“The latest accounts we can procure are as follow, that the French still occupy Trieste, and that they are hourly expected at Fiume, which the Austrian troops and gun vessels have quitted and gone to Segna: that General Meydick is still successful in Dalmatia, and that General Marmont is shut up in Zara, from whence it is probable he will, (if not relieved by the army from Istria,) endeavour to make his escape. Colonel Meydick commanding the Imperial flotilla at Segna, is very urgent for the co-operation of the British frigates.
“The vessels which have taken refuge in Lussin, as well as the island itself, are in great distress from the want of provisions, &c. and from the state in which we left them, the batteries are very defenceless.
“Having seriously considered all these circumstances, and the effect which might at such a moment be produced upon the mind of the inhabitants by that force being weakened, which they are so accustomed to look up to for protection; I trust I shall only anticipate your Lordship’s wishes by remaining on the coast, until the senior officer off Corfu can be informed of the situation of affairs.
“I wrote to Captain Brisbane on the subject, on the 19th, by an Austrian brig, but am informed that she has only sailed for Corfu this morning. I shall therefore dispatch the Redwing with this, and with the Amphion and Thames use our utmost efforts in assisting the Austrian army in fortifying the island, and facilitating (if necessary) the evacuation of Fiume and Segna.
“Several reports corresponding in general with each other, particularly as to dates, have lately reached us of a battle having taken place near Schoenbrun, and that the Imperialists had beaten the French, but little confidence is placed in them. The pass of Prevalt is however believed to be still in possession of General Giulai with 15,000 Croatians, which accounts for the French not having advanced more rapidly in that quarter.
“I have, &c.
“J. BRENTON.”
“To Vice-Admiral Lord Collingwood.”
On the 28th May, while off Lussin with the Spartan and Amphion, Captain Brenton fell in with a squadron of line of battle ships under Captain Hargood, consisting of the Northumberland, Excellent, and Montagu; and no sooner had the Commander received Captain Brenton’s report of the state of Trieste, than he decided upon making an immediate attack upon the Russian squadron in that port, and made all sail for it, sending the Spartan and Amphion a-head. The squadron got into the bay at day-light on the 29th, and had the wind continued, would undoubtedly have succeeded in their object without much loss; but the line of battle ships were first becalmed on the south shore, and afterwards involved in one of those extraordinary currents so common in the Adriatic, that although apparently having sufficient way for steerage, yet with every sail full, neither helm or sails had any power over the ships, which were to use the common phrase among seamen, completely in irons; whilst at the same time, the Spartan and Amphion, not a league to the northward, were perfectly free.
This most mortifying detention continued until five o’clock in the evening, when the sea breeze set in, and the influence of the current was no longer felt; but the Russians and the French had made good use of their time. They had from four o’clock in the morning a conviction that an attack was intended; and the Russian ships were hauled close into shore, and moored head and stern with their broadsides commanding the entrance of the harbour. Their inside guns were landed, and batteries made with them all along the Eastern, and Northern shores of the bay, manned with French troops; they had also forges for heating shot, and every preparation for a vigorous defence, which fourteen hours could give them, assisted as they were by several thousands of French troops. These preparations passed under the immediate notice of Captain Brenton and Captain Hoste, who were together the whole day, and could see all the operations of the enemy through their spy-glasses, frequently going together on board the Commodore to make their report during the day. Both agreed that in the early part of the day, success to the British Squadron might be considered as certain; but they were also both of opinion that as the day declined, the prospect was clouded over; and long before six o’clock they had expressed their conviction to the Commodore that an attack would be hopeless. At this hour when the sea breeze set in, the Commodore taking Captain Brenton into his cabin, requested he would give a decided official opinion as to the expediency of making an attempt upon the Russian ships. To which Captain Brenton answered, “Were I in your place commanding this squadron, I certainly would not make the attempt; the enemy are now too strong, and the hazard to the British squadron would be too great.” The Commodore requested the first Lieutenant might be sent for to hear this opinion, when Captain Brenton said, “If you will turn the hands up on the quarter deck, I will repeat what I have said, before the whole ship’s company.” This was deemed conclusive, and the signal was made immediately for the squadron to haul their wind. Some dissatisfaction was manifested at this decision, and expressed to the great annoyance of the Commodore; but a moment’s consideration would have convinced the most ardent and intrepid officer in the navy, that not only all chance of success was out of the question, but that the retreat of the British Squadron from the port would have been very doubtful, if possible. The sea breeze had set in fresh at six o’clock, and would, in all probability, have lasted till midnight. Under such circumstances how was a crippled ship to have made her retreat? and what must have been the situation of the squadron, exposed to the fire of three line of battle ships, converted into floating batteries, their guns from the side next the shore all landed and become heavy batteries, manned with French troops, and at least 5000 of these occupying Trieste? Captain Brenton and Captain Hoste never ceased to congratulate themselves as having been the means of saving the squadron from the most severe loss, if not from destruction.