From Du Simitière's Thirteen Portraits (London, 1783).—Ed.
By a march up the creek, Gates might have placed his superior force on Rawdon's flank and rear. This was what Rawdon feared, and what De Kalb is said to have advised. Instead he passed two days in idleness, and then, inclining to the right, marched to Clermont or Rugeley's Mill, on the road from Charlotte to Camden, and not more than thirteen miles from the latter. There, seven hundred militia from Virginia joined him. From that place, too, he sent four hundred men, including some regulars, to assist Sumter in a contemplated attack on the enemy's communications. It was now determined to seek a more defensible position on the banks of a creek seven miles nearer Camden. This position could be turned only by marching a considerable distance either up or down the creek. Exactly what Gates had in view by this movement can not now be ascertained.[1018]
Cornwallis arrived at the front on the morning of August 14th, and decided to surprise Gates; but the two armies started on respective marches at precisely the same hour, ten o'clock of the evening of August 15, 1780. Their advanced guards met at about half past two the next morning. Armand, a French adventurer, with his "legion" forming the American van, retired panic-stricken, and the two armies deployed across the road. The position in which the opposing generals now found themselves was singularly favorable to the smaller numbers of the British, as the front was necessarily very short, owing to a marsh which protected while limiting either flank. This advantage Cornwallis was not slow to perceive. A hurried council was held on the American side, and it was decided that there was no alternative but to fight. At dawn the enemy was observed getting into position on the extreme left. Stevens, with the Virginia militia, already in line, was ordered to charge before the enemy's formation was complete. It so happened that Cornwallis, thinking the Virginians were making some change in their dispositions, ordered his right forward. Led by the gallant Webster, the British came on with such a rush that the men of Virginia threw down their loaded guns with bayonets set, broke and dispersed to the rear. Nor did the North Carolinians do better. Seeing the Virginians break, they did not await the onset, but threw away their arms and fled. One regiment indeed, inspired by the example of the regulars, fired several rounds before it broke. Deserted by those whom they had marched so many weary miles to succor, the men of Maryland and Delaware fought till to fight longer was criminal. Then the under-officers, on their own responsibility, brought off all they could, for their commander, De Kalb, overwhelmed by eleven wounds, had fallen into the hands of the enemy,—"a fate", says Williams, "which probably was avoided by other generals only by an opportune retreat." That night Gates found himself at Charlotte, sixty miles from the scene of conflict. Caswell was with him, and they were soon joined by Smallwood and Gist. In fact, excepting the one order issued to the Virginians at the outset, the leaders seem to have left the conduct of the fight to De Kalb and the subordinate officers. From Charlotte Gates retired to Hillsborough, where the legislature was then sitting.
Cornwallis seems to have been satisfied with the havoc wrought on the field of battle, for he pursued without vigor, and soon returned to Camden and gave his attention to Sumter. That enterprising but negligent chieftain had captured the redoubt at the ferry over the Wateree, and had ensnared a convoy destined for Cornwallis. On the night of the 17th, hearing of Gates's overthrow, Sumter left his camp, and moved with such celerity that a corps which Cornwallis sent against him failed to strike him. Shortly after, Tarleton found him less vigilant, and came upon him so unexpectedly that resistance was hardly attempted, and Sumter escaped with scarcely half his force.
Gates has been severely blamed for this defeat; too severely, it seems to me. The march of the regulars from Buffalo Ford to Lynch's Creek was undoubtedly full of hardship, but it was well planned and executed. Nor do the troops who made it seem to have been demoralized by it. On the contrary, seldom have men fought more gallantly than De Kalb's division fought on the morning of August 16, 1780. The Virginians, whose flight made defeat probable, followed the Continentals in the march across the "desert", and did not suffer nearly as much as the leading division. The North Carolina militia, whose panic turned a probable defeat into a rout, had no part whatever in that painful march. The disaster was due to the over-confidence which Gates felt in his men. Had the militia stood firm, the event of the campaign might have been different. There was no defect in Gates as a strategist or tactician. He had a larger number of men in line than his opponent. His dispositions were as perfect as the time and place permitted. The defeat Was "brought on", to use the emphatic words of Stevens, the gallant leader of the Virginians, "by the damned cowardly behavior of the militia."
From Camden Cornwallis advanced to Charlotte, overcoming all obstacles which the militia under Davie interposed. Other militia, meanwhile, under Clarke, advanced on Augusta, but British reinforcements from Ninety-Six, under Cruger, forced Clarke to abandon the attack, and, burdened with the families of some leading Whigs, he retired towards the mountains. Cornwallis, hearing of this, ordered Ferguson, who had been beating up recruits in the upper country, to endeavor to cut Clarke off. Now it happened that at this very time the sturdy frontiersmen, under the leadership of Colonel William Campbell, Colonel Isaac Shelby, Lieutenant-Colonel John Sevier, and Colonel Charles McDowell, had assembled at Watauga, bent on the destruction of Ferguson and his little army.[1019] To the number of one thousand and forty they left their place of meeting on September 26th and marched for Gilberton, where Ferguson was supposed to be. On the 30th they were joined by Colonel Cleveland, with three hundred and fifty men from North Carolina. The senior officer was McDowell, but from his slowness he was not deemed the best man to conduct such an arduous enterprise, and while he was sent to Gates to name a leader they chose Campbell for their chief. Pressing on, they reached the Cowpens, where they were joined by Williams and Lacy, with about four hundred men from the Carolinas.
Meantime Ferguson, not ignorant of the approach of this formidable force, which appeared to have sprung from the earth, had begun his retreat towards Charlotte. Anxious to intercept Clarke, he had delayed his march longer than was prudent, and had taken post on the top of a spur of King's Mountain, where he probably hoped to be reinforced before the enemy should come up with him. While at the Cowpens, on October 6th, the Americans received certain information of Ferguson's position. They resolved to select the best mounted of their little army, and, leaving the poorly mounted and the footmen to follow, to go in pursuit of Ferguson and fight him wherever found. In the evening, therefore, they broke up from the Cowpens, and, marching all night, reached, without being discovered, the foot of King's Mountain on the afternoon of the next day. The spot on which the British were found was singularly well suited to the mode of fighting in which the backwoodsmen were adepts. King's Mountain proper is sixteen miles long, and in some places is high and steep. The southern end, however, where Ferguson was encamped, rises only about sixty feet. It was wooded, except on the summit, which partook of the nature of a plateau. The Americans, under their respective leaders, so timed their movements that Ferguson was surrounded almost before he knew it. The band led by Campbell seems to have made the first attack from the south. It was speedily driven back at the point of the bayonet, but re-formed at the foot of the hill and returned to the charge. Meantime Shelby was pressing on from the north. He, too, was driven back, when, re-forming his men, he also returned to the fight. These charges and countercharges were three times repeated. Cleveland, Sevier, and the rest did their work splendidly in their respective positions. The British, inspired by the example of their heroic leader, fought bravely and well; but their position was so perilous that their loss was double that of the assailants. Ferguson, while leading a charge, or perhaps while endeavoring to cut his way out, was killed. De Peyster, the second in command, showed the white flag, as was his duty, resistance being useless, but the firing did not cease for some time, even though the beaten Tories were suing for quarter. At that moment an attack was made from the rear by another band of British, who were probably returning from a foraging expedition. This new and sudden attack led to a renewal of the slaughter of the unresisting foe on the hill.
The neighborhood was bare of provisions, and the next morning the now half famished victors, with their no less hungry prisoners, made a hurried retreat towards the mountains. On the 13th the Americans arrived at a place then called Bickerstaff's Old Fields, about nine miles from the present hamlet of Rutherfordton. There they improvised a court, and sentenced thirty to forty of their prisoners to death. But after nine had been hanged, the remainder were reprieved or pardoned.