Japan: From the Japanese Government History

by Unknown

It will be recalled that the Anglo-Japanese agreement was announced in the midst of the negotiations between Lessar and the Chinese government concerning Manchuria. During the diplomatic flurry attending the momentous declarations made first by Japan and Great Britain and then by Russia and France, the Manchurian negotiation seemed to have been temporarily forgotten, until the world was taken by surprise to hear of the conclusion, on April 8, 1902, of a new Russo-Chinese convention regarding the three eastern provinces, which went into force simultaneously with the signing of the agreement at three o'clock in the afternoon of that memorable day. Not the least surprising feature of it was the remarkable mildness of its terms. Russia promised, upon the condition that China should protect the Russian railways, Russian subjects, and their enterprises in Manchuria, to evacuate the territory and restore it to Chinese sovereignty. The evacuation was to take place at three different periods within the ensuing eighteen months, as follows: from regions west of the Liao River, by October 8, 1902; from the rest of the province of Sheng-king and the province of Kirin, by April 8, 1903; and, finally, from the Amur (Hei-lung) province, by October 8, 1903. Pending the evacuation, the number of Chinese troops and the sites of their stations in Manchuria should be determined by consultation between the Chinese and Russian officers, but after the evacuation those troops might be freely distributed at the direction of the Chinese officers. Then, however, the Russian Government should be notified of every change made in this respect. Suppressing other points in the convention which do not concern us directly, it is seen that it says nothing about Chinese territories outside of Manchuria, and, within the latter, contains no new mining or railway demands, while it appears to promise an eventually complete restoration of Manchuria to China. The moderate tone of the present instrument as compared with the former abortive conventions, and coming so soon after the renewed declaration of the Russo-French alliance of its devotion to the principle of the territorial integrity of China, seemed to confirm the sincerity of Russia's avowed intention in the East.

The first period of the Manchurian occupation, according to this convention, was to close on October 8, 1902. Before that date the Russian forces had completely withdrawn from that part of the Sheng-king province lying to the west of the Liao River. Russia had fulfilled her pledge. It was alleged, however, by several eyewitnesses that the so-called evacuation largely meant the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chinese quarters into the numerous and extensive Russian barracks and blockhouses along the Manchurian railway. The most important section of Manchuria, namely, the rest of the Sheng-king and the whole of the Kirin province, was, according to the convention, to be evacuated on April 8, 1903. That day came and passed, without seeing, except in a few places, even the nominal evacuation. In the midst of a suspense full of apprehension the Russians lodged at the Chinese foreign office, as a price for the yet unfulfilled evacuations, new demands in seven articles, which astounded the diplomatic world. The demands were in substance as follows: 1, the non-alienation of any part of Manchuria to any other power; 2, the right to construct a Russian telegraph line between Niu-chwang and Peking; 3, the promise that under no pretext any other foreigner should be employed in North China; 4, the sole management of the customs tariff at Niu-chwang by the Russo-Chinese Bank, and the Russian supervision of the quarantine service at the same port; 5, the opening of no new port or mart in Manchuria to foreign trade; 6, the maintenance of the status quo in the Mongolian administration; and, 7, the pledge to be made by China that all the privileges that the Russians enjoyed before the late émeute should not hereby be affected. The Japanese minister, Uchida, entered on April 21 a vigorous protest at the foreign office at Peking, and was followed by the British and American ministers. The United States, which had already been negotiating with China for the opening of two new ports in Manchuria, where she possessed the greatest interest of any nation in the import trade, made a query on April 24 direct to St. Petersburg as to the authenticity of the reported demand. She was assured both by the Russian foreign minister and Minister Cassini, as was Great Britain by the Russian representative at London, that the published reports of the proposed convention were absolutely incorrect. It appeared as if the Russian disclaimer were final and a signal diplomatic success had been accomplished by Secretary Hay. But to say that the reported articles were incorrect was not the same as to say that they were entirely unfounded, or even that every one of them was incorrect. The government of the tsar seems to have left sufficient room in its statements for the inference not only that there was proceeding a pourparler with the Chinese foreign office, but also that some of the rumored articles were not to be denied. However that may be, it is noteworthy that the knowledge of the Russian demand aroused among the leading classes of the Chinese people a patriotic ebullition not known even during the Japanese war and the Boxer insurrection. Petitions from all of the eighteen provinces reminded the Peking government in the strongest terms that the loss of Manchuria would lead to a widespread uprising in the empire, a repetition of the anti-foreign crusade of 1900, a probable wholesale partition of the Middle Kingdom by the rebels and the powers, and an eventual downfall of the ruling dynasty. In this remarkable upheaval, merchants and students, including those staying in Japan, took no less active part than the officials and literates, who, as the ruling class, are usually the most alive to the interests of the government and the civilization of China. Under these circumstances it is not strange that before May 10 the foreign office at Peking replied to the Russian government that the former could assuredly not concede to a demand that ignored previous agreements, the stipulations of which China had never violated.

This reply of China to Russia hardly had a greater effect to settle the dispute than did the pacific disclaimer given about ten days before by Russia to the United States, but on the contrary, was followed by a month the uncertain and trying nature of which to Prince Ching and his foreign office has seldom since been equaled during the whole period of the negotiations. While Pokotilov, the influential Peking agent of the Russo-Chinese Bank, was reported to be freely dispensing gifts and favors to win over certain members of the office and of the inner court, the Russian chargé, Plançon, demanded an immediate reply to three of the once proposed seven articles, which pertained to the non-alienation of the Manchurian territory, the opening of no new ports, and the maintenance of the status quo in Mongolia. Prince Ching, as well as the empress dowager, seemed to waver, or at least to bide time. The attempt of some patriots to install in the foreign office the most respected Viceroy Chang Chih-tung fell through, and the attitude of the Japanese government was deemed not sufficiently reassuring to encourage China once more to assume a decisive tone. In the meantime the Russian minister, Lessar, returned on May 29 to Peking after an absence, and severely reprimanded the foreign office for frequently allowing diplomatic secrecy to be violated. In his conference with Prince Ching, on June 10, he renewed the demand in each of the seven articles, every one of which the prince however, was obliged to refuse, as before. At Lessar's intimation that an indiscriminate refusal would result in serious disadvantages to China, and his suggestion that some substitute for the old demand might be devised for mutual benefit, the prince had only to request the minister of the tsar to present his own substitute, as the former naturally had none. A new demand was accordingly presented, which embodied the first, fourth, and sixth articles of the former convention, the fourth being now stated in two articles. Prince Ching begged for five days' delay, and temporarily secluded himself from the world, his negotiation with Lessar being in the meanwhile carried on by secret correspondence. The protests from the Japanese, American, and British ministers, as well as the renewed demand of the two former to open new ports in Manchuria, did not avail.

Irritating to Japan as was the Manchurian situation, she was confronted in Korea by a still more serious state of things. The diplomatic history of the latter country since the conclusion of the war of 1894-1895 may now be briefly recounted. The years between 1895 and 1898 witnessed violent fluctuations of influence between the Russians and the Japanese in Korea. The Japanese had been too eager for reform, and, at least on the occasion of the murder of the queen on October 8, 1895, had allowed themselves to be too much influenced by their less responsible element to withstand the obstruction and diplomacy of the Russians. It was not until the departure of Waeber, the astute Russian minister, and until the activity of the Russians in China had become all-engrossing, that the latter's influence was again eclipsed by that of the Japanese. During this period of struggle Russia and Japan concluded three agreements defining their position in Korea, namely, the Komura-Waeber memorandum signed at Seul on May 4, 1896, the Yamagata-Lobanov protocol signed at St. Petersburg on June 9, 1896, and the Nishi-Rosen protocol concluded at Tokyo on April 25, 1898. Some of the more permanent of the terms of these agreements deserve notice, as they gave to Japan a conventional ground for her negotiations with Russia in 1903-1904, just prior to the war. The two governments "recognized definitively the sovereignty and the entire independence of Korea, and mutually engaged themselves to abstain from all direct interference in the internal affairs of that country." No military teacher or financial adviser should be furnished to Korea by either power without consulting the other. In view of the large development of the Japanese commercial and industrial enterprises in Korea, the Russian government agreed not to impede the development of the commercial and industrial relations between Japan and Korea. In case further definitions of principles should become necessary or other points for discussion should arise, the representatives of the two powers should be instructed to negotiate amicably. The arrangement made in these agreements was from its nature temporary, and would have created fresh complications even if its terms had been strictly observed.

As soon as her hands were freer in Manchuria, Russia, represented at Seul by the ambitious Pavlov, and also by the semiofficial diplomats, Baron Gunzburg and Miss Sonntag, employed such means as befitted the peculiar situation of Korea in their persistent effort to overthrow Japanese and promote Russian influence in the peninsula. For this purpose they made to the Korean court propositions of almost every conceivable nature, including demands for concessions at Masampo, Chinhai Bay, and Kojedo Island, in the south, for the right to build telegraph and railway lines in the north, and for the employment of Russian financial advisers and military instructors. It was not till April, 1903, however, that, simultaneously with her pressure upon Peking, Russia began to work the timber concession which she was said to have secured in 1896, when the Korean king had taken refuge in the Russian legation at Seul. Early in May, ostensibly to defend the forest land, forty-seven Russian soldiers arrived at Yongam-po on the Yalu, where, despite protests from the Korean government, an extensive tract of land was seized and fortification was begun. Presently, one hundred, and then two hundred more Russian troops arrived, while on the Manchurian side of the frontier fresh troops entered An-tung and Feng-hwang-Cheng, so that the pressure of the Russian forces was heavily felt upon the Korean border.

At length the Japanese government came to the decision that it should deal directly with the government of the tsar in order to establish once and for all the integrity of China in Manchuria, as well as the independence and reform of Korea, to define the respective rights and interests in those countries of Japan and Russia, and radically and fundamentally to free the general peace of the Far East from the factors that had continually and profoundly threatened it. The decision in its main points had been reached by the press and the entire nation long before the cabinet ministers and privy councilors met before the throne, on June 23, and built thereon a definite policy to be pursued in the coming negotiations with Russia. These negotiations were attended by tortuous delays on the part of Russia, but the Japanese nation, realizing that never in their long history had they been confronted with a graver national problem, met it with a remarkable perseverance. The government, also, conducted itself with dignity and consideration, for none knew better than it that the immediate peace of the East was dependent upon the success of the pending negotiations. The different motives of Russia and Japan for these negotiations and the different spirit in which each carried them on may be well seen in the following official statements made by the respective governments soon after the diplomatic relations between them had been severed. The Russian communication, issued on February 9, 1904, by the foreign office at St. Petersburg, said:

"Last year [1903] the Tōkyō cabinet, under the pretext of establishing the balance of power and a more settled order of things on the shores of the Pacific, submitted to the imperial government [of Russia] a proposal for a revision of the existing treaties with Korea. Russia consented, and Viceroy Alexiev was charged to draw up a project for a new understanding with Japan in coöperation with the Russian minister at Tōkyō, who was intrusted with the negotiations with the Japanese government. Although the exchange of views with the Tōkyō cabinet on this subject was of a friendly character, the Japanese social circles and the local and foreign press attempted in every way to produce a warlike ferment among the Japanese and to drive the government into an armed conflict with Russia. Under the influence thereof the Tōkyō cabinet began to formulate greater and greater demands in the negotiations, at the same time taking most extensive measures to make the country ready for war.

"All these circumstances could not, of course, disturb Russia's equanimity, but they induced her also to take military and naval measures. Nevertheless, to preserve peace in the Far East, Russia, so far as her incontestable rights and interests permitted, gave the necessary attention to the demands of the Tōkyō cabinet, and declared herself ready to recognize Japan's privileged commercial and economic position in the Korean peninsula, with the concession of the right to protect it by military force in the event of disturbances in that country. At the same time, while rigorously observing the fundamental principle of her policy regarding Korea, whose independence and integrity were guaranteed by previous understandings with Japan and by treaties with other powers, Russia insisted on three points:

"(1.) On a mutual and unconditional guarantee of this principle.

"(2.) On an undertaking to use no part of Korea for strategic purposes, as the authorization of such action on the part of any foreign power was directly opposed to the principle of the independence of Korea.