Greene's hopes were soon dashed. The shattered lines of the enemy re-formed and returned to the conflict. Pressing heavily on the Virginia regulars, and reinforced by the 1st battalion of the Guards, which had disengaged itself from Lee, the whole American line was endangered. Greene, who wished to run no chances, and who probably did not know that Lee had once more connected himself with the main line, ordered a retreat. The artillery, the horses having been killed, was left on the ground, but otherwise the withdrawal was easily and skilfully effected.
Such was the battle of Guilford. Numerically, Greene was superior; but of good troops he had only a handful. When the two leaders summed up their losses, it became evident that a decisive blow had been struck at Cornwallis. The Americans lost seventy-nine killed and one hundred and eighty-four wounded, together with one thousand and forty-six missing. Of these last some may have been wounded, but by far the greater part were militiamen, who had returned to their homes. Cornwallis reported his own loss at ninety-three killed, and four hundred and thirteen wounded, and twenty-six missing—a most serious diminution of his force.
Cornwallis in his proclamation and letters maintained, however, that he had achieved a great triumph. It was his despatch to Germain which occasioned the well-known assertion of Charles James Fox that "another such victory would destroy the British army." Even before the fight it had been almost a necessity to open communications with the sea, as the army was suffering for want of the stores that had been destroyed at Ramsour's Mill. Believing the Cape Fear River navigable as far as Cross Creek, Cornwallis had sent Major Craig to seize Wilmington and to open navigation as far as possible, which he succeeded in doing to a point at a short distance above Wilmington. Leaving his wounded at the New Garden Quaker Meeting-house, near the battlefield, Cornwallis set out on the morning of the 18th for Wilmington, arriving there on April 7, 1781. Greene had pursued as soon as possible. But his ammunition, never very abundant, was now almost exhausted. Besides, food was very scarce in the district to be traversed, and Greene arrived at Ramsey's Mill only to find that Cornwallis had built a bridge over Deep River at that point and escaped, although Lee had pressed so hard on his rear that the bridge could not be destroyed. Here the pursuit ended; for the Virginia militia, now that their time was up, refused to serve longer. Though Cornwallis escaped, and though Greene had lost one of the best contested battles of the war, he had won the campaign. He was free once more to turn his attention toward relieving South Carolina of her military rulers. On April 6th, one day before Cornwallis arrived at Wilmington, the southward march began, Lee being detached to operate on the line of Rawdon's communications with Charleston.
Lee soon joined Marion, who was skulking in swamps between the Pedee and Santee, and, uniting forces, the two captured a fortified depot of Watson, the British officer scouring this region, and then endeavored to prevent his rejoining Rawdon.
On the 7th of April Greene had broken up from Ramsey's, and, taking the direct road, had encamped on Hobkirk's Hill, to the north of Camden, and about a mile and a half from the British works at that place. As Rawdon did not come out from his intrenchments, Greene on the 23d moved nearer. Anxious for Marion and Lee, and desirous of supporting some artillery which he detached to them, Greene moved to a position south of Camden. It appears, however, that on the 23d or 24th he decided to fall back. Accordingly, on the afternoon of the 24th he reëncamped on Hobkirk's Hill. During that night a renegade drummer-boy informed Rawdon of the position and number of the American force. He also said that Greene had neither artillery nor trains near at hand, although both were on the march to join him. It was a most propitious time to strike, and Rawdon determined to attempt a surprise the next morning.
Making a considerable detour to the right, he struck the American left almost unperceived. Greene had thrown out a strong picket in that direction, but the superiority of the British was so great that they drove in the guards and were upon the Americans before the formation was complete. That the attack was not a disaster was due to the prudence of Greene, who had encamped in order of battle. Perceiving that Rawdon's line was very short, Greene ordered Ford with the 2d Maryland to flank it on the right, and Campbell was told to do the same on the left. Gunby with the 1st Maryland, and Hawes with the Virginia regulars, were ordered to attack with the bayonet in front, while Washington with the cavalry was to get into the rear and take advantage of any opening that might offer. Unfortunately, neither Ford nor Campbell were able to put in their men before Rawdon, seeing his danger, brought up his reserves and extended his flank. This was owing partly to Ford being struck down in the beginning of the movement.
The defeat of Greene, however, was due to one of those accidents against which no foresight can provide. It seems that as the 1st Maryland was getting into position to charge, or perhaps as it was moving forward, Beattie, the captain of one of the leading companies, was shot. His men began firing, and fell into confusion. Then Gunby, instead of pushing his rear companies forward, as Greene always declared he should have done, ordered the regiment to form on the rear companies. The men retiring were seized with a panic, and the heroes of three battles broke. They were rallied soon after, but it was then too late. The whole line was compromised, and Greene ordered a retreat.
Though Greene was not surprised, the attack was most unexpected. This was owing in a great measure to the woods in his front, which permitted Rawdon to reach the picket line without discovery. Even then Greene fully expected victory, and had his men done their duty, as he had a perfect right to expect, this adventurous attempt of the young British commander would have resulted in his complete overthrow. Such was Greene's opinion, and such is the opinion of most American writers.[1024] Retiring first to Sanders Creek or Gum Swamp, the very spot Gates was trying to reach when he met Cornwallis, and later to Rugeley's Mill, Greene brought up his provisions and recruited the strength of his men. Though not beaten at Hobkirk's Hill, Greene was greatly discouraged. Especially distressing was the non-arrival of expected reinforcements. The terms of service of his best men were expiring, and he could see no source from which to draw recruits. His losses in the recent engagement had not been so great as those of his opponent; but Marion and Lee had been unable to prevent Watson from rejoining his chief. Still Greene did not lose heart. As soon as his men had recovered from fatigue he crossed the Wateree and posted himself at Twenty-five-Mile Creek, on the road from Camden to Fishing Creek and the Catawba settlements.
Watson reached Camden on May 7th. On the evening of the same day Rawdon moved out from his fortifications, and, crossing the Wateree, turned on Greene, intending to pass his flank and attack him from the rear. But Greene was too vigilant, for, learning of Rawdon's departure from Camden, he retired still higher up the river, first to Sandy's Creek and later to Colonel's Creek, the latter being nine miles from his former position. The position on the further bank of Colonel's Creek was very favorable to the party attacked. The light troops had been left in the front, as at Hobkirk's Hill. Coming upon them at Sandy's Creek, Rawdon mistook them for the main body, and their position seemed so strong that he did not feel willing to risk an attack. It was impossible for him to remain longer in Camden with Greene in such threatening attitude, especially as his line of communication with Charleston was in the hands of Lee and Marion. On the 10th, leaving his wounded who were unable to be moved at Camden, Rawdon evacuated that place, and marching to the east of the Santee, he crossed at Nelson's Ferry and took post at Monk's Corner, not more than thirty miles from Charleston.
