Lives of Distinguished North Carolinians, with Illustrations and Speeches

by Unknown

During its operations it acknowledges no equal which may check its will, and knows no superior afterwards which may rightfully punish its deeds. The language of the Court does not strictly and precisely describe the relation of master and slave which subsisted in ancient Rome, and does now subsist in modern Turkey; a relation which this Court in the case of State vs. Read did most emphatically denounce as inhuman, unsuited to the genius of our laws, and unnecessary to protect the master in his legal rights. In that case Judge Henderson fixes the true boundary of the master's power. It extends, says he, to securing the services and labors of the slave, and no farther. And he expressly declares that a power over the life of the slave is not surrendered by the law, because the possession of such a power is noways necessary to the purposes of slavery, and that his life is in the care of the law.

The idea of the perfect submission of the slave is in true accordance with the policy which should regulate that condition of life, wherever it may exist. But whether it will more certainly result from the absolute power of the owner than from a large but limited authority, is questionable indeed. More especially, if it be true, as argued in the opinion already referred to, that the absolute power of the master, although left unrestrained by law, is checked and fettered by what is stronger than law, the irresistible force of public sentiment. If that force is now setting in a counter-current against the license of absolute power, either it is to be deprecated and stopped, or absolute power is most clearly proved to be unnecessary to the ends of slavery. The courts of the country should foster the enlightened benevolence of the age, and interpret the powers which one class of the people claim over another, in conformity, not with the spirit which tolerates the barbarian who is guilty of savage cruelty, but with that which heaps upon him the frowns and deep execrations of the community. All domestic police power must be regulated by the feelings and views of those who dispense it. If it be true, then, that public sentiment will no longer tolerate the excessive cruelties from the master, as is said by Taylor, Chief Justice, in the State vs. Hale; by Henderson, Chief Justice, in the State vs. Read; and by Ruffin, Chief Justice, in the State vs. Mann; and if it be true, likewise, that the relation between master and slave is to be discovered from the opinions and feelings of the masters, we cannot hear without surprise that it is necessary, in the actual condition of things, to clothe the master with an uncontrolled and absolute authority over the body of the slave. If such necessity now exists, the rhetorician hath spoken, and not the judge. If such necessity does not exist, the power is given for abuse, and not to accomplish the objects of slavery. It would seem really, that whilst the courts are lauding the Christian benevolence of the times manifested by the humane treatment of the slaves, they are engaged in investigating to what possible extent the master may push his authority without incurring responsibility. They feel shocked at the discovery they make themselves, but rise from their labor with the consolation that few are so abandoned to a sense of public indignation as to enjoy the revealed prerogative. If the expression could be divested of the appearance of sarcasm, some truth might, perhaps, be found in the assertion that the great result of their disclosure has been to teach the kind master how merciful and moderate he is in the midst of such plenitude of power, and the cruel one, how despised and desecrated he will be if he use its legal license. Good men will feel no pleasure in the revealment, bad men will be freed from the check of ignorance.

It is further said in the State vs. Mann, "That the slave, to remain a slave, must be made sensible that there is no appeal from his master; that his power in no one instance is usurped." The language here is equally explicit, and altogether as strong, as that before quoted. It denies to the slave the smallest attribute of a rational or feeling creature. It not only represses thought, and extinguishes all power to deliberate on any command of his master, however repugnant to natural justice it may be, and whether its execution is to affect himself or others; but it professes to control into perfect tameness the instinct of self-preservation. It would be difficult, and if it were easy, it would be lamentable, to accomplish the former; but it would be impossible to effect the latter. Such insensibility to life would defeat the very object of its inculcation—the value of the slave. For we can never hope to regulate this powerful instinct of nature with an adjustment which will quietly yield all its love of life into the hands of a ferocious master and yet preserve it against the world beside. But if it were desirable so far to annihilate it, the task is beyond the reach of human ingenuity and not to be accomplished by the possession of absolute power, however fearfully enforced or terribly exercised. The relation of master and slave may repress all the noble energies and manly sentiments of the soul, and may degrade the moral being into a brute condition. And when this is done we shall not be astonished to see the moral brute exhibiting the instinct natural to the brute condition. How vain must it always be, when we shall have reduced humanity to its ultimate capability of degradation, to expect any embellishment of mind to adorn the wretched existence. If the relation require that the slave be disrobed of the essential features which distinguish him from the brute, the relation must adapt itself to the consequences and leave its subject the instinctive privileges of a brute.

I am arguing no question of abstract right, but am endeavoring to prove that the natural incidents of slavery must be borne with, because they are inherent to the condition itself; and that any attempt to restrain or punish a slave for the exercise of a right, which even absolute power cannot destroy, is inhuman, and without the slightest benefit to the security of the master, or to that of society at large. The doctrine may be advanced from the bench, enacted by the Legislature, and enforced with all the varied agony of torture, and still the slave cannot believe, and will not believe, "That there is no one instance" in which the master's power is usurped. Nature, stronger than all, will discover many instances and vindicate her rights at any and at every price. When such a stimulant as this urges the forbidden deed punishment will be powerless to reclaim or to warn by example. It can serve no purpose but to gratify the revengeful feelings of one class of people and to inflame the hidden animosities of the other.

With great deference to the opinion already commented on, it would appear to me that a conclusion directly the reverse as to the necessity of the absolute power in the master should have been drawn from the premises. The slave can only expect to learn the law of the land as respects the power of the owner over him, from the manner in which it is generally, and almost universally, administered by the owner. If their treatment is now so mild or becoming so, as rarely to require the interposition of any tribunal for their protection, they will soon be taught by the conduct of their masters, if not already taught, that absolute power is not the master's right; and the consequence which may be expected will be that the slave will be prepared to resist its exercise when bad men attempt to commit the cruelties allowed by it. So important is it that the Court should, as far as possible, conform their exposition of the rights of men with those sentiments of the public which, by the Court themselves, are admitted to be wholesome and just. And especially should they do so when those rights are constituted by public opinion and almost exclusively by that alone.

Whatever be the power, however, which the master may possess, it is given with the sole view to enable him to coerce the services of the slave, and all experience teaches us that a power over life is not necessary to effectuate that end.

The usual modes of correction are found to be altogether sufficient. Punishment short of death serves the end of the master both as a corrective and as an example. Power over the life of the slave, being therefore unnecessary, ought not to be conceded. The use of highly dangerous weapons in cases of simple disobedience is not tolerated by the law, because they are calculated to produce death.

If the deceased had been resisted a great degree of force might have been used, and the law would not have been scrupulous in determining the excess. If he had been chastising the prisoner in the ordinary mode and death had ensued, it would have been nothing more than an unfortunate accident. But the prisoner was neither resisting his master nor did the calamity grow out of any attempt to chastise. It is confidently contended that a master has not by the law of the land the right to kill his slave for a simple act of disobedience, however provoking may be the circumstances under which it is committed; that if a slave be required to stand, and he run off, he has not forfeited his life. This is conclusive, if the law will never justify a homicide except it be committed upon unavoidable necessity, and will never excuse one, except it be done by misadventure or se defendendo. There is no principle of criminal law which will justify or excuse the death that has been caused through the provocation of the passions alone.

This court has repudiated all idea of similarity between the relation of master and apprentice, as understood in the English law, and that of master and slave as understood in ours. I cannot perceive the propriety of such total repudiation. The foundation of both relations is the same, to wit, service; and although the slave may stand in a lower grade than the mere apprentice, and be more dependent on his master, yet it is submitted that the difference is in the degree and not in the nature of the authority which the master of the one or the other may exercise. This seems to have been the idea of Justice Blackstone, who, in speaking of homicide by parents and masters caused by immoderate correction, proceeds: "Thus by an edict of the Emperor Constantine, when the rigor of the Roman law began to relax and soften, a master was allowed to chastise his slave with rods and imprisonment; and if death accidentally ensued he was guilty of no crime; but otherwise, if he struck him with a club or a stone, and thereby occasioned his death, or if in any yet grosser manner (as by shooting), immoderate suo jure utatur, tunc reus homicidii sit. 4 Bl. Com., 183."

It is not my purpose, however, to place the slave and apprentice on the same footing. It is freely conceded that there is a great difference between the two conditions, and that many cases of homicide committed precisely under the same circumstances would be murder of an apprentice, and only manslaughter of a slave. Thus the master has the right to beat his apprentice as well as his slave, but the principle is universal (with a solitary exception), that a man having the right, under a given provocation, to lay hand upon another, but using a weapon calculated to produce death, and death ensuing, is guilty of murder. The exception alluded to is the slaying of an adulterer caught in the act. Now, if an apprentice disobeys and runs from his master in order to escape chastisement, and the master shoots and kills him, it is murder.