Japan had never been so slavish a disciple as not to develop her original traits. As soon as Japan proved receptive of Western arts and sciences, there was resentment on the part of China and Korea, which felt as if Japan had deserted the historic community of the East and turned a renegade and servile imitator of the inferior civilization of the barbarian. To an equal extent Japan desired, even unconsciously, to demonstrate that her new career not only was not misguided, but also was the only possible way to preserve herself and save the East. Conflict with China became acute when Japan desired to open to the world the tightly sealed kingdom of Korea, over which China claimed suzerainty. Japan's attempt to open Korea, then, should be taken as the starting point of our account of the war of 1894-1895.

To complete our general survey, it may again be emphasized that the same problem which caused the breach of 1894 also produced the conflict of 1904. The interests at stake had, indeed, grown wider and deeper during the ten intervening years, and Russia was a far more powerful and aggressive power than China, but the fact still remained that, from Japan's standpoint, her vital interests were at issue in 1904 as they were in 1894, and, from that of the world, the conflict raged now as it did then between an open and an exclusive policy.

As has been said above, Japan's attempt to open Korea as an independent and sovereign nation was the occasion for the outbreak of the Chinese war of 1894. Why did Japan desire to open Korea? Was it because Japan would apply to Korea the treatment she herself had received from the United States and other powers? Or was it an expression of the vigor of a newly regenerated nation? Probably the motives were not so simple, for it should be remembered that from the prehistoric ages the career of Japan and of Korea had been so vitally entwined that their close relationship of one kind or another was as inevitable as their geographical proximity itself. Moreover, beyond the peninsula stood two other powers, China and Russia, whose friendship Japan could not always count upon. In providing against any possible danger from these powers, the entire question seemed to hinge upon Korea, for with the fall of the latter the very existence of Japan would be threatened. It seemed essential for Japan, in order to protect her own life, either to annex Korea before it fell prey to another power or to insure its effective independence by opening its resources and reforming its rotten administration. Japan chose the latter alternative. But this brought her to a conflict with the Koreans themselves, for they were too thoroughly imbued with Chinese civilization and too deeply corroded by official corruption not to resent Japan's eagerness to modernize and revivify Korea. Korea thus presented the singular spectacle of resisting the suggestion of a friendly nation to insure her independence and power. Japan was confronted with the colossal task of overcoming the Korean misapprehension and breaking down the Chinese suzerainty over the peninsula.

This double conflict began almost as soon as the imperial authority was restored in Japan. In 1868 Japan sent a message to Korea with a view to opening friendly relations with her. Korea, however, being ill informed of the nature of the political change which had just taken place in Japan, and acting under the false representation by China of Japan's aggressive pretensions, resolutely declined to entertain these overtures. Other similar attempts also miscarried, and, in 1872, a Korean magistrate set a placard upon the gate of the residence of a Japanese officer at Fusan, in which Japan was stigmatized as the laughing stock of the world for her slavish imitation of barbarous customs. The taunt ended in saying that Japan had been so insolent as to impose the shameless policy upon Korea also, but the latter had too high a sense of propriety to be so deluded. It is noteworthy that the objections here raised were characteristically double, that Japan was under the shadow of other powers and was losing her nationality, and that she dared to force Korea to follow her unwise example. The former was sufficiently repugnant, the latter made it unendurable. When in 1873 Japan demanded China's explanation for the repeated insults made by Korea upon Japan in the latter's attempts to negotiate with her, the Chinese government declared that it was not answerable for Korea's conduct, for she was not its dependency. This aroused an outcry in Japan that she should independently force Korea open, but a greater insult from Korea was still to come. As a Japanese war vessel on its way to Niu-chwang stopped at the Kang-hwa Island, not far from Chemulpo, in August, 1875, it was fired upon by the inhabitants and two marines were killed. The Japanese-Korean treaty, which was concluded as a result of this incident, deserves a special note, not only because it was the first modern treaty made by Korea with a foreign power, but also because it for the first time showed clearly Japan's fundamental policy regarding Korea, upon which policy has depended and will for a long time depend many a serious event in the history of the Extreme Orient. By this treaty Korea was declared independent, the two parties binding themselves to treat each other on the basis of equality, and three Korean ports were shortly to be opened to foreign trade. This epoch-making treaty was concluded on February 26, 1876, at which date Korea was at last conventionally independent and partially open to the outside world.

We need not tarry to repeat the story already told of the strong internal opposition that the moderate Korean policy of the government had aroused in Japan, and of its far-reaching consequences in her domestic politics. What mainly interests us here is the question as to what effect did the treaty produce upon Korea herself, whose sovereignty it recognized in unmistakable terms. This conventional independence of Korea had hardly altered the state of her political mind. Korea, it should always be remembered, had since prehistoric ages been trained in that school of experience in which she found herself eking out her bare existence between stronger surrounding nations, which she was wont either to propitiate or to set one against another for her precarious safety. The Koreans had thus by habit and by conviction grown up an opportunist nation. They gratified Japan by complying with her wish to declare them independent, while, at the same time, they courted China's favor by maintaining their vague dependency upon that empire. As indefinitely did China support her contention that Korea at once was and was not dependent upon her.

The time soon came, however, when China was obliged to define her position toward Korea, for the more apparent Japan's policy of upholding Korean independence became to China, the more urgent was it for the latter to reassert her suzerainty over the peninsula. The ambiguous phraseology with which China had masked herself was suddenly cast aside when an acute crisis came. In 1882 Tai-wen-kun, the father of the Korean king, assumed the administrative power at Seul, and set about executing with great rigor his anti-foreign policy. The old patriot believed, like many a Japanese before the restoration, that exclusion and independence were synonymous. On April 23 the Japanese legation was attacked by Korean troops, its twenty-seven members barely escaping to Japan by way of Chemulpo on an English vessel. With unusual rapidity the Peking government sent forces to Korea, who captured Tai-wen-kun and carried him off to China, demonstrating in this way the latter's assumed right of forcible intervention in Korea. China thus asserted by deed her suzerainty over Korea, and herein is already forecast an ultimate conflict between her and Japan, although neither power may have expected it as yet. Japan, on her part, contented herself by securing the punishment of the guilty, payment of 50,000 yen for the killed and wounded, and also an indemnity amounting to half a million yen, four-fifths of which were remitted the next year. She was, besides, allowed to station troops at Seul for protecting her residents against future emergencies.

This Korean trouble of 1882 was followed two years later by a greater crisis, and again the occasion was a political disturbance at Seul. In 1884, when China was at war with France over Annam, the progressive party in Korea, which had been inspired by the example of Japan, took advantage of the situation and overthrew by violent force the pro-Chinese, conservative government. Suddenly the defeated party, together with 2000 Chinese troops, invaded the palace, murdered several members of the new cabinet, and attacked and burned the Japanese legation. The minister, Takezoye, fled for his life, while many of his compatriots residing at Seul were outraged or killed. The king, who had summoned Japanese soldiers to guard the court, now threw himself on the protection of the Chinese. In Japan the cause of the trouble was attributed to the mild Korean policy of the government. In 1885, accordingly, an agreement was made with Korea whereby the latter again promised to punish the guilty and indemnify the outrage. Korea was settled, and China had now to be dealt with. To allay the censure directed at himself by the nation, Itō proceeded in person to China, where he concluded with the Chinese commissioner, Li Hung Chang, the famous Tientsin Convention of April 18, 1885, which had so much to do with the later breach with China in 1894. It was agreed by this convention that Japan and China should withdraw troops from Korea, that they should not furnish Korea with military instructors, and that if it should become necessary at any future time for either party to send soldiers to Korea, it should notify the other of its intention. It was further stated, in a supplement, that there existed no definite evidence that Chinese troops had killed Japanese residents at Seul, and punishment would be inflicted on the guilty only when sufficient proof was forthcoming. As a matter of fact, no investigation followed and no punishment was meted out. On the contrary, the Chinese resident at Seul, Yuan Shih-kai—now the powerful pro-Japanese viceroy of Chihli, but then an astute promoter of China's ascendency over Korea—who was considered to have been largely responsible for the conduct of the Chinese forces, not only was not recalled, but was reinstated as Chinese minister at Seul. The greatest displeasure of the Japanese nation, however, was felt over the clause in the convention abrogating Japan's right, gained in 1882, of stationing troops in Seul to protect her citizens and their interests. Itō was consequently denounced at home now more loudly than before. China, on her part, equally resented the conclusion of the convention, for she was thereby obliged to treat Japan on an equal footing with herself in Korea. Both countries suffered equally, for while Japan forfeited the rights she had previously acquired, China's claim of suzerainty was seriously impaired. Things remained in this strained condition until nine years later, in 1894, when an unforeseen event forced them to a breaking point. It was the Tonghak rebellion, which brought military forces of Japan and China face to face in Korea.