Librarian of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania.
"THESE are the times that try men's souls. The summer soldier and the sunshine patriot will in this crisis shrink from the service of his country, but he that stands it now deserves the love and thanks of man and woman."
So wrote Thomas Paine, December 19, 1776. The preceding month had been fraught with adversity. The loss of Fort Washington on the 16th of November had rendered Fort Lee useless, as with it alone the passage of the river could not be obstructed. Its evacuation was immediately ordered, and the ammunition and some of the guns were removed. Before all could be taken away, however, the fort became the object of the enemy's attention. On the night of the 19th, two columns under Cornwallis, composed of British and Germans, with a detachment from the fleet, in all about six thousand men, crossed the river and landed at Closter dock, seven miles above Fort Lee, then commanded by General Greene. The night was stormy, and the movement escaped the notice of Greene's sentries. By morning the sailors had dragged the artillery to the top of the Palisades, and everything was ready for an advance upon the fort. Greene was informed of the landing of Cornwallis, and immediately took steps to secure a retreat for his command, then numbering about three thousand men. Word was sent to Washington, who was at the village of Hackensack with the troops which he had brought with him from White Plains. In three quarters of an hour the commanding general was at Greene's side. Seeing that the fort was not tenable, he ordered a retreat. No time was to be lost; and leaving the tents standing, the kettles over the fires, and such stores as could not be removed, the troops were hurried towards the advancing enemy with such speed that they gained the road leading to the only bridge over the Hackensack before Cornwallis could intercept them.
The situation of the Americans was now more precarious than it had been at Fort Lee. They were in danger of being shut in between the Hackensack and Passaic rivers; they were in a perfectly flat country, without intrenching tools or camp equipage; their right flank could be turned and their line of retreat threatened if the British should land a force at the head of Newark Bay or at Amboy. Washington's forces were greatly reduced by reverses and by desertions. Nearly all that were left were militia of the flying camp, called out for an emergency, and impatient to return home, as their time of service had nearly expired. Small as his numbers were, Washington was obliged to post some at Amboy and others at Brunswick, to protect his flanks. As those remaining were insufficient to hinder the advance of the enemy in his front, he ordered Lee, whom he had left in command on the east of the Hudson, to cross that river and join him, and, with hardly three thousand men, Washington began his retreat through the Jerseys.
On the 21st he was at Aquacknoc Bridge on the Passaic, and by the 23d at Newark. On the 28th he left Newark, the advance-guard of the British entering the town as his rear-guard quitted it, and the next day he arrived at Brunswick. Here an attempt would have been made to prevent the enemy crossing the Raritan, but the stream was fordable in a number of places. As the British approached, the Jersey and Maryland brigades, whose terms of service expired that day, refused to stay an hour longer, and as the British crossed the river the line of march was again taken up for Trenton. This point was reached on the 2d of December, two brigades having been left at Princeton, under Stirling, to watch the enemy.
Having seen his stores and baggage safely over the Delaware, and being reinforced by about twelve hundred militia from the neighborhood of Philadelphia, Washington faced about on the 6th, with such men as were fit for service, and set out to join Stirling at Princeton.
It had not been the intention of Howe, when he ordered Cornwallis over the Hudson, to do more than take possession of and hold East Jersey, and Cornwallis's orders did not permit him to go beyond Brunswick. But the slight opposition which Washington was able to offer to the British advance excited in Howe the hopes of capturing Philadelphia, and he joined Cornwallis in person at Brunswick. After a short halt, he pushed on towards Stirling at Princeton, and before Washington could reach that general Stirling was in full retreat, to avoid being intercepted. A retrograde movement was ordered, and by the 8th the American army was on the west bank of the Delaware. The advance of Cornwallis's column reached the river before the rear-guard of the Americans had landed on the Pennsylvania side; but as Washington had secured all the boats for a considerable distance above and below Trenton, his position was comparatively a safe one. Here for a time he rested his men, and urged upon Congress the necessity of raising additional troops, and the importance of preparing for the defence of Philadelphia, as the military stores were in that city.
In his retreat through the Jerseys, Washington was greatly embarrassed by the conduct of General Charles Lee. The instructions he had given Lee on the 17th of November to join him may have been discretionary, but the language and frequency of his orders left no doubt of the expectations of the commander-in-chief. But Lee chose to read the orders in the light of his wishes. On the east of the Hudson he had an independent command, which he purposed to retain as long as he could. Schemes and suggestions that should have had no weight were allowed to delay his passage over the river until December 2d, and then his advance was slow and hesitating. The prospect of receiving reinforcements from the Northern army, which would make his command equal to that of Washington, strengthened his wish to act independently. He proposed, as soon as the troops from the north should join him, to attack the rear of the enemy. While this plan may not have been devoid of military judgment, it is doubtful if it would have had more than a temporary effect on Howe's movements, while it would have deprived Washington of the reinforcements he so greatly needed. Notwithstanding Washington's explicit directions to avoid the enemy in joining him, Lee hung so close to the enemy's flank as to leave a doubt of his real intentions, and on the morning of the 13th, just after having put on record that he believed Washington to be "damnably deficient", he was surprised and taken prisoner by Lieutenant-Colonel Harcourt, at White's tavern, near Baskingridge, three miles from his camp.
CHARLES LEE