Note on Portrait of Kosciuszko.—After an engraving by Anton Oleszeynski. Cf. Dr. Theodor Flathe's Geschichte der neuesten Zeit (Berlin, 1887), i. p. 205. Cf. A. W. W. Evans's Memoir of Kosciusko, privately printed for the Cincinnati Society, 1883. There was a model made in wax from life by C. Andras, from which an engraving was made by W. Sharp (W. S. Baker's William Sharp, Engraver, Philad., 1875, p. 66).
There are some notes on Kosciusko by Gen. Armstrong in the Sparks MSS. Cf. Greene's Hist. View, 297, and B. P. Poore's Index, for his claims on the United States (p. 131).—Ed.
Lee with the "Legion" had arrived from Augusta on the 3d, and had conducted operations against the stockade covering the watering-place with such vigor that it had been evacuated on the 17th. Four days more would have placed the garrison in the power of the besiegers. But it was not so to be. Rawdon, in Charleston, had received considerable reinforcements direct from Ireland, and early in June he pushed forward through the heat, and eluded Sumter.[1027] With Rawdon within a day's march, Greene must either take the fort by storm or abandon the siege. He decided on an assault,—probably more to satisfy the desires of his men than because he thought it was the best thing to be done. On the 18th, at noon, the attack was made in two columns, Greene not being willing to hazard his whole force in a general storm. On the extreme right, Lee, with "Legion" infantry and the remains of the gallant Delaware regiment, directed his efforts against the stockaded fort, which had already been abandoned, according to the British account of the siege. At all events, Lee had no trouble in carrying out his part of the work. But on the other flank the assault was not so successful. Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell, with his Virginia regiment and with the 1st Maryland, formed the storming column. They advanced with great gallantry, but, though they gained the ditch, they could not effect a lodgment on the parapet. They were driven back with considerable loss by two parties of the besieged, which attacked them in the ditch on both flanks in such a way that the artillery and riflemen in the tower could not fire without injuring friend and foe alike. Greene called off his men, and Rawdon being within a few miles, he retired on the next morning to a safe place of retreat. In the end he retreated as far as Timm's Ordinary, between the Broad and Catawba rivers. Rawdon, his men worn down with their long march, could not overtake him, and finally halting on the banks of the Enroree, he turned back to Ninety-Six. That place being untenable with the means at his disposal, he divided his men into two parties. With one he regained the low country, resigning the command to Stuart on account of ill-health.[1028] Gathering the Tories of the neighborhood, Cruger escorted them to Charleston, while Greene led his army to the High Hills of the Santee, where he passed the heats of the summer.
At length, toward the end of August, Greene learned that Stuart was proposing to establish a fortified post at a strong and healthful position called Eutaw Springs. Greene determined to prevent this, and descending from his camp he made a wide detour to get across the river which separated the two armies; for although he was distant from Stuart only sixteen miles as a bird flies, the most practicable route was nearly seventy miles long. He crossed the Wateree at Camden, and, marching parallel to the river, crossed its affluent, the Congaree, at Howell's Ferry on the 28th and 29th. Proceeding by slow and easy marches, he reached Burden's plantation on the 7th of September. At that place Marion joined him, and preparations were made for an advance on the enemy the next day. Stuart at Eutaw seems to have been singularly negligent. He sent out but one patrol, which was captured by Lee. He would have been surprised had not two men deserted from the North Carolina regiment and given him warning. As it was, he had barely time to call in his foraging parties before Greene was upon him.
Stuart had with him about 2,300 men of all arms, Greene rather less. The British commander ranged his men in one line, the right being protected by Eutaw Creek, while the left was in the air, as the military term is. Greene advanced in two lines, the militia, under Marion, Pickens, and Malmady, being in the front. The right of the second line was held by Sumner with the North Carolina regulars. In the centre were the Virginia Continentals under Campbell, while on the left J. E. Howard and Hardman led the two Maryland regiments. To Lee, who had the advance during the march, was assigned the protection of the right flank, Henderson with a South Carolina brigade covering the left. The cavalry under Washington and the brave remnant of the Delaware regiment brought up the rear, and acted as a reserve.
Here at last there was no wavering among the militia, excepting those from North Carolina, who nevertheless fired several rounds before breaking. Under Marion and Pickens the rest fought splendidly. It is said that some of them fired no less than seventeen rounds before giving way; then Sumner advanced with the North Carolina regulars. At length they, too, were forced back; but the British following them with too great impetuosity, their own line became deranged. This was the opportunity for the men of Maryland and Virginia to retrieve the reputation lost at Guilford and Hobkirk's Hill, and splendidly they responded to the call. Rushing forward,—the Virginians alone disobeying orders so far as to fire,—the whole burst upon the enemy in front and swept him from the field. Unfortunately, their course led through the British camp, and they dispersed to plunder the abandoned tents. Now it happened that when the British fell back a party threw themselves into a strong brick house and an adjoining picketed garden; thence they delivered a withering fire upon the victors of a moment before. And more unfortunate still, when the "Legion" was ordered to charge the retiring foe, Lee could not be found, and the charge, being made without vigor, was a failure. On the right, too, the British had not retreated: they still occupied a flanking position, from which they could not be dislodged, even though Washington and all but two of his officers were killed or wounded in the attempt. All these things, coupled with the heat, compelled Greene to sound the retreat. Leaving such of the wounded as were within range of the brick house on the field, he retired to his camp at Burdell's, seven miles distant, that being the nearest point where a supply of good water could be obtained. Both commanders claimed the victory. It would be not unfair, perhaps, to call it a drawn battle. Neither party can be said to have retained possession of the field, as Stuart retreated with great precipitation from the vicinity on the night of the next day. Greene acknowledged a loss in Continentals alone of 408 in killed and wounded. The loss in militia has never been stated. It must have been considerable, as a portion of the militia fought with great obstinacy. According to the American accounts, the enemy lost in prisoners 500 men, including 70 wounded. But Stuart reported only 257 missing; his killed and wounded he gives at 433.
As soon as Greene ascertained the retreat of the enemy he followed with all speed; but Marion and Lee were too weak to prevent Stuart's receiving a reinforcement. Stuart finally halted at Monk's Corner, while Greene passed the Santee at Nelson's Ferry and retired to the High Hills.
Cornwallis at Wilmington had a difficult problem to solve. Should he go south to the relief of Rawdon, or north to the conquest of Virginia? Another campaign in North Carolina was plainly out of the question. The distances were so great and the country was so sparsely settled that it was a matter of great difficulty to move any considerable force there, even when unopposed. The recent campaign had fully demonstrated that a bold and enterprising leader with a handful of trained troops could seriously impair the usefulness of a royal army, even though he could not destroy it. The best base of operations for another campaign in South Carolina was Charleston, and the best way to get there was by water; but any such movement looked too much like a retreat to be seriously considered. Besides, Cornwallis did not believe that he could get to Camden in time to relieve Rawdon, as the place was not provisioned for a siege. On the other hand, a movement into Virginia offered many advantages. There the army would always be within easy march of the sea, and reinforcements could be brought from New York or sent thither with great ease. Then, too, it seemed to Cornwallis—and his supposition was probably correct—that with Virginia, the great storehouse of the Southern armies, once in his hands, the complete conquest of the Carolinas would be easy and certain. So impressed was he with this idea that he endeavored to induce Clinton to shift the headquarters of the army from the Hudson to the Chesapeake; but Clinton had other views, and New York remained the base of operations. Clinton even went further, and avowed his dislike of the whole plan of operations; but Cornwallis had the approval of Germain, and the northern movement was undertaken.
Clinton, however, had always looked with favor on desultory expeditions to Virginia, as they drew the attention of that State to her own defence, and therefore away from the defence of the Carolinas. As early as the spring of 1779, he had sent Matthews and Collier to the Chesapeake, with instructions to do as much damage to the Americans as possible; but beyond plundering Portsmouth and burning Suffolk they accomplished little, and returned to New York. The next year Leslie was detached in the same direction to effect a diversion in favor of Cornwallis's invasion of North Carolina. King's Mountain not only put an end to that invasion, but compelled Cornwallis to call Leslie to his aid. Leaving Portsmouth, which he had fortified, Leslie sailed for Charleston, and reached the front in season to take part in the campaign against Greene. On Leslie's withdrawal Clinton sent another expedition to Virginia to destroy military stores which had been collected for the supply of Greene. The command this time was given to Arnold, though, to guard against a new treason, dormant commissions were given to his chief officers, Lieutenant-Colonels Dundas and Simcoe. Arnold penetrated to Richmond without encountering much opposition. He destroyed nearly everything of value at that place, and then endeavored to seize some arms which had at one time been deposited at Westham. Failing in this, he descended the river to Portsmouth. The militia had now collected in considerable numbers. For this or for some other reason, Arnold kept within the fortifications of that place.