It is certainly discouraging for a nation which has hitherto held, and which means to keep, the first place in the world as a naval Power to find that in systematic training Russia and Germany are dangerously surpassing us. No doubt in the raw material of a navy we can compete fearlessly with any country on the face of the earth; our sailors can not be matched for enterprise, resolution, and discipline, nor can our captains, in spite of some late disasters, be out-sailed or out-manœuvred by any who sail under foreign flags. But we must not forget that war on the seas, like war on land, is year by year becoming more and more a scientific pursuit. Our magnificent iron-clad fleet, in which Mr. Reed feels justly a parental interest, is too precious a possession to be intrusted to men who do not know how to use so two-edged an instrument. But how should our naval officers know how to manage an iron-clad ship? They are taught nothing about the construction of these triumphs of modern science; they do not, as a rule, possess even the elementary knowledge which would enable them to commence the study of the subject.
Whether the unequaled advantages offered by Greenwich Hospital be turned to account or some more expensive method be adopted by a Government which pins its credit on economy, the necessity of providing for the education of naval officers can no longer be ignored. Not to speak of the absolute absurdity of sending iron-clads to sea in charge of officers who know no more of the construction of an iron-clad than they know of the latest improvements in cotton-spinning machinery, it is obvious that a system under which men whose business is to navigate costly vessels of war, are sent to their work without knowing even the elements of mathematics, must sooner or later result in a disastrous collapse. It may be a question whether such has not been the case already,—whether the recent mischances in the conduct at sea of some of our finest vessels may not be traceable to the imperfect education of the officers.
When other nations are giving their sailors scientific teaching, and when we are expending gigantic sums on the construction of a Navy which must be handled in accordance with scientific principles, it appears absurd, or worse, to allow the commanders and the officers of our iron-clads to go to sea without the slightest guarantee for their knowledge of the peculiar conditions under which one of our modern monster ships is to be managed. If an iron-clad happens, as we may presume, considering what has lately happened, is not impossible, to strike upon a rock or otherwise seriously to damage herself at a distance from home dockyards, the chances are that no one on board, from the captain down to the carpenter, will know how to repair the damage.
To the urgent demand for more scientific knowledge of naval construction, Admiral Henry J. Rouse interposes a plea for more seamanship, discipline, and education afloat. In the Times for Sept. 28, the bluff Admiral says, rather bluntly:
I was alive to the want of seamanship and to the neglect of a naval education from the moment a midshipman left his school and was appointed to a steamer: but I always flattered myself there was one redeeming point—namely—gunnery—in which the officers of the present day had a wonderful preëminence over the old school. How is the proposed college to ameliorate this state of things? Will it make the young officers engineers when on board ship? They are not allowed to interfere with the engineer, who is, in fact, the commanding officer. Will warrant officers, carpenters, and gunners, be educated there? And in answer to Mr. Reed relying upon the carpenter in the event of a ship grounding (not an uncommon occurrence), we look to the captain to lay out his anchors, lighten his ship and heave her off by purchase over purchase; we do not consult the carpenter. Mr. Reed says,—“The men who will have to design for our Navy will never be free to design the best ships which can be provided until an improved education of the whole naval service unbinds the hands of the scientific servants of the Admiralty.”
Who are the scientific servants? Are the men who designed the iron-bound monsters at the expense of half a million each; which have every bad quality, which can neither sail, wear, nor stay better than a coal barge, and which roll and pitch like maniacs owing to the weight of their armor, and which are certain to founder if called upon to face a very heavy gale? Are the servants scientific who stow their ballast on empty cells, thereby preventing a ship righting herself if she heels over 33 deg. under canvas, and which makes her capsize keel uppermost, according to the simple law of gravitation which impels the vacuum to the surface? Was the servant scientific who reduced a ship’s ballast 300 tons, and put a corresponding weight of iron on the upper works, boasting he had retained the same line of immersion without calculating the loss of stability, and did not the Admiralty listen to him like countrymen to a mountebank, and reward him with a grant of money?
If a Greenwich College could diminish the frightful excesses and expenditure in the last eight years in the building department, for which the House of Commons demanded an investigation, which was checkmated by sending a distinguished admiral to the Cape of Good Hope; if it could instruct the scientific servants in the mysteries of their vocation, and convert the simple landsmen in Charing-cross into naval oracles; if it could make young officers seamen by inspiration, then I should agree with Mr. Reed that a Greenwich College would be most desirable.
As for the junior officers nothing but a sailing ship can educate a seaman. If a midshipman loses the precious years from 14 to 17 in a steamer he will be too old and proud to learn his profession, and when later in life he is sent to take command of a prize ship under canvas in war time he will look very foolish in half a gale of wind.
If any man will take the trouble to think, he must be convinced that no ship of any size, no armor clypei septemplicis, no guns of 25 tons can compete with an iron-cased steam ram of about 1,200 tons, invulnerable, bomb-proof, which would put five feet of cold steel under a ship’s water line going 14 miles per hour. We are now building gunboats to protect the coast. One of Mr. Drake’s steam rams of about 300 tons, without a gun mounted, would destroy a dozen of them. In the next naval action history will be repeated. Romans, Carthagenians, and again the naves rostratæ, alias the Steam Ram, will carry the day. It is wonderful that the Admiralty for the last twenty years have been building their hogs in armor to defy shot and shell, ignoring the terrible attack of this superior power. It is never too late to mend. To save enormous sums of money and a waste of coal we ought to pay off all our useless monsters, and during peace to commission small ships with auxiliary screws, never to burn a coal except in a case of necessity; and then, by keeping squadrons at sea, we might improve our discipline, our seamanship, and esprit de corps.
The letter of Admiral Rouse was accompanied by a leader in the Times of the same date from which we take a few paragraphs.