These are questions which Washington and the board of inquiry and all American writers have decided in the negative. Clinton, in his notes on Stedman already referred to, Cornwallis (Corresp., i. 78), Simcoe (Mil. Journal, pp. 152, 294), and other British military writers then, as well as historians like Adolphus (Hist. England, iii. ch. 39) and Mahon (both in his History, vii., and his Miscellanies), have supported the affirmative view. The most conspicuous dissent to the general English opinion at the time was Sir Samuel Romilly, in a letter to Roget, Dec. 12, 1780 (Memoirs, i. 140, quoted in P. W. Chandler, Amer. Crim. Trials). The more reasonable among the Tories, like Curwen (Journal, p. 323), defended the sentence. Later English military writers like Mackinnon (Coldstream Guards), and historians like Massey (England, iii. ch. 25) and Lecky (England, iv. 155), have held that "the justice of the sentence cannot be reasonably impugned;" and this seems to be the drift of the best current English opinion to-day (cf. Dawson's Papers, 211, etc.; Sargent, p. 413, who in chapter 22 gives the characters of the members of the board, which English writers have attacked), though there is an occasional exception. The Saturday Review, for instance, in 1872 (Amer. Bibliopolist, Oct., 1872), contended that a technical construction of the law should not have guided Washington. The last considerable discussion of the case was raised by Mahon, whose views were controverted in Chas. J. Biddle's Case of Major André (Penna. Hist. Soc. Mem., vi. 317-416, Philad., 1868; Hist. Mag., i. 193), and in Arnold's Life of Arnold. Irving (Washington, iv. 101) is the most signal instance among American writers of the power to hold the judgment apart from sympathetic emotion, when he pronounces André's exploits are "beneath the range of a truly chivalrous nature." (Cf. Bancroft, x. 393, and Mag. Amer. Hist., Dec., 1885, p. 620.) There is some evidence to show that André in the spring of 1780 had been a deliberate spy at Charleston.
If there are any aspects of the circumstances attending the discovery of the plot with which one would willingly dissociate the name of Washington, it is the countenance which he gave to the proposition to Clinton to exchange André for Arnold, and his encouragement of the attempt of Sergeant Champe, a little later, to abduct Arnold from New York. Henry Lee (Memoirs of the War in the Southern Department, ii. 159-187; R. E. Lee's ed., p. 394) gives the most detailed account of Champe's connived-at desertion, but he evidently mixes together the later with the earlier incident, and has brought the story in some minds into the category of myths. Lee's story appeared in New York in 1864 in a separate brochure as Champe's Adventures in attempting to capture Gen. Arnold (pp. 48). The House Reports, no. 486, Twenty-seventh Congress, 2d session, ii. (1842), show a petition of "Sergeant-Major Champe" for reward for services. Cf. Sparks's Washington, vii. 546; Niles's Principles, etc. (1876), p. 307; Arnold's Arnold, 336; Sargent's André, 451; Lossing's Field-Book, ii. 207.
[1014] Lincoln's order-books bear witness to the seriousness of the trouble. Even Moultrie became alarmed, and wrote to C. C. Pinckney that he was afraid lest by straining after too much liberty they might lose all.
[1015] A court-martial, presided over by Moultrie, censured Ashe for his lack of the proper precautions, while acquitting him of the charge of cowardice on the field of battle.
[1016] Curry, the deserter, was taken at Hobkirk's Hill by his former friends and hanged.
[1017] The Santee in its upper course as far as the line separating the two Carolinas is known as the Catawba; thence to its junction with the Congaree it is called the Wateree. The three names should be borne in mind.
[1018] It seems, however, tolerably certain that he had greatly overestimated the size of his army, rating it at seven thousand, while in reality the returns showed an effective force of only "three thousand and fifty-two, rank and file." When Williams explained this to Gates, the latter replied: "Sir, the number of the latter (privates) are much below the estimates formed this morning; but these are enough for our purpose." It seems never to have occurred to Gates that Cornwallis would attempt to bring him to action.
[1019] What brought these men together is not certainly known; but a determination to keep the war away from their homes seems to have been the main cause of their action. Probably the threats which Ferguson made, in the vain hope of intimidating them, may have had a good deal to do with it.
[1020] The court of inquiry into Gates's conduct was never convened; at first, because it was impossible to get it together without injury to the service, since Steuben's presence was necessary. Later, when Greene became cognizant of the whole affair, he became convinced that Gates was the victim of circumstances, and advised against holding the court.
[1021] Afterwards, when his attention was called to this hazardous position, Morgan declared that had he passed the Broad River his militia would have left him. As to the unprotected condition of his flanks, he asserted that had there been a swamp in the neighborhood the militia would have taken refuge in it. He added that he should have viewed the surrounding of his army with unconcern, as then his men would have been obliged to fight it out. In fact, like his great chief, Morgan had a very poor opinion of the militia. He placed them in the front rank with orders to fire at least two shots, and then to retire behind the regulars, who were posted on a slight eminence in their rear. A skirmish line of militia sharpshooters protected the front, while the cavalry remained in reserve. The best proof of the excellence of these dispositions is to be found in the results of the encounter.