About nightfall the enemy occupied some two hundred yards of our breastworks. Through no inefficiency or negligence on the part of the officers and men were the works carried, but owing to the weakness of the line, its extreme length, and the want of sufficient force to defend it, for they acted most heroically on this trying occasion. Only one unwounded man (an officer) did I see seeking the rear, and he one whom I had the previous day ordered under arrest for trafficking with the enemy (exchanging tobacco for coffee). Him I hailed and inquired where he was going, when he recalled his arrest of the previous day, from which I immediately released him, and sent him back to his command.
I had a verbal conference with General Lee and afterwards officially reported my inability to hold this point against any vigorous attack. In consequence of this report, Lieutenant-Colonel Peyton, the Army-Inspector, was sent to examine this line, and he coincided with my views and so reported to General Lee. On an average throughout, the space from man to man was at least eight feet in the line of trenches. I doubted not that with a reserve of five hundred men I could have driven the enemy from any point which they might capture, and repeatedly urged that such an arrangement be made, knowing well that the enemy, by concentrating a large force on any given point, could press their way through the line, and my only salvation was in having the means at hand to drive them back before large numbers could enter. Our left was the post of greatest danger. There should the reserve have been placed; but General Lee informed me that every available man was on duty, and I must do the best I could.
On Sunday night of the 2nd we had orders to abandon the works, and without the knowledge of the Federals, we withdrew to the north side of the Appomattox river, following the Hickory Road to Goode's Bridge, where we recrossed the Appomattox, proceeding towards Amelia Court House, which we reached on the morning of the 5th. Wednesday we remained stationary in line of battle, confronting the enemy until about dark, when we followed the army, taking up the rear, being very much impeded on the march by the wagon train and its most miserable management, which, as I apprehended, would cause us some disaster. The enemy showed themselves on Thursday, about 8 o'clock A. M., in our rear and on our left flank, when near Amelia Springs, and in a short time began to press us vigorously.
I then formed Cox's and Cowand's Brigades in line of battle, with a heavy skirmish line in front to impede their progress, and to cover our rear, sending Battle's, Cook's and Archer's Brigades forward for one-half mile to form there, across the road, in line of battle in order to allow Cowand and Cox to retreat safely when the enemy had deployed and prepared to attack; our right flank being protected by a North Carolina brigade of cavalry under General Roberts. In this manner alternating the brigades throughout the day, we continued to oppose the enemy and retreat, endeavoring to protect the lagging wagon train, which was successfully done up to about 4 P. M., when we approached Sailor's Creek, and upon the ridge running parallel with that stream we made the final stand of the day, the wagons becoming blocked up at the bridge crossing the stream. At this point General Lee ordered me if possible to hold this line until he could have artillery put in position on the opposite hills over the creek parallel with those I occupied.
The enemy pushed on rapidly, attacking us with very great pertinacity. We here repeatedly repulsed their assaults, but by turning both of our flanks they succeeded in not only dislodging but driving us across the creek in confusion. About now the artillery from the heights occupied by General Lee opened upon the enemy, and the sun being down they did not cross the creek. After we broke, personally I was so pressed, the space between the two wings of the enemy being not over two hundred yards, that I sought safety in retreat. I galloped to the creek (the bridge being in their possession) where the banks were very precipitous, and for protection from their murderous fire, concluded to jump my horse in, riding him through the water, and effect my escape by abandoning him on the other side, the bullets of the enemy whistled around me like hail all the while. By great good fortune, the opposite banks proving not so precipitous, and my horse, seeming to appreciate the situation, clambered up the height and started off in a run, thus securing my safety. This same animal, Warren, I still own and treasure for his past services. That night we took the road for Farmville, crossing the Appomattox at High Bridge, posting guards on the south side, thus collecting all stragglers and returning them to their commands.
The next morning (Friday) we continued our march down the railroad and formed line of battle on the Lynchburg road, still endeavoring to preserve that "impedimenta" of Cæsar's—the wagon-train—marching by the left flank through the woods parallel to the road traveled by the wagon train, and about one hundred or so yards distant from the road. Upon reaching the road and point that turns towards Lynchburg from the Cumberland road, three of my brigades, Cook's, Cox's, and Cowand's, had crossed the Cumberland road and were in line of battle, and at right angles with Battle's and Archer's Brigades, who were still parallel with the Cumberland road. Heavy firing was going on at this point, when General Mahone came rushing up and reported that the enemy had charged; turning his flank, and driving his men from their guns and the works which he had erected early in the day for the protection of these cross roads. I then ordered my three brigades, Cook's, Cox's, and Cowand's [to move], at a double-quick on the line with Battle and Archer, and charging the enemy, we drove them well off from Mahone's works, recapturing the artillery taken by them and capturing a large number of prisoners. I held this position until sent for by General Lee, who complimented the troops of the division upon the charge made and the service rendered, ordering me to leave a skirmish line in my front, and stating that Field's Division would occupy my position; I was to hurry with all possible dispatch to the road which intersected the Lynchburg road, as the enemy's cavalry were reported to be approaching by that road.
We reached this road, halting and keeping the enemy in check until the wagons had passed, and then continued the march parallel with the road traveled by the wagon train, continuing thus to march until night, when we took the road following to protect the trains.
On Saturday, the 8th, no enemy appeared, and we marched undisturbed all day. Up to this time, since the evacuation of Petersburg, we had marched day and night, continually followed and harassed by the enemy. The men were very much jaded and suffering for necessary sustenance, our halts not having been sufficiently long to prepare their food, besides all our cooking utensils not captured or abandoned were where we could not reach them. This day Bushrod Johnson's Division was assigned to and placed under my command, by order of General Lee. Upon passing a clear stream of water and learning that the other division of the corps had gone into camp some two miles ahead, I concluded to halt and give my broken-down men an opportunity to close up and rejoin us, and sent a message to General Gordon, commanding the corps, making known my whereabouts, informing him I would be at any point he might designate at any hour desired.
By dark my men were all quiet and asleep. About 9 o'clock I heard the roar of artillery in our front, and in consequence of information received, I had my command aroused in time and passed through the town of Appomattox Court House before daylight, where, upon the opposite side of the town, I found the enemy in my front. Throwing out my skirmishers and forming line of battle, I reconnoitred and satisfied myself as to their position, and awaited the arrival of General Gordon for instructions, who, awhile before day, accompanied by General Fitz Lee, came to my position, when we held a council of war. General Gordon was of the opinion that the troops in our front were cavalry, and that General Fitz Lee should attack. Fitz Lee thought they were infantry and that General Gordon should attack. They discussed the matter so long that I became impatient, and said it was somebody's duty to attack, and that immediately, and I felt satisfied that they could be driven from the cross-roads occupied by them, which was the route it was desirable that our wagon train should pursue, and that I would undertake it; whereupon Gordon said, "Well, drive them off." I replied, "I cannot do it with my division alone, but require assistance." He then said, "You can take the two other divisions of the corps." By this time it was becoming sufficiently light to make the surrounding localities visible. I then rode down and invited General Walker, who commanded a division on my left, composed principally of Virginians, to ride with me, showing him the position of the enemy and explaining to him my views and plan of attack. He agreed with me as to its advisability. I did this because I felt that I had assumed a very great responsibility when I took upon myself the charge of making the attack. I then made dispositions to dislodge the Federals from their position, placing Bushrod Johnson's Division upon my right, with instructions to attack and take the enemy in the flank, while my division skirmishers charged in front, where temporary earthworks had been thrown up by the enemy, their cavalry holding the crossings of the road with a battery. I soon perceived a disposition on their part to attack this division in flank. I rode back and threw our right so as to take advantage of some ditches and fences to obstruct the cavalry if they should attempt to make a charge. In the meantime the cavalry of Fitz Lee were proceeding by a circuitous route to get in rear of them at these cross-roads. The enemy observing me placing these troops in position fired upon me with four pieces of artillery. I remember well the appearance of the shell, and how directly they came towards me, exploding and completely enveloping me in smoke. I then gave the signal to advance, at the same time Fitz Lee charged those posted at the cross-roads, when my skirmishers attacked the breastworks, which were taken without much loss on my part, also capturing several pieces of artillery and a large number of prisoners, I at the same time moving the division up to the support of the skirmishers in echelon by brigades, driving the enemy in confusion for three-quarters of a mile beyond the range of hills covered with oak undergrowth. I then learned from the prisoners that my right flank was threatened. Halting my troops I placed the skirmishers, commanded by Colonel J. R. Winston, Forty-fifth North Carolina troops, in front, about one hundred yards distant, to give notice of indication of attack. I placed Cox's Brigade, which occupied the right of the division at right angles to the other troops, to watch that flank. The other divisions of the corps (Walker's and Evans') were on the left. I then sent an officer to General Gordon announcing our success, and that the Lynchburg road was open for the escape of the wagons, and that I awaited orders. Thereupon I received an order to withdraw, which I declined to do, supposing that General Gordon did not understand the commanding position which my troops occupied. He continued to send me order after order to the same effect, which I still disregarded, being under the impression that he did not comprehend our favorable location, until finally, I received a message from him, with an additional one as coming from General Lee, to fall back. I felt the difficulty of withdrawing without disaster and ordered Colonel J. R. Winston, commanding the skirmish line which had been posted in my front on first reaching these hills, to conform his movement to those of the division, and to move by the left flank so as to give notice of an attack from that quarter. I then ordered Cox to maintain his position in line of battle, and not to show himself until our rear was one hundred yards distant, and then to fall back in line of battle, so as to protect our rear and right flank from assault. I then instructed Major Peyton, of my staff, to start the left in motion, and I continued with the rear.
The enemy upon seeing us move off, rushed out from under cover with a cheer, when Cox's Brigade, lying concealed at the brow of the hill, rose and fired a volley into them which drove them back into the woods, the brigade then following their retreating comrades in line of battle unmolested. After proceeding about half the distance to the position occupied by us in the morning, a dense mass of the enemy in column (infantry) appeared on our right, and advanced, without firing, towards the earthworks captured by us in the early morning, when a battery of our artillery opened with grape and canister and drove them under the shelter of the woods.