NOTES ON EXPERIENCE GAINED AT THE FRONT
By General Sir O’Moore Creagh, V.C.
1. The experience gained at the front in the present campaign may be divided broadly under two heads: Firstly, the test under war conditions of the general principles upon which the British Army has been trained in peace. Secondly, knowledge concerning the tactics of the enemy and his method of employing various arms. With regard to the former of these two heads of information, it is important to note that the broad principles upon which the training of the British Army has been based are described by a General Officer as being sound, and that the need of paying strict attention to them in carrying out training is emphasized by him. On the other hand, valuable experience has been gained as to the best method of applying these general principles to the peculiar conditions which have so far prevailed in the present campaign, including the tactics adopted by the enemy. Information based on this experience, more especially so far as it concerns the employment of musketry in attack and defence, is included in these notes, as it may prove useful to officers in training their commands.
2. These notes, therefore, do not affect the general principles of training laid down in this book. They merely deal with the application of these principles to the peculiar conditions which have so far obtained in the course of the campaign. These conditions may at any time give place to others, for it must be remembered that in no two military operations is the situation exactly the same. Instructors, therefore, must avoid the mistake of training their men for any particular given conditions of warfare, and remember that general principles and broad rules alone are applicable to the leading of troops in war (Infantry Training, 1914).
3. German Musketry.[2]—(i) The Germans consider it unnecessary to teach men to fire at distances beyond 400 metres. Their plan of infantry attack (see diagram, p. ix) is devised to get within this range without opening fire. Accordingly, judging distance is practised by officers only, and no attention is devoted to the indication of targets, concentration of fire, or to fire direction and control generally, as practised in the British Army. To concentrate the fire of a platoon or company on one spot at 1,000 yards range was considered by Germans to be a waste of ammunition. Their training seems to have been limited to independent firing by battalions on large areas of ground.
(ii) Only some of their men were practised in rapid firing, which averaged eight or nine rounds a minute, as against the fifteen well-aimed shots a minute which British troops are trained to deliver in rapid firing. In this respect it may be mentioned that the straight bolt of the German rifle is not so easy to work as the bolt of the British rifle, nor is its clip so easy to put in. When put to the test of war, the musketry of the German infantry is characterized by British officers as poor and “lamentable.”
4. British Musketry.—On the other hand, the German officer referred to in the footnote below described British musketry under the test of war as “marvellous,” and, in doing so, expressed the views generally held in the German Army as the result of experience. He states that the Germans had counted on being able to rush the British troops by weight of numbers by the plan of attack described in the next paragraph; but they found themselves unable to do so because the British rifle fire was “so straight and so quick.” He added that “they had never had a chance against the British,” because, although they reckoned on their third line with their machine-guns being able to get within 400 yards of the enemy, they had never been able to do this over open ground against the British, because their first line was down too soon—sometimes at 800 to 1,000 yards. Again, on the Aisne, this German officer’s machine-gun battery came under the concentrated fire of British infantry at 1,000 yards, and though his men suffered heavily from it, they were unable to reply to the British, as they were unable to see them.
5. A German Plan of Infantry Attack.—(i) The diagram on page ix gives a rough idea of a German plan of infantry attack in close formations, as explained by a German officer. The first line is looked on as cover from bullets for the second and third lines, to enable these two lines to get close to the enemy with the minimum of loss. The Germans considered massed formations to be the only way to get up close to the enemy. Both ranks of each line in these formations are close together. When their third line is stopped, they have standing orders to dig in at once, and for this purpose the third line carries shovels and small picks. It has already been explained that, owing to the tremendous effect of British musketry fire, this German plan of attack has repeatedly failed after very heavy loss has been incurred.
(ii) As regards fire effect, the Germans had considered the machine-gun to be the most valuable method of discharging bullets, and an enormous amount of time, trouble, and ammunition has been expended on machine-gun training, as well as upon their artillery, upon which they relied largely in their plan of attack. Notes referring to German machine-guns will be found in Machine-Gun Training of this series.
6. German Night Attacks.—(i) The enemy’s night attacks are made without scouts or advanced parties, and the advance is made with great rapidity. Infantry in trenches must always be ready to open a burst of rapid fire at a few seconds’ notice; so long as this can be done, there will be no chance of a trench being rushed. Supports should be in the cover-trenches, and, when the firing-line is attacked, should not fire, but rely on the bayonet.