(ii) Cavalry.—The fire effect which infantry can develop against cavalry is such that infantry which is ready to open a steady and timely fire has nothing to fear from a cavalry charge, provided the cavalry cannot find dead ground over which to approach. Any formation which allows fire to be delivered quickly and accurately is suitable for meeting cavalry. Closing an extended line to meet cavalry delays the opening of fire, and may offer a vulnerable target to the enemy’s artillery. Even if cavalry succeeds in riding through a firing-line, it can inflict little loss upon it if the infantry holds its ground. Whenever there is a possibility of being charged by cavalry, special care must be taken to watch and guard the flanks.
(iii) Artillery.—Artillery coming into action, limbering up, or in movement, is a vulnerable target against which rapid fire or even fire at long infantry ranges is justifiable. Infantry will experience difficulty in putting shielded artillery out of action by direct fire even at close infantry ranges, but it can prevent the artillery from moving and interfere with the service of the guns. Infantry can best obtain decisive effect against guns with shields by means of enfilade or oblique fire.
(iv) Machine-Guns.—Machine-gun sections with their guns on travelling carriages are as vulnerable as artillery limbered up; but detachments carrying the gun into action are difficult to distinguish from infantry. Machine-guns in position are usually concealed, and are a difficult target. To obtain good effect against them it is usually necessary to employ a considerable number of rifles.
(v) Aircraft.—Aircraft form a very difficult target to fire directed from the ground, and only a small proportion of their area is vulnerable. Bullets can pass through the fabric of aeroplane wings without doing serious damage. Indiscriminate fire at hostile aircraft is, moreover, likely to cause casualties in neighbouring units, and will also disclose the position of the troops to the enemy’s observer. The strictest control must be exercised over all fire directed against aircraft. In the case of rifle fire at aeroplanes, men should be instructed to aim six times the length of the machine in front, and at the nose of the envelope in the case of airships.
(vi) Retiring Troops.—Other conditions being equal, the effect of fire in the open at all ranges is always greater when directed at retiring troops as compared with the effect on troops advancing.
Section 44.—Tactical Application of Rifle Fire.
1. In connection with the tactical application of rifle fire, it must be remembered that the essence of infantry tactics in the attack consists in breaking down the enemy’s resistance by the weight and direction of its fire, and then completing his overthrow by assault—that is, by bayonet charge. Although the enemy may not await the assault, infantry must always be animated with the desire to close with him as quickly as possible. Troops under cover, unless enfiladed, can seldom be forced to retire by fire alone, and a decision by fire, even if possible, takes long to obtain. To drive an enemy from the field, assault, or the immediate threat of it, is almost always necessary.
2. Superiority of Fire.—The object of fire action is to attain superiority of fire over the enemy’s fire. Fire is said to attain superiority when by its superior effect it beats down or silences the enemy’s fire. Superiority of fire in the different stages of attack enables the advance to be pushed up by degrees to ground from which the assault can be delivered on the enemy’s position. Superiority of fire enables the defence to check the enemy’s advance, and in active defence to create opportunities for a general assumption of the offensive or for local counter-attacks. Superiority of fire is produced by superior efficiency in (a) fire direction and control, (b) fire discipline, (c) use of the rifle, and (d) ammunition supply.
3. Opening Fire.—When from his position it is possible to do so, the company commander decides as to the time for opening fire, subject to such orders as the battalion commander may issue, and regulates the supply of ammunition. In the defence he also normally arranges for the distribution or concentration of fire, and indicates the targets generally to his subordinates; but in the attack these duties will usually devolve upon the subordinate commanders with the firing-line.
4. Decision as to Opening Fire.—In forming a decision as to when fire should be opened, regard must be had to the necessities of the tactical situation. The following conditions must also be taken into account: