Burgoyne's logistics, or means of supplying and moving his army, were very defective. Not till June 7, 1777, a month after his arrival in Canada, did he make provision for the transportation of either stores or artillery, and then his arrangements were so entirely inadequate that they seemed based upon the assumption that his adversary was his inferior in all military qualities. Hence, he decided "to trust to the resources of the expedition for the rest", while for his own personal baggage he used no less than "thirty carts." Most of his provisions had to be brought from England, a distance of 3,600 miles; some from Canada; and for the rest he relied upon the meagre resources of the hostile country he was to traverse. Consequently his army was often on reduced rations, sometimes nearly starving, and finally, to secure its existence, he undertook his disastrous raid upon Bennington.
After the pursuit of St. Clair, Burgoyne should have returned with his army to Ticonderoga, and taken the water route by Lake George, instead of forcing his way through an obstructed wilderness to Fort Edward, which he did not reach till July 30th, nor leave till August 14th. Had Schuyler directed Burgoyne's operations he could not have planned measures more conducive to his own advantage. On the Lake George route were only two small armed schooners to oppose any resistance, and from the head of the lake was a direct road to Albany, which had been followed by Abercrombie and Amherst. As it was, Burgoyne was compelled to send his supplies and artillery by the lake, and then carry them over the portage to Fort Edward, which consumed more time than would have been necessary to move in light marching order direct to Albany. General De Peyster, a careful student of this campaign, says: "Burgoyne could have been reassembled at 'Old Ty' by the 10th July; could have been transported to Fort George by the 12th; and, having left his heavy guns and all but his light artillery and indispensable materials there or at Ty, in depot, with a sufficient guard, could have reached Fort Edward on the evening of the 13th July. From this point to Albany is about fifty miles. With six or ten days' rations and an extra supply of ammunition sufficient for a battle of that period, Burgoyne could have swept Schuyler out of his path with ease, and, allowing one day's delay for a fight, could have occupied Albany on the 16th July." But the British commander had proclaimed, "This army must not retreat." Though he subsequently tried to palliate his mistake, all his correspondence shows that pride in carrying out his declaration, not military principles, made him persevere in the false movement which lost him the campaign, and secured in the end American independence.
Burgoyne, after his brilliant success at the opening of the campaign, suddenly relapsed into the sluggishness of his German allies. Instead of rapidly pursuing his demoralized foe, he tarried at Skenesborough till his pathway was thoroughly obstructed and the fugitives had recovered from their panic. After he had lost his prestige and the Americans had gained confidence by success at Stanwix and Bennington, he attempted with diminished forces to cope with the growing strength of his opponent. Thus, by delay, he lost in September what he might have achieved in July. From his arrival at Skenesborough till he had reached his southernmost point at Freeman's Farm, he moved only fifty miles in seventy-four days.
Slow in all his movements, Burgoyne's tardiness was increased by his large and superfluous train of artillery which accompanied all his toilsome marches. Even when he required the greatest celerity, he chose for his raid upon Bennington, not the nimble-footed light infantry under the dashing Fraser, but cumbrous dismounted German dragoons moving only a mile and a third an hour.
Burgoyne was not only slow, but he was irresolute. After his disastrous defeat at Bemis's Heights he lost five precious days in fatal indecision while retreat was possible. On October 12th his last chance had passed, he then being completely invested by the Americans, and nothing was left to him but surrender. According to Madame Riedesel, he had given in this crisis of his fate more attention to his mistress than to his army. Aspasia had triumphed over Mars.
While Burgoyne committed many blunders, his opponents had their shortcomings also. The fortifications of Ticonderoga, after falling into the hands of the Americans, were too much extended for their defence by a moderate garrison; but the most fatal error was the failure to occupy Mount Defiance, which completely commanded all the American works, and, when seized by the British, left St. Clair no alternative but hasty retreat and the abandonment of much artillery and considerable supplies. The fugitives then counted largely on the delay of their pursuers, who followed them with celerity, severely punishing them at Skenesborough and Hubbardton.
Congress committed the most criminal error, outweighing all others, in substituting, at the most critical moment of the campaign, a military charlatan for an accomplished soldier,—in supplanting Schuyler, who was the organizer of the victories, by Gates, who "had no fitness for command and wanted personal courage." To say nothing of the difference in merit of the two commanders, the time for making the change was most inopportune.
Putnam, a brave officer but no general, managed things so badly in the Highlands that Forts Montgomery and Clinton were lost, and the Hudson was opened to the enemy whenever he chose to advance.[729]